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vForeword
Preparing for the inevitable impacts of global warming and avoiding even more dangerous levels of greenhouse 
gas emissions will require an unprecedented mobilization of financial resources. Much of this investment will need 
to take place in the developing world, to meet growing energy demands with low carbon alternatives, and to enable 
poorer countries to build resilience to the effects of rising temperatures. 
In Copenhagen, in 2009, as part of an effort to reach a new global deal to combat climate change, wealthier 
countries agreed to ramp up their support dramatically for poorer countries and pledged to mobilize as much as USD 
100 billion a year in public and private climate finance by 2020. 
The programming of these resources will need to be entrusted to one or more financial mechanisms. While a 
number of institutions including the World Bank, through its Climate Investment Funds, the Global Environment 
Facility, and the Kyoto Protocol, through its Adaptation Fund, are already playing a role in climate finance, none 
has yet won the confidence of both contributor and recipient countries. Governments are therefore in the process of 
designing something new. 
What kind of institution can attract and program finance at the scale necessary to drive profound transformations 
in developing countries while at the same time securing the ownership and support of their governments, the private 
sector and civil society? Power, Responsibility, and Accountability seeks answers in the successes, failures, and ongoing 
experiments revealed through case studies of 10 international and national institutions already channeling finance to 
projects to address climate change. 
The authors conclude that the success of future climate finance will depend on finding a new balance of power, 
responsibility, and accountability in the relationship between contributor and recipient countries and the financial 
institutions they create and operate. In particular, as developing countries gain more formal and informal power in 
the governance structures of these institutions, they must also embrace a greater responsibility for investing in long 
term emission reductions. Investments must be driven by high social and environmental standards shaped and owned 
by a partnership between developed and developing countries. Accountability mechanisms must be put in place 
that enable the communities affected by climate investments to set priorities and benefit from the outcomes of these 
investments. Climate finance managed by international institutions must be invested in the capacity of national 
institutions to design and implement ambitious but home grown climate policies.
This is a formidable challenge, and reaching consensus on the design and operation of climate finance will strain 
the capacity of institutions from the global to the local level. A great deal depends on ensuring that these institutions 
are robust enough to withstand that pressure and that the process and outcomes are widely perceived as legitimate. 
The stakes are high, with global efforts to reduce emissions dependent in large part on effective delivery of climate 
finance. 
JonatHan lasH 
President, World Resources Institute
Professor emil salim 
Chairman, Council of Advisors, President of Indonesia 
and former Minister of Environment and Population 
Government of Indonesia
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The 2009 Copenhagen Climate Summit left 
unresolved major questions about how to fund low-
carbon development in developing countries.1 In a 
high-level political declaration—the “Copenhagen 
Accord”—developed countries agreed to “provide 
new and additional resources . . . approaching USD 
30 billion for the period 2010–2012” and to a goal 
of jointly mobilizing USD 100 billion a year by 2020 
from both public and private sources, to address the 
needs of developing countries.2 As the negotiations on 
a global climate deal continue, disagreement remains 
on how much of these funds will come from public or 
private sources and whether these billions should be 
delivered through new or existing institutions. There 
is also heated debate over whether a single centralized 
institution or a decentralized approach that coordinates 
international, regional, and national institutions would 
be more effective. 
Although there are many variations in government 
positions, broadly speaking, developed countries favor 
a substantial role for existing institutions, such as the 
multilateral development banks (MDBs) that they 
have funded and led for the past 60 years. Developing 
countries prefer new institutions, arguing that existing 
ones favor the interests of contributor countries and 
have failed to deliver on promises to support poverty 
alleviation and sustainable development. The ongoing 
negotiations on a global climate deal reflect this “north-
south” gulf. Despite these differences, one thing is 
clear: if the institutional arrangements entrusted with 
managing new flows of climate finance are to succeed 
in raising the required resources and in investing these 
resources effectively, they will need to be perceived as 
legitimate by both contributors and recipients.
institutional Arrangements for climate Finance: 
Power, Responsibility, and Accountability 
The full report seeks to ground the debate on the future 
of climate finance in an objective analysis of existing 
efforts to finance climate mitigation and adaptation in 
developing countries. The authors step back from the 
question of which institutions should be entrusted with 
new flows of climate finance to examine instead how 
governments can design a climate financial mechanism in a 
way that is widely perceived as legitimate. We identify three 
crucial dimensions of legitimacy: power, responsibility, 
and accountability (see Box A). While these three 
dimensions interrelate and overlap, we have found them 
to provide a useful analytical framework to analyze and 
guide choices in institutional design. 
Box A  dimensions oF PoWeR, ResPonsiBility, And AccountABility in the design oF A climAte FinAnciAl mechAnism
PoWeR:  
the capacity—both formal and informal—to determine outcomes
•	 How will the financial mechanism’s governance structure distribute voice and vote between and among contributors and recipients? 
•	 What role will the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s (UNFCCC) institutions, including the Conference of the Parties, play in guiding the 
financial mechanism?
•	 To what extent will contributors be able to determine funding priorities by placing conditions on the resource mobilization and allocation process?
•	 How influential will the secretariat and management staff of the financial mechanism be in determining project design and selection? 
•	 Will advisory groups, civil society observers, and local communities play a role in determining how the financial mechanism operates? 
ResPonsiBility:  
the exercise of power for its intended purpose
• Are the financial mechanism’s standards, program priorities, and eligibility criteria strong enough to ensure its resources are invested fairly and effectively?
• How do cost-sharing formulas (e.g., incremental, marginal, transformative costs) allocate responsibilities between contributor and recipient countries, and 
between the financial mechanisms and recipient countries? 
• To what extent are national institutions and local civil society entrusted with ensuring the effective design and implementation of investments? 
AccountABility: 
the standards and systems that ensure power is exercised responsibly
•	 How does the financial mechanism measure, evaluate, and incentivize results?
•	 Are effective environmental and social safeguards in place to ensure the investments do no harm?
•	 How are fiduciary duties and financial management standards supported and enforced?
•	 Are grievance and inspection mechanisms in place to ensure that standards are followed? 
E x E C U T I v E  S U m m A R y ix
We review the governance structures, operational 
procedures, and records to date of 10 international 
and national financial mechanisms, with reference to 
these core dimensions of legitimacy, to draw lessons 
for future institutional arrangements (see Box B). We 
place special emphasis on the experiences with the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF), which, in operation 
since 1994, is the longest serving operating entity of 
the United Nations Framework Covention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) financial mechanism. In addition 
to the GEF, we review experiences from the Multilateral 
Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, 
in operation since 1990, which is often referred to as a 
model for future funds. The remaining funds reviewed 
are much newer and yield more insights with regard to 
design, rather than operation.
We recognize that perceptions of the legitimacy of 
a financial mechanism are inherently subjective and 
that this subjectivity is revealed in the very different 
preferences expressed by contributor and recipient 
countries. We believe, however, that if governments 
were to discuss the dimensions of legitimacy more 
explicitly, the stakes and the trade-offs would become 
more apparent, and a more shared understanding 
on how to design a legitimate financial mechanism 
would emerge. We believe that the failure, thus far, to 
address the distribution of power, responsibility, and 
accountability more explicitly has led to a proliferation 
of financial mechanisms that are underfunded, which in 
turn leads to calls to create new mechanisms. 
We recognize that perceptions of a financial 
mechanism’s legitimacy will also depend upon an 
institution’s performance—its demonstrated capacity to 
commit funding to investments that reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions and build resilience to climate change. 
Most of the climate financial mechanisms studied have 
not been operating at a scale or for a time period that 
would allow a full assessment of their performance. We 
nonetheless seek to make recommendations that could 
improve the design and the performance of new and 
existing climate financial mechanisms.
We conclude that a new global deal on climate finance 
is likely to significantly redistribute power, responsibility, 
and accountability between traditional contributor 
and recipient countries. Most significantly, the power 
of emerging economies to control climate finance 
mechanisms will grow, as will their responsibility and 
accountability for the performance of these institutions. 
In light of the dramatic changes in global politics and the 
global economy in past decades, this redistribution seems 
both long overdue and necessary to provide the basis for a 
successful global partnership on climate finance. 
Box B  FinAnciAl institutions RevieWed
GLOBAL ENvIRONmENT FACILITy: The interim financial mechanism of the UNFCCC (since 1994)
mONTREAL PROTOCOL FUND: The multilateral fund to phase out ozone depleting substances (since 1990)
ADAPTATION FUND: Created under the Kyoto Protocol, financed by a two percent levy on Clean Development Mechanism transactions and voluntary donor 
contributions (since 2008)
FOREST CARBON PARTNERSHIP FACILITy: World Bank carbon financing pilot for forest emissions (since 2007) 
CLImATE INvESTmENT FUNDS: World Bank and MDB pilot funds (since 2008) a
• CLEAN TECHNOLOGy FUND: Financing for clean technology deployment that significantly reduces greenhouse gases 
• PILOT PROGRAm ON CLImATE RESILIENCE: Funding for adaptation to climate change 
• FOREST INvESTmENT PROGRAm: Financing to address the role of forests in climate change
BRAZIL AmAZON FUND: Brazilian National Development Bank fund to reduce deforestation (since 2008)
BANGLADESH CLImATE CHANGE RESILIENCE FUND: National climate change fund, administered by the World Bank (since 2008) b
INDONESIA CLImATE CHANGE TRUST FUND: Planning Ministry (BAPPENAS) fund, administered by the U.N. Development Programme (since 2009)
notes
a.  The Climate Investment Funds also include Scaling-Up Renewable Energy Program in Low Income Countries (SREP), which will fund scaled-up development of 
renewable energy in low-income countries. The SREP was not reviewed for this Report.
b.  The Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund was previously called the Bangladesh multi-Donor Trust Fund
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conclusions and Recommendations
This is a dynamic time for climate finance, as the 
international community struggles to craft mechanisms 
that are perceived to be legitimate by all UNFCCC 
Parties and that are capable of funding climate-related 
activities efficiently and at scale. Our analysis of 
established and new climate financial mechanisms and 
the current UNFCCC negotiations leads us to conclude 
the following:
n Change is coming. A new global deal on climate 
finance will likely reinterpret the principles that in 
the past have guided the design of climate finance 
mechanisms in a way that significantly redistributes 
power, responsibility, and accountability between 
traditional contributor and recipient countries. 
n A new balance of power, responsibility, and 
accountability could enhance recipient country 
ownership. Greater representation of developing 
countries on the governing bodies of international 
financial institutions more generally, and climate 
finance mechanisms more specifically, should help 
ensure greater emphasis on the national and local 
“ownership”—and thus the effectiveness—of climate 
finance investments. 
n A new understanding of how to balance national 
interests with global responsibility and accountability is 
required. This will require assurance that nationally 
driven investments contribute to global benefits 
in the form of net emission reductions and that 
investments protect the most vulnerable countries 
and communities.
n New financial mechanisms—at both the global and the 
national level—are necessary. If the international 
community raises the scale of public finance 
necessary to move developing countries onto a 
low-carbon, climate-resilient pathway, the capacity 
and the creativity to spend these resources well will 
necessitate the creation of one or more new financial 
mechanisms at the global level and multiple national-
level institutions. 
n Existing institutions must also be reformed. The scale 
of the climate change challenge and of the scale of 
the funding necessary to respond to that challenge 
will also necessitate the reform of existing financial 
institutions, many of which have been supporting 
fossil fuel–led growth and have yet to mainstream 
concerns about the impacts of climate change into 
their strategies.
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n Current negotiating positions reflect deep historical and 
ideological divisions—particularly between developed 
and developing countries—that will need to be overcome 
by building trust and experimenting with new kinds of 
relationships.3 Developed countries have been keen 
to build on existing financial institutions they have 
shaped and traditionally controlled. Developing 
countries are wary of these same institutions, which 
they see as historically having advanced contributor 
interests and theories of development, through both 
the formal and informal exercise of donor power. 
n At the international level, the choice between reforming 
traditional development agencies, such as the GEF, 
U.N. Development Programme (UNDP), the U.N. 
Environment Programme (UNEP), and MDBs, and 
creating new financial mechanisms will raise issues of 
institutional economy and effectiveness. In order to 
generate a greater sense of trust and ownership, 
backers of existing agencies may have to accept a 
degree of duplication of existing capacity through 
the creation of new mechanisms—particularly where 
significant gaps in capacity are identified—and to 
accept strengthened lines of accountability of climate 
finance mechanisms to the UNFCCC Conference 
of the Parties (COP). On the other hand, those 
calling for the creation of new institutions may need 
to concede that it may waste precious resources to 
replicate the staff and services provided by existing 
agencies. 
n Balancing the roles of international and national 
institutions will also involve trade-offs. Traditional 
development agencies have gained the trust of 
contributors by putting in place systems to both 
measure and manage impacts of their investments. 
Developing country recipients, however, have 
been frustrated by the bureaucracy and the 
focus on generic rather than country-specific 
concerns that these systems can generate. Many 
developing countries will likely struggle to convince 
contributors that their national institutions have the 
capacity to manage large-scale development finance 
without the support of development agencies. 
Notably, a number of developing countries are 
taking steps to build and strengthen this capacity 
and will need support to do so. 
n Delivering climate finance at scale, at least in the short 
term, will likely involve multiple mechanisms, both new 
and reformed. This is true because of the complex 
politics of the international negotiations and the 
differing views of legitimacy held by contributors and 
donors. The urgency and complexity of delivering 
funds at scale argues for moving forward, at least in 
the near term, with the institutions that we have, 
and investing in the strength and quality of COP 
guidance and national planning processes to ensure 
coordination and coherence. This experience should 
then guide the design and operation of the new 
institutions that will become necessary as the scale of 
resources grows.
n Low-carbon, climate-resilient development is an 
unexplored frontier for all countries and has potential 
risks as well as benefits. While high standards will 
have to be developed and maintained to ensure 
emissions fall and the vulnerable are protected, 
climate finance will necessarily entail experiments 
with new policies and technologies that will need to 
be watched closely for unintended environmental 
and social impacts.
n Policymakers must agree on ways to diversify the 
sources of climate finance and to de-link them from 
the levers of informal power. If existing institutions 
are to meet evolving standards of legitimacy, then 
their fundamental governance structures, as well 
as their operational procedures, will need to be 
reformed to give greater voice to developing country 
recipients. If formal grants of power are to lead to the 
effective exercise of that power, the international 
community must also make greater efforts to identify 
sources of revenue, such as new levies or long-
term commitments, that are independent from the 
discretion of contributor governments. 
n It is necessary to build the capacity of non-state actors 
and civil society to monitor climate finance governance. 
Civil society groups at all levels can and are playing 
an important role in monitoring and influencing 
decision-making within climate finance funds. But 
they need to occupy such spaces more effectively than 
they have to date by monitoring and engaging in more 
inclusive decision-making processes with technical 
rigor and authority. However, “representation” of non-
state actors can be a very difficult issue—civil society 
is diverse with widely differing views.
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n Near- and medium-term climate finance should focus on 
strengthening national institutions. A next generation of 
climate investments should promote the responsibility 
of recipient countries by strengthening the national 
institutions that will implement mitigation 
and adaptation activities and by ensuring their 
transparency and accountability to citizens within 
countries, as well as to the international community. 
While it is important that development agencies 
provide technical support to national institutions, 
they should work in closer partnership with national 
stakeholders. It will be particularly important to 
engage with stakeholders outside of government, 
including the private sector, independent research 
institutions, and civil society. Such collaborations 
can help ensure climate finance proposals more 
appropriately reflect national circumstances and 
priorities.
n It is important to draw from the lessons learned from 
decades of development finance to build national 
institutions that reflect universally accepted principles of 
good governance. Traditional finance and development 
institutions have decades of experience—both good 
and bad—in translating internationally agreed upon 
agendas into national and local investments. National 
institutions should draw from these experiences and 
be designed and supported to operate in accordance 
with universal principles of good governance. 
Strong provisions for accountability should be put in 
place, including sound fiduciary management, anti-
corruption measures, and grievance mechanisms and 
inspection procedures that ensure compliance with 
environmental and social standards and safeguards.
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Reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions on a scale 
necessary to avert the worst impacts of climate change, 
while at the same time building resilience to these 
impacts, will require an unprecedented mobilization 
of financial resources.1 A significant amount of these 
resources will need to be raised from public sources in 
developed countries, invested in developing countries, 
and be managed by one or more international 
institutions entrusted with a set of specific functions 
(see Table 1). The question of which international 
institutions—new, existing, or reformed—should 
carry out these functions has become central to the 
negotiations to reach a “global deal” on climate change. 
Negotiations are taking place in the context of the Bali 
Action Plan, a decision of the COP to the UNFCCC, 
and in the context of the Copenhagen Accord, a high-
level political statement that has been supported by 
138 Parties to the UNFCCC.2 The Bali Action Plan 
emphasizes the need for “[i]mproved access to adequate, 
predictable and sustainable financial resources” but 
provides little guidance on institutional design. The 
Copenhagen Accord anticipates the establishment 
of mechanisms to finance reduced emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+), “effective 
and efficient fund arrangements” for adaptation, and a 
“Copenhagen Green Climate Fund”3 (see Box 1). The 
negotiating texts under consideration reveal that Parties 
are currently weighing a range of institutional options, 
from a centralized financial mechanism operating under 
the auspices of the COP, to a more decentralized system 
that outsources functions to a variety of international, 
regional, and national institutions.
This Report argues that if the institutions entrusted 
with managing new flows of climate finance are to 
succeed in raising these resources and in investing these 
resources effectively, they will need to be perceived 
as legitimate by both contributors and recipients. An 
institution is perceived to be legitimate when the 
decisions it makes are considered appropriate and 
acceptable to those who must abide by them. In general, 
the legitimacy of an institution should be assessed on 
the basis of the procedures by which it takes its decisions 
and the effectiveness of its investments.4 An institution 
is more likely to be perceived as legitimate when it 
operates in a transparent, participatory, and accountable 
manner, and when it sets and abides by clearly 
articulated rules. Perceptions of a financial mechanism’s 
legitimacy will also be based on its governance structure, 
Box 1   stAte  oF  PlAy:  the  BAli  Action PlAn And the  “coPenhAgen AccoRd”:  nAtionAlly  APPRoPRiAte 
mit igAtion Actions,  “mRv”,  And climAte  F inAnce
International	negotiations	on	climate	finance	post-2012	are	being	
carried	out	under	the	Bali	Action	Plan	(BAP),	a	set	of	negotiating	
guidelines	adopted	by	the	13th	Conference	of	the	Parties	(COP-13)	of	
the	UNFCCC.	At	its	15th	meeting	in	Copenhagen,	Denmark,	COP-15	
did	not,	as	had	been	planned,	reach	an	agreed	outcome	for	the	BAP,	
so	these	negotiations	continue.	One	hundred	and	thirty-eight	UNFCCC	
Parties	have	expressed	support	for	the	“Copenhagen	Accord”—a	
12-paragraph,	high-level	political	declaration	that	helps	to	clarify	
these	Parties’	expectations	for	a	global	deal	on	climate.	Because	the	
Accord	has	no	official	status	under	the	UNFCCC,	the	extent	to	which	
it	will	guide	the	conclusion	of	the	BAP	process	is	unclear.
The	Bali	Action	Plan	calls	for	improved	access	to	adequate,	
predictable,	and	sustainable	financial	resources	and	technical	
support	and	for	the	provision	of	new	and	additional	resources,	
including	official	and	concessional	funding	for	developing	country	
Parties.	The	Copenhagen	Accord	reiterates	these	principles	and	
commits	developed	countries	to	provide	USD	30	billion	for	the	period	
2010–2012	and	to	a	goal	of	jointly	mobilizing	USD	100	billion	a	year	
by	2020	from	a	wide	variety	of	public	and	private	sources.
Under	the	BAP,	the	funding	is	to	be	provided	in	a	measurable,	
reportable,	and	verifiable	(MRV)	manner.	The	Copenhagen	Accord	
adds	that	the	accounting	of	the	finance	should	be	“rigorous,	robust	
and	transparent.”	Under	the	BAP,	the	funding	is	to	support	and	
enable	the	enhanced	implementation	by	developing	countries	of	
nationally	appropriate	mitigation	actions	(NAMAs),	which	are	also	
to	be	undertaken	in	a	measurable,	reportable,	and	verifiable	manner	
and,	according	to	the	Accord,	will	be	measured,	reported,	and	verified	
in	accordance	with	guidelines	adopted	by	the	COP.	
Both	the	BAP	and	the	Accord	emphasize	the	importance	of	funding	
for	adaptation	through	innovative	means	of	funding.	Financial	and	
technical	support	is	also	to	be	provided	for	capacity	building	in	
the	assessment	of	the	costs	of	adaptation	in	developing	countries,	
in	particular	the	most	vulnerable	ones,	to	aid	in	determining	their	
financial	needs.
In	terms	of	the	design	of	the	institutions	that	would	manage	these	
funds,	the	BAP	is	silent.	The	Accord	anticipates	that	a	“Copenhagen	
Green	Climate	Fund”	will	be	established	under	the	UNFCCC	to	
support	the	full	range	of	climate	finance,	including	mitigation,	
forests,	and	adaptation.	It	implies	that	this	Fund	will	be	effective,	
efficient,	and	have	a	“governance	structure	providing	for	equal	
representation	of	developed	and	developing	countries.”
Sources:	
Report	of	the	Conference	of	the	Parties	to	the	U.N.	Framework	Convention	on	
Climate	Change	at	its	13th	Session,	Decision	1/CP.13	(December	2007);	Report	
of	the	Conference	of	the	Parties	to	the	U.N.	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	
Change	at	its	15th	Session,	Decision	2/CP.15	(December	2009);	U.S.	Climate	
Action	Network,	“Who’s	On	Board	with	the	Copenhagen	Accord?”	(2009),	online	
at:	http://www.usclimatenetwork.org/policy/copenhagen-accord-commitments.
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for example, whether it reflects an equitable balance of 
contributors and recipients.
An institution widely perceived as legitimate is, in 
turn, more likely to gain the confidence of contributors, 
private investors, and recipients, which is essential 
to raise resources and to ensure that investments are 
owned and implemented in the host country. A financial 
mechanism’s legitimacy should also be assessed on its 
track record. In the context of climate change, a question 
for assessing the legitimacy of an institution could be: 
does it have the capacity to back the most promising 
technologies, policy innovations, and investments in 
human and institutional capacity to stimulate the large-
scale transformations necessary to achieve low-carbon, 
climate-resilient growth? Most of the climate financial 
mechanisms studied have not been operating at a 
scale or for a time period that allows for an assessment 
of performance. We, nonetheless, seek to make 
recommendations that would improve both the design 
and the performance of climate financial mechanisms.
1 1 PRevAiling APPRoAches to 
institutionAl legitimAcy5 
After 20 years of climate change negotiations, the 
UNFCCC Parties have agreed on a set of approaches to 
the design of its financial mechanism in the Convention 
text, in related COP decisions, as well as through the 
operations of the Convention’s financial mechanism 
under the GEF. Any new financial mechanism developed 
under the UNFCCC would likely have to follow or 
justify a departure from these same basic approaches: 
n	 The governance of the financial mechanism should 
be based on an equitable, balanced representation of 
all Parties through universal membership within a 
transparent system of governance;6
n	 The financial mechanism should function under 
the guidance of and be accountable to the COP for 
conformity with the policies, program priorities, and 
eligibility criteria established by the Parties;7
n	 The wealthier developed countries should commit 
to provide new and additional resources in a 
predictable and identifiable manner that determines 
the amount of funding necessary and available based 
on appropriate burden sharing and that sets out 
the conditions under which that amount will be 
periodically reviewed;8
n	 Independent scientific and technical advice should 
inform program and project design;9 
n	 Developing countries may, on a voluntary basis, 
propose projects for financing, including estimates of 
incremental costs and consequent benefits;10
n	 Developed countries should provide financial 
resources, including for the transfer of technology, 
needed by a developing country Party to meet 
the agreed full incremental costs of implementing 
measures as agreed between that Party and the 
financial mechanism;11
n	 Financial resources should support policies and 
measures that are cost-effective, to ensure global 
benefits at the lowest possible cost;12
n	 Through the principle of institutional economy, 
which avoids the creation of new institutions while 
tapping into and coordinating the comparative 
advantages of existing institutions,13 and a non-
exclusive but coordinated approach that allows for 
financial resources related to the implementation of 
the Convention to flow through bilateral, regional, 
and other multilateral channels,14 multiple institutions 
and diverse accountability mechanisms should be 
involved in financial flows under the UNFCCC.
These approaches shaped the design of the Convention 
and the GEF, which in turn have attracted the near 
universal participation of states. It could be assumed that 
tab le  1    WhAt  Will  A  climAte  F inAnce mechAnism 
do?  tyPicAl  Functions And Roles
Function Roles
Oversight •	 Setting policies, program priorities, and eligibility 
criteria
Resource 
mobilization
•	 Replenishment of trust fund
•	 Leveraging of additional sources of funding from 
Implementing Agencies and the private sector
Resource 
allocation
•	 Allocation of resources among multiple focal areas 
(e.g., mitigation, adaptation, and forestry)
•	 Prioritization among eligible recipients
Project cycle 
management
•	 Preparation and approval of projects
•	 Financial management of loan and grant agreements
Standard setting •	 Development and approval of performance metrics
•	 Development and approval of environmental and social 
safeguards
Scientific and 
technical advice
•	 Advice on appropriate policies and best available 
technologies
•	 Advice on scientific trends and risk assessment
Accountability •	 monitoring and evaluation of project and portfolio 
performance
•	 Review and inspection of problematic projects
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the institutional arrangements based on these approaches 
are—or once were—perceived by the Parties as legitimate. 
1 2 Rethinking legitimAcy: PoWeR, 
ResPonsiBility, And AccountABility in 
Post-2012 climAte FinAnce
The negotiations on climate finance are forging a new 
relationship among traditional contributors, traditional 
recipients, and the financial mechanisms they create. 
This new relationship is being defined through ongoing 
GEF operations, through the Copenhagen negotiations, 
and through “live experiments” in climate finance being 
conducted in existing and newly minted institutions 
vying for a role in future climate finance. It is also 
emerging through related discussions aimed at increasing 
the “voice and vote” of developing countries within the 
Major Economies Forum and the G-20.15  
We examine this new relationship along three essential 
dimensions—power, responsibility, and accountability—
as a means of better understanding how different 
design choices may affect perceptions of an institution’s 
legitimacy, in terms of the fairness and effectiveness 
of its procedures and its impacts (see Box A). Each 
of these dimensions interrelates and overlaps. For 
example, if the power of governments is to be exercised 
responsibly it may need to be shared with scientific and 
technical experts. Power may need to be disciplined by 
standards and resource allocation frameworks designed 
to ensure responsible investment. And power may need 
to be diminished through the use of accountability 
mechanisms designed to challenge or overturn 
government decisions. With these interrelationships 
in mind, we have found the power, responsibility, 
accountability framework to be a useful means for 
analyzing and guiding institutional design.
Power: By power we mean the capacity to determine 
outcomes. Power is distributed both formally and 
informally between and among Parties, and between 
Parties and the institutions they create.16 Formal power 
is recognized through membership and decision-making 
rules. In the current negotiations, developing countries 
are asking for more power than they have secured in 
previous negotiations, both formally, through more 
seats and more votes in decision-making bodies, and 
operationally, through greater participation in the 
programming of financial flows. 
The relationship between a financial mechanism 
and the COP under current and future climate treaties 
is another important aspect of the distribution of 
formal power. Developing countries enjoy a numerical 
majority in the COP and see strengthening the COP’s 
role in the financial architecture as strengthening 
their own capacity to determine outcomes. If multiple 
international financial mechanisms are entrusted with 
climate finance, the COP’s authority will also set overall 
direction for the administration of climate funds by these 
institutions. This may be crucial to promoting a greater 
degree of coherence in climate strategies. 
By informal power we mean power exercised 
through political and economic influence outside the 
formal rules on voice and vote. Informally, the power 
relationship between Parties and a financial mechanism 
will be mediated through its governing body and its 
administrative and management staff. As a practical 
matter, executive authority exercised by states is 
often devolved on a day-to-day basis to secretariats, 
technical experts, and program officers, or outsourced to 
Implementing Agencies and operating entities. These 
agencies work with the recipient government to prepare 
and approve projects and can be highly influential. 
Finally, power can be shared, to some degree, with non-
state actors, including non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), the private sector, and local communities with 
a stake in the impact of investments.
Our analysis marks a clear trend toward developing 
countries gaining more formal power in the governance 
structures of financial mechanisms both through 
additional seats and recognition of the authority of 
the COPs. It is unclear, however, whether this formal 
power is translating into greater capacity to determine 
outcomes and, if it is, whether this is enhancing Parties’ 
perceptions of the climate financial mechanism’s 
legitimacy in terms of the quality and impact of its 
decisions.
Responsibility: By responsibility we mean the exercise 
of power for its intended purpose, specifically, to ensure 
that the resources entrusted to a financial mechanism 
are programmed effectively and equitably. This 
includes responsibility exercised in allocating resources 
(through, for example, participation in decisions made 
by a governing body) and in leading the design and 
implementation of projects and programs in the host 
country. 
How responsibility for responding to climate change 
and its impacts is shared between developed and 
developing countries is part of the broader dynamic 
of the climate change negotiations. In the context of 
international climate finance, developed countries 
will bear all or most of the responsibility for mobilizing 
funds. In return they, and the financial institutions they 
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dominate, are requesting that developing countries 
prepare “low-carbon development plans” as part of their 
participation in the post-2012 climate regime. This 
additional demonstration of responsibility by developing 
countries is justified in part by the need to show that 
resources are being programmed effectively and are not 
contributing solely to isolated projects but to changes 
across a country’s economy that will lead, eventually, to 
net GHG reductions.
For their part, developing countries are now seeking to 
gain “direct access” to funds raised globally for climate 
mitigation or adaptation purposes. Essentially, direct 
access would enable those national and sub-national 
developing country institutions that meet appropriate 
financial standards to take direct responsibility for the 
programming of resources at the country level. This 
would entail entering into grant and loan agreements 
with the fund without having to rely upon Implementing 
Agencies, such as multilateral development banks and 
U.N. agencies. 
At the same time, some developing countries are 
keen to limit their responsibilities for delivering specific 
climate outcomes to those efforts made possible by 
new and additional climate finance. Some developing 
country Parties see their efforts to implement national 
climate programs as contingent on developed countries’ 
fulfillment of stated commitments to provide financial 
support.17 However, most estimates of the level of 
investment necessary to shift developing countries 
toward low-carbon development far exceed what is likely 
to be available from official development assistance.18 
This suggests that new ways of sharing responsibility for 
the effectiveness of climate finance that combine public, 
private, domestic, and international financial flows will 
need to be agreed upon.
Since its creation, the GEF has applied the concept 
of “incremental costs” to determine the distribution 
of responsibility for financing specific initiatives at 
the project level (see Section 2.3). This concept, in 
theory, identifies and funds that portion of the project 
that generates “global environmental benefits,” leaving 
the remainder to be funded by mainstream domestic 
and international sources. Our analysis suggests that 
this has been a difficult concept to apply in practice. 
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Favela: Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (2007).
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Current negotiations may modify or replace the use 
of the “incremental cost” concept as the means of 
determining what gets financed. For example, we 
highlight current experiments with new concepts such 
as “transformational costs” and “performance-based 
finance” under the Clean Technology Fund and various 
REDD+ funding mechanisms, while the Least Developed 
Country Fund and the Special Climate Change Funds 
measure their contributions against a “development 
baseline.”
Accountability: By accountability we mean the 
standards and systems for ensuring that power is 
exercised responsibly. A climate financial mechanism 
will need to be accountable to the COP, to its 
contributors, to the countries in which it invests, as 
well as to the local communities that will depend on 
the benefits of its investments. Recipient countries have 
traditionally led the calls for greater accountability 
to the COP (which they see as their power base) 
to ensure that resources are raised and distributed 
fairly. Contributor countries have pushed for greater 
accountability at the project level, where return on 
investment is measured. 
As developing countries seek greater power and 
take on greater responsibility in the programming of 
global environmental finance, this traditional dynamic 
between contributor and recipient countries will need 
to shift. As their role increases in setting policies 
through the governance of financial institutions, 
developing countries—particularly those with greater 
voting power—must be prepared to also be held more 
accountable by the media and civil society for the 
effective functioning of these institutions, including the 
quality of the decision-making processes and the impacts 
of decisions taken.
At the project level, traditional approaches to 
climate finance have relied heavily on Implementing 
Agencies, which act as intermediaries between financial 
mechanisms and host governments to provide systems 
for accountability. Initiatives by developing countries 
to secure “direct access” to financial resources through 
national institutions should be welcomed by those 
supportive of national “ownership” of development 
investments; however, these initiatives need to be 
supported with high standards of accountability. 
National institutions need to provide performance-
based accounting for results to meet fiduciary standards 
that demonstrate sound financial management and 
to establish and implement environmental and social 
safeguards against the unintended consequences of 
investments. This concept of direct access is currently 
being tested through the operation of the Kyoto 
Protocol’s Adaptation Fund, but with no funds disbursed 
or projects implemented, the lessons from this Fund are 
not yet clear. 
1 3 AssumPtions And scoPe oF AnAlysis
Climate change negotiators, particularly those from 
developing countries, appear to have a strong appetite 
for creating new institutions (see Box 2 for a survey of 
key proposals on climate finance from Parties to the 
UNFCCC). This is true despite many delegations also 
supporting the principle of institutional economy—that 
new institutions should only be created when their 
intended functions cannot be carried out by existing 
institutions. Despite past disappointments, Parties appear 
to retain faith that they can design a new financial 
mechanism that meets their evolving standards of 
legitimacy.
Our analysis therefore seeks to inform both the reform 
of existing institutions and the design of new ones. 
Our working assumption is that whatever results from 
subsequent climate negotiations will involve, at least 
in the near term, multiple institutions (multilateral, 
regional, bilateral, and national, both within and outside 
the UNFCCC)—or involve what some have referred 
to as a “de-centralized” model.19 While many countries 
are calling for the establishment of an overarching body 
to oversee climate finance, we believe the politics and 
flows of climate finance are (and have always been) 
far too complex to be fully captured by any single 
institution. Thus, even if a new institution is established 
it will face the challenge of coordination, alignment, 
and complementarity with various other initiatives 
and institutions—particularly with those outside the 
UNFCCC umbrella. A common understanding of 
the principles we explore should help bind either a 
centralized or a de-centralized model together.
We are also aware that, in addition to involving 
multiple institutions, climate finance will likely flow 
through multiple financial instruments, including 
grants, concessional loans, private sector direct and 
indirect investments, and carbon markets. Our analysis 
focuses on institutions designed to provide grants and 
concessional loans from publicly raised funds. We feel, 
however, that many of the issues and principles discussed 
in this paper are relevant to any institution designed to 
manage climate finance, such as proposed technology 
transfer committees or carbon market mechanisms.
We recognize that supporting mitigation of climate 
change and adaptation to its impacts is an enormously 
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complex undertaking that will require efforts that range 
from capacity building to large-scale investments in 
infrastructure. Some of the generalizations we draw result 
from the experiences of significantly different institutions 
investing in very different kinds of activities and facing 
very different kinds of challenges. We have found 
that the larger the scale of the investment, the higher 
the risks, and the more challenging the relationships 
of power, accountability, and responsibility. We feel, 
however, that the conclusions and recommendations 
we reach are relevant and applicable to any institution 
entrusted with climate finance.
We recognize that perceptions of the legitimacy 
of a financial mechanism are inherently subjective, 
and that this subjectivity is revealed in the very 
different preferences expressed by contributor and 
by recipient countries. In order to explore the gap 
in these preferences we have had to make broad and 
crude generalizations about the differences between 
the positions of “contributor” and “recipient” countries 
and the context in which these relationships are being 
challenged. While we have attempted to ground these 
generalizations in the official statements and positions 
of governments, we recognize that many subtleties have 
been lost.
We believe, however, that if governments were to 
discuss the dimensions of legitimacy more explicitly, 
the stakes and the trade-offs would become more 
apparent, and a more shared understanding on how to 
design a legitimate financial mechanism would emerge. 
We believe that the failure thus far to address the 
distribution of power, responsibility, and accountability 
more explicitly has led to a proliferation of financial 
mechanisms that are underfunded, which in turn leads to 
calls to create new mechanisms. 
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Box  2   PRoPosAls  on climAte  F inAnce undeR the  BAli  Action PlAn (2008–2010)
the g-77 Proposal for a new Financial mechanism 
The	G-77	and	China	have	proposed	that	developed	countries	should	
contribute	0.5	to	1.0	percent	of	gross	national	product	(GNP),	totaling	
an	estimated	USD	150–300	billion	a	year,	in	support	of	mitigation,	
adaptation,	technology	transfer,	and	capacity-building	programs	
in	developing	countries.	This	would	be	administered	through	a	
single	fund	with	multiple	windows	to	address	each	of	these	priority	
areas.	The	COP	would	appoint	a	Board	with	an	“equitable	and	
geographically	balanced	representation	of	parties”	to	be	assisted	
by	a	Secretariat	of	professional	staff.	It	anticipates	establishing	
a	Consultative	Advisory	Group	of	“all	relevant	stakeholders”	and	
an	Independent	Assessment	Panel.	Recipients	would	have	“direct	
access”	to	the	funds	and	would	not	have	to	work	through	the	U.N.	or	
other	multilateral	agencies.	The	proposal	emphasizes	the	importance	
of	country-level	engagement	and	the	need	to	support	programmatic	
approaches	to	allow	for	“implementation	at	scale.”	
china’s multilateral technology cooperation mechanism 
China’s	proposal	for	financing	and	technology	support	for	developing	
countries	calls	for	balanced	representation	among	Parties	and	a	
separate	Monitoring	and	Evaluation	Panel	within	the	governance	
structure	of	the	Mechanism.	This	structure	reflects	an	effort	to	
maximize	the	accountability	of	Parties	and	the	projects	and	programs	
they	finance.
india’s Financial mechanism
India’s	proposals	for	a	financial	mechanism	have	built	on	the	central	
tenets	of	the	G-77	proposal,	emphasizing	that	UNFCCC	financing	
should	be	treated	as	an	“entitlement,	not	aid.”	It	has	suggested	that	
all	financing	should	be	provided	in	the	form	of	grants,	as	opposed	to	
repayable	loans	(concessional	or	hard).	India	proposes	that	climate	
finance	should	be	governed	by	a	new	mechanism	under	the	COP.	This	
“Executive	Board”	would	be	composed	to	“equitably”	represent	all	
Parties.	National	implementing	entities	designated	by	developing	
country	Parties	would	be	responsible	for	approving	projects,	actions,	
and	programs.	A	thematic	assessment	unit	would	“carry	out	the	
relevant	assessments	for	disbursement	to	the	designated	national	
funding	entities	of	the	developing	country	Parties.”	The	Mechanism	
could	also	administer	a	registry	that	tracks	receipt	and	deployment	
of	financial	resources.	
Bolivia’s multilateral climate Fund  
(Based on the outcome of the World People’s conference on 
climate change and the Rights of mother earth)
This	scaled-up	variation	on	the	G-77	proposal	calls	for	developed	
country	Parties	to	provide	at	least	6	percent	of	their	GNP	for	climate	
change.	It	proposes	that	3	percent	should	go	to	adaptation,	1	percent	
to	mitigation,	1	percent	for	technology	development	and	transfer,	
and	1	percent	for	capacity	building	over	the	longer	term.	It	seeks	USD	
400	billion	from	public	sources	for	fast	track	financing.	It	also	seeks	
an	equivalent	of	USD	150	billion	in	International	Monetary	Fund	
(IMF)	Special	Drawing	Rights.	The	Fund	would	function	under	the	
authority	and	guidance	of	the	COP	and	be	fully	accountable	to	it	as	
the	financial	instrument	of	the	Convention.	An	Executive	Board	with	
equitable	and	geographically	balanced	representation	would	oversee	
multiple	funding	windows,	including	for	adaptation,	mitigation,	
technology	transfer	and	development,	and	capacity	building.	Panels	
of	technical	experts	would	inform	programming,	and	a	monitoring	
and	verification	mechanism	would	exist.	Operation	would	follow	the	
principles	of	openness,	transparency,	effectiveness,	and	easy	access.
united kingdom’s compact model
The	UK	has	proposed	a	Global	Compact	Model	that	would	facilitate	
“delivery	of	finance	at	scale	against	ambitious,	credible,	country-
owned	national	plans	which	incorporate	mitigation	and	adaptation.”	
The	compact	approach	would	be	administered	by	an	institution	with	
an	equal	number	of	developed	and	developing	country	representatives	
to	constitute	“balanced”	power	structures.	Nationally	owned	low-
carbon	and	climate-resilient	development	strategies	would	provide	
the	basis	for	allocating	finance,	and	there	would	be	an	instrument	
for	coordinating	support	to	a	country	from	a	number	of	potential	
sources,	including	bilateral	and	multilateral	programs.	Systems	would	
be	put	in	place	at	the	national	level	to	measure,	report,	and	verify	
implementation	of	the	Compact.	The	approach	has	been	informed	in	
part	by	the	UK’s	experience	with	the	Climate	Investment	Funds,1	which	
are	piloting	some	elements	of	this	approach.
mexico’s green Fund Proposal
Mexico	is	proposing	the	creation	of	a	multilateral	Green	Fund	within	
the	UNFCCC	aimed	at	scaling	up,	instead	of	simply	re-allocating,	
financing.	The	idea	is	to	secure	quasi-universal	contributions	based	
on	common	but	differentiated	responsibilities.	All	countries	would	
contribute	to	the	Fund	on	the	basis	of	GHG	emissions,	population,	and	
gross	domestic	product	(GDP).	There	would	be	equal	representation	
of	Annex	I	and	non-Annex	I	countries,	but	developing	countries	would	
have	access	to	amounts	larger	than	their	own	contributions.
switzerland’s Proposal
Switzerland	has	proposed	a	uniform	global	levy	of	USD	2	per	ton	
of	carbon	dioxide	on	all	fossil	fuel	emissions	to	be	assessed	on	
all	countries,	except	those	(developing)	countries	with	an	annual	
emissions	rate	lower	than	1.5	tons	of	carbon	dioxide	per	capita.	
These	resources	would	provide	financing	for	adaptation	and	
mitigation	in	developing	countries.	Two	sets	of	funds	have	been	
proposed:	a	Multilateral	Adaptation	Fund	that	would	focus	on	climate	
change	impact	and	risk	reduction	by	providing	finance	for	policies	
and	measures,	and	an	insurance	pillar	that	would	finance	recovery	
and	rehabilitation	in	response	to	the	impacts	of	climate	change.	
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Box  2   (cont inued)
european union Proposal 
In	its	September	2009	communication	on	finance,	the	EU	suggested	
that	“for	an	overall	governance	structure	[for	global	climate	
finance]	to	be	efficient,	effective,	and	equitable	it	needs	to	build	on	
ownership,	subsidiarity,	coherence,	transparency,	accountability,	
rewarding	performance,	additionality	and	complementarity.”2	It	
has	proposed	a	new	High-Level	Forum	on	International	Climate	
Finance	to	monitor	and	regularly	review	gaps	and	imbalances	in	
financing	mitigation	and	adaptation	actions.	It	has	suggested	that	
“governance	of	the	future	international	financial	architecture	should	
be	decentralised	and	bottom-up,”	and	should	be	efficient,	effective,	
and	equitable.	To	this	end,	developed	countries	should	record	
financial	support	in	a	registry.
u s ’s Financing Proposal
In	October	2009,	the	United	States	proposed	the	establishment	of	a	
new	Global	Fund	for	Climate	operating	under	the	Convention,	and	in	
June	2010,	it	provided	further	details	on	how	the	COP	could	establish	
the	new	Fund	by	laying	out	a	three-step	process:	(1)	adopting	a	COP	
decision	that	provides	the	framework	for	designing	the	new	Fund;	(2)	
negotiating	the	design	of	the	new	Fund	itself;	and	(3)	agreeing	to	a	
memorandum	of	understanding	(MOU)	between	the	COP	and	the	Fund.3	
The	United	States	envisages	the	setting	up	of	a	Board	as	the	executive	
authority	of	the	Fund	that	is	accountable	to	the	COP	alone.	While	the	
United	States	had	initially	anticipated	the	World	Bank	to	be	both	the	
Trustee	and	the	Secretariat	for	the	Fund,	it	now	acknowledges	that	
other	institutions	staffed	with	professionals	with	relevant	experience	in	
public	and	private	finance,	as	well	as	mitigation	and	adaptation,	could	
serve	as	the	Secretariat.	However,	they	continue	to	see	the	World	Bank	
as	the	only	institution	with	the	fiduciary	standards,	safeguards,	and	
experience	to	serve	as	the	Trustee.
For	the	process	of	negotiations	to	establish	the	Fund,	the	United	
States	envisages	either	the	Trustee	convening	a	technical	financial	
process	or	a	working	group	led	by	a	Party	or	group	of	Parties	with	
finance	experts	convening	a	series	of	meetings	to	negotiate	the	
instrument,	approve	it,	and	nominate	the	Board.	Once	established,	the	
Board	would	negotiate	an	MOU	with	the	COP.	The	technical	financial	
negotiating	process	will	address	the	purpose	and	principles	of	the	
Fund;	the	modalities	for	the	Board,	the	Secretariat,	and	funding;	
the	use	of	specialized	windows;	the	monitoring	and	review	process;	
and	the	fiduciary	and	safeguard	responsibilities.	Based	on	its	earlier	
submission,	the	United	States	proposed	that	both	developed	and	
developing	countries	(except	least	developed	countries)	contribute	
to	the	Fund,	and	that	the	GEF	continue	to	support	capacity	building,	
technology	innovation,	and	development	activities.	These	issues	were	
not	further	elaborated	on	in	its	latest	intervention.
maldives’ Proposals 
The	Maldives	has	proposed	the	implementation	of	a	Financial	
Mechanism	for	Meeting	Financial	Commitments	building	on	existing	
commitments	in	the	Convention.	The	Mechanism	would	include	a	new	
Board,	a	Secretariat,	an	Expert	Group	or	Committee,	a	Consultative	
Group	of	stakeholders,	and	an	Independent	Assessment	Panel;	
ensure	full	implementation	of	relevant	provisions	in	the	Convention	
relating	to	the	provision	of	financial	resources;	and	provide	a	means	
for	registering	the	developing	country	implementation	of	financing	
obligations	and	for	matching	these	with	nationally	appropriate	
mitigation	actions.	The	Maldives	emphasizes	that	funding	under	
the	Convention	is	distinct	from	official	development	assistance,	
as	it	is	to	be	considered	as	compensation	for	damage	rather	than	
redistribution	of	wealth	or	charity.	Its	proposal	calls	upon	developed	
countries	to	provide	public	money	amounting	to	at	least	1.5	percent	
of	GDP,	in	addition	to	innovative	sources	of	finance,	annually	by	2015	
to	assist	developing	countries	make	their	transitions	to	climate-
resilient,	low-carbon	economies.	Finally,	the	Maldives	supports	the	
establishment	of	the	Copenhagen	Green	Climate	Fund	and	calls	on	
the	Fund	to	be	created	as	soon	as	possible	and	to	provide	adequate	
financing	(quick-start	and	longer-term),	and	the	country	further	calls	
for	“an	assessment	of	the	adequacy	of	short-	and	midterm	financing	
pledges	in	light	of	the	latest	scientific	and	economic	analysis	and	
the	Convention’s	obligation	to	provide	full	incremental	costs	to	
developing	countries.”4
Sources: 
UNFCCC,	“G77	and	China—Proposal:	Financial	Mechanism	for	Meeting	
Financial	Commitments	under	the	Convention”	(Accra,	Ghana:	United	Nations,	
August	2008),	online	at:	http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/application/
pdf/g77_china_financing_1.pdf;	Ministry	of	Environment	and	Forests,	
Government	of	India,	“Climate	Change	Negotiations:	India’s	Submission	to	the	
UNFCCC”	(August	2009);	H.	Reid,	“UK	Global	Compact	Model,”	Presentation	
at	the	Seminar	on	Post-2012	Architecture	(Bonn,	Germany,	June	2009);	
Communication	from	the	European	Commission	to	the	European	Parliament,	
the	Council,	the	European	Economic	and	Social	Committee	and	the	Committee	
of	the	Regions,	“Stepping	Up	International	Climate	Finance:	A	European	
Blueprint	for	the	Copenhagen	Deal”	(September	2009):	12;	UNFCCC,	“Ad	Hoc	
Working	Group	on	Long-Term	Cooperative	Action	Under	the	Convention”	(April	
30,	2010),	online	at:	http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/awglca10/eng/
misc02.pdf.	
Notes:
1.		These	manage	the	UK’s	£800	million	Environmental	Transformation	Fund.	
2.		Communication	from	the	European	Commission	to	the	European	
Parliament,	the	Council,	the	European	Economic	and	Social	Committee	and	
the	Committee	of	the	Regions,	“Stepping	Up	International	Climate	Finance:	
A	European	Blueprint	for	the	Copenhagen	Deal”	(September	2009):	12.
3.		The	details	of	the	U.S.	proposal	are	based	on	its	intervention	at	the	Ad	
Hoc	Working	Group	on	Long-Term	Cooperative	Action	under	the	Convention	
(AWG-LCA)	meetings	in	Bonn	in	June	2010.
4.		UNFCCC,	“Ad	Hoc	Working	Group	on	Long-Term	Cooperative	Action	Under	
the	Convention”	(April	30,	2010),	online	at:	http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/2010/awglca10/eng/misc02.pdf.
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Before looking forward to a next generation of climate 
finance, we reflect on how power, responsibility, and 
accountability were incorporated into the design of the 
current “operating entity” of the UNFCCC’s financial 
mechanism: the GEF. The GEF’s role as an “operating 
entity” of the Convention’s financial mechanism has 
remained controversial, particularly among developing 
countries, and the GEF has not yet been given a 
prominent role in the post-2012 climate regime.21
When, in 2001, the Kyoto Protocol Parties established 
a Special Climate Change Fund and a Fund for Least 
Developed Countries, they entrusted their operations 
to the GEF. Under the Kyoto Protocol’s more recently 
established Adaptation Fund (AF), the GEF Secretariat 
will support the Fund’s project cycle, but the Parties 
established a separate Adaptation Fund Board rather 
than give a governance function to the GEF Council. 
The October 2009 climate finance proposal from the 
United States, which was a main architect of the GEF, 
seems to relegate the GEF’s role to capacity building, 
rather than large-scale project finance.22
Developing countries have expressed disappointment 
in what they perceive as the GEF’s lack of responsiveness 
to their concerns. Their calls for a closer relationship 
between any new financial mechanism and the COP, 
as well as their demands for direct access, stem largely 
from their frustration with the GEF. Understanding why 
the GEF’s design has not been embraced as legitimate is 
crucial to crafting a new set of arrangements for climate 
finance.
2 1 geF goveRnAnce: A neW BAlAnce oF 
PoWeR
In many ways the GEF was a watershed in institutional 
design.23 Its founding document, the GEF Instrument, 
provides for universality of participation of all Parties 
through its Participants Assembly, and an equitable, 
balanced representation of participants through a 
constituency system in the GEF Council, which 
divides seats roughly evenly between developed and 
developing country members.24 GEF decision-making 
in both the Assembly and the Council is by consensus. 
If consensus fails in the Council, formal voting (as yet, 
never exercised) is based on a double-weighted majority, 
which would require in effect a 60 percent majority of 
participants (dominated by recipient countries) and a 
60 percent majority of contributors (non-recipients), to 
approve a decision.25 This balance of power in the GEF 
structure reflected the need for a new kind of partnership 
that recognized developing countries as co-investors and 
partners in global environmental governance. As such, 
the GEF could be seen as a model for any new financial 
mechanism. 
However, the South African submission to the 
discussion on GEF’s 2009 replenishment negotiations is 
generally representative of views expressed by developing 
countries, and it strongly implies the need for change in 
the GEF’s governance structure:
The issue of Governance of the GEF has been 
another concern for us. We believe that in light of the 
changing landscape since the [1992] Rio Summit we 
must review the Governance structures with a view 
to assessing whether they are fully reflective of the 
current situation. In this context, there is an urgent 
need for a comprehensive and strategic review of the 
institutional and governance structures of the GEF, 
including the constituency system, the replenishment 
process, operational efficiency and the relationship 
between the various structures.26
Thus the general dissatisfaction with the GEF’s 
institutional and governance structures is based not only 
on the formal distribution of power within the GEF 
Council but also on the relationship between the GEF 
and other structures within the complex, distributed 
model of climate finance. 
2 2 the geF, the coP, And the 
imPlementing Agencies: the 
chAllenges oF “institutionAl 
economy”
As with any new climate financial mechanism that 
may be established, the GEF has had to find its place 
in a relationship with the COP and with other existing 
institutions that currently play roles in climate finance. 
In 1992 the UNFCCC Parties decided, rather than 
creating a new institution, to “outsource” the operations 
of its financial mechanism to the GEF, which was then a 
pilot donor-run trust fund within the World Bank. This 
outcome was justified on the grounds of institutional 
economy and with the understanding that the GEF would 
be reformed to be made more democratic and accountable 
to the COP. The GEF Council was established and 
its project cycle designed to draw on the capacities of 
existing institutions, in particular the GEF “Implementing 
Agencies,” for example, the World Bank, UNDP, and 
UNEP. However, this new arrangement raised a unique 
set of challenges about how to formalize and coordinate 
these institutional relationships among the GEF, the 
COP, and the various Implementing Agencies.27
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Developing countries, which form the overwhelming 
numerical majority in the COP, have consistently 
insisted on the recognition of the COP as the “supreme 
body” of the UNFCCC, particularly in relation to 
its financial mechanism. One of the constraints to 
formalizing the relationship between the COP and 
the GEF has been the indeterminate nature of the 
“legal personalities” of both the COP and the GEF.28 
Over the course of the relationship between the two 
bodies, UNFCCC Parties and GEF Participants had 
come to the view that neither the COP nor the GEF is 
sufficiently endowed with legal personality to enter into 
a formal legal agreement, and thus settled on a loosely 
worded MOU.29 The MOU between the GEF Council 
and the COP30 gives effect to the respective roles and 
responsibilities of the two bodies; the COP is recognized 
as the supreme body of the Convention, and the GEF 
is established as the international entity entrusted with 
the operation of the financial mechanism. However, the 
GEF-COP MOU provides for only a limited means of 
accountability between the two bodies. For example, the 
MOU provides that:
[i]n the event that the COP considers [a] specific 
project decision does not comply with the policies, 
programme priorities and eligibility criteria 
established by the COP, it may ask the Council 
of the GEF for further clarification on the specific 
project decision and in due time may ask for a 
reconsideration of that decision.31
The MOU does not indicate what will happen to 
resolve the conflict if it persists.
While no such conflict has formally arisen, an 
independent NGO study of the relationship between the 
COPs and the GEF concluded that:
the GEF is, legally and practically speaking, 
functionally autonomous from the conventions it 
serves. No effective sanctions are available to the 
COPs that would empower them to force the GEF 
to conform with their guidance. Consequently, the 
COPs cannot exercise enforceable control over the 
entity that operates their financial mechanisms.32
The formal relationship between the GEF 
and its Implementing Agencies has also proved 
controversial. While each Implementing Agency 
has passed a resolution endorsing its assigned role 
in the GEF instrument, each, understandably, also 
remains responsible and accountable under its own 
rules, procedures, and governance structures.33 GEF 
Participants have highlighted the need to address 
operational issues that arise from the involvement of 
multiple Implementing Agencies, such as the lack of 
speed and responsiveness of funding and implementation 
and the high transaction costs on recipient countries.34
2 3 PoWeR, ResPonsiBility, And 
AccountABility in the geF PRoJect 
cycle: incRementAl costs And the 
geF’s AllocAtion FRAmeWoRks
Two of the most important and controversial concepts 
that have dominated the GEF’s approach to climate 
finance are “incremental costs” financing and its 
efforts to design a framework for allocating resources. 
Both of these concepts are described by proponents as 
providing a rational, analytical basis for deciding how 
much money to invest in particular aspects of particular 
projects in particular countries.35 Both concepts have 
proved controversial—particularly with smaller recipient 
countries—for strengthening the power of the GEF 
Secretariat, narrowing the amount of funds available, and 
decreasing the sense of national ownership of investments. 
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Any new climate financial mechanism will have to 
struggle with similar challenges by coming up with 
standards and procedures for negotiating cost allocation 
with host countries and for allocating scarce resources 
between and among countries with different national 
circumstances.
incremental cost Financing
Under the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the 
GEF, eligible developing countries may receive grant 
funding for the “agreed full incremental costs” of 
measures taken to implement their commitments. The 
concept is designed to limit and add leverage to grants 
made for global environmental purposes by:
n	 Providing a means to distinguish between the 
additional, incremental costs of building a global 
environmental benefit (such as decreasing greenhouse 
gas emissions) into a development investment and 
a business-as-usual investment made for domestic 
benefits;
n	 Creating a grant-based incentive for Implementing 
Agencies, such as development banks, to mainstream 
global environmental benefits into conventional 
development loans;
n	 Setting the parameters for negotiating agreed costs 
between contributor agencies and recipients project-
by-project; and
n	 Providing the basis for a cost-benefit analysis that 
allows for an assessment of the global environmental 
benefits derived from an incremental cost 
investment.36
From the RAF to the stAR: lessons learned in 
Resource Allocation 
While the incremental cost concept operates to 
identify levels of funding on a project-by-project basis, 
since 2005 the GEF has been using the Resource 
Allocation Framework (RAF) to allocate funding 
among recipient countries.37 The RAF is designed to 
create a greater sense of shared responsibility between 
contributors and recipients, a sense of accountability 
for recipient performance, and to focus resources on 
countries with the potential to achieve the greatest 
global benefit (in the case of climate change, the largest 
emitters). GEF recipients are ranked with regard to: (1) 
Rice harvest: Santiago City, Philippines (2008).
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their potential to generate global environmental benefits 
in a particular focal area (the “GEF Benefits Index,” 
or GBI); and (2) their capacity, policies, and practices 
relevant to successful implementation of GEF programs 
and projects (the “GEF Performance Index,” or GPI).38 
The highest-ranked countries, which together account 
for 75 percent of the funds allocated in a given focal 
area, receive their own country-specific allocations. 
The remaining countries, known as “Group Allocation 
Countries” (GACs), are placed in a group for each of the 
GEF’s focal areas. Each group must share the remaining 
25 percent of funds available to that focal area.39
The RAF has provided predictability to countries 
with large individual allocations, which has in turn 
empowered these countries in negotiations with 
Implementing Agencies. Between 2006 and 2010, 
the countries receiving the five largest allocations 
under the RAF for climate change were China, India, 
Russia, Brazil, and Mexico.40 Countries with smaller 
allocations (and with a small percentage of global GHG 
emissions)—which include most of the least developed 
countries (LDCs) and most vulnerable countries—
receive less, and less predictable support. The RAF did 
not, however, apply to adaptation funding. 
The midterm review of the first RAF funding period 
showed that 93 percent of GACs had not yet accessed 
any climate change funds. In addition, “the experience 
with the RAF pipeline negotiations brought out more 
strongly the inherent conflicts between the criteria 
of global environmental benefits and country-specific 
sustainability needs.”41 This has led many, if not all, 
GACs to conclude that the RAF has not led to greater 
ownership or empowerment.42
During the RAF midterm review survey, 60 percent of 
stakeholders indicated that RAF implementation “may 
shift project decision-making power in favor of the GEF 
Secretariat,”43 which has day-to-day responsibility for its 
implementation. When combined with unclear guidance 
from the Secretariat, this has slowed access to funds. 
Efforts are underway by the GEF Participants and the 
Secretariat to reform the RAF in the context of heated 
debates on the role the GEF might play post-2012. A 
process to develop a System for Transparent Allocation 
of Resources (STAR) that would replace the RAF has 
now been approved. One of the principal objectives 
of this revision is to increase the amount of funding in 
absolute terms that is available to least developed and 
vulnerable countries that do not make the top ranks of 
the GBI. Options for refining the GBI and enhancing 
the GEF Performance Index have also been proposed.44 
2 4 conclusions
The experience of GEF operations, as well as global 
shifts in economic and political power, and the 
heightening of shared concerns about climate change 
and biodiversity loss, are leading to a reinterpretation of 
the approaches that led to the GEF’s design. However, 
many of the financial, political, and institutional 
dynamics and constraints that shaped the GEF remain 
relevant. If negotiators decide to design a new financial 
mechanism, they should consider the GEF experience.
The experience of the GEF also shows that 
strengthening the formal voice of recipient 
countries by adding membership and votes to the 
governance structure does not necessarily lead to 
their empowerment. The influence of contributors, 
Implementing Agencies, and international civil servants 
dependent on contributor resources, will remain strong 
in the GEF, and perhaps determinative of such crucial 
issues as resource allocation.
Tying the COP and the GEF Council together with 
a loosely worded MOU, operationalized through vague 
annual “guidance” from the COP and reporting from 
the GEF, has not created a sense of accountability. 
The outsourcing of finance-related functions from the 
COP to external institutions, such as the GEF and its 
Implementing Agencies, may respect the principle of 
institutional economy, but it also raises accountability 
challenges and can lead to a complex and cumbersome 
project cycle, requiring the approval of multiple 
agencies. The GEF has recognized this and has been 
making efforts to streamline the project cycle.
The incremental cost concept and the RAF have 
proved unpopular with recipient countries. However, 
some framework for prioritizing efforts that will be 
funded, and for determining what portion of a country’s 
actions will be funded, is necessary given that the 
demand for financing will inevitably exceed availability. 
Any post-2012 climate financial mechanism will also 
have to grapple with the challenge of allocating scarce 
resources among countries and of balancing the need to 
support smaller countries’ target emissions reductions 
and climate resilience with emissions reductions that can 
be achieved cost effectively and at a large scale.
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Installing solar panels: Rema, Ethiopia (2009). 
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This Section reviews the ways in which developing 
country demands for greater power in the formal 
decision-making structures of finance mechanisms 
have led to significant increases in their “voice and 
vote” through more seats on boards and more balanced 
voting systems. They have managed to secure the 
formal acknowledgment that any financial mechanism 
be accountable to the Conference of the Parties, 
where developing countries have the majority of 
seats. However, developing countries’ desire to have 
a greater say in the outcome of the governing boards 
that raise and allocate resources, and in the project 
cycles that design and implement investments, has 
been frustrated. Part of this frustration results from the 
interaction between power and the standards meant 
to represent greater responsibility and accountability. 
The governments that contribute the largest share 
of resources continue to exercise economic and 
political power informally, through the imposition of 
conditionalities and priorities in the process of resource 
mobilization, resource allocation, and in the operation 
of project cycles. Responsibility and accountability 
may also require government power to be shared, 
disciplined, and even diminished through the greater 
involvement of non-governmental participation 
that brings in scientific and technical expertise, 
as well as the voices of people affected by project 
implementation.
3 1 demAnds FoR ReFoRm in the FoRmAl 
BAlAnce oF PoWeR
Recipient countries are increasingly questioning the 
legitimacy of the balance of power between contributors 
and recipients in the context of climate finance, and 
they are demanding a greater say in how priorities are 
set and how funds are disbursed and accounted for. 
Their demands stem in part from the history of donor 
dominance of key finance institutions such as the 
World Bank, the IMF, regional development banks, and 
bilateral aid agencies.45
Demands for reform also reflect the overall dynamic 
of the Copenhagen negotiations and the tug-of-war 
over “common but differentiated responsibilities” 
and heightened expectations around the “measuring, 
reporting, and verification” of developing country 
actions to reduce emissions as well as developed country 
financial contributions. As the threats of climate change 
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grow, developed countries are seeking to leverage 
greater results from their climate finance investments. 
Developing countries are pushing back, insisting that 
climate finance be viewed as “compensation” for the 
damage from climate change caused by the North and 
for any lower-cost development opportunities the South 
is asked to forgo.46 
Both sides of the debate reflect a perception that 
previous attempts to rebalance power between 
contributors and recipients, such as the voting structure 
of the GEF Council, have failed to produce a new 
“global partnership.” Instead, previous efforts of reform 
have merely replicated the donor-recipient dynamics 
of the past. While developing countries may have been 
offered more voice in GEF decision-making through its 
voting structure, contributors have gained back power 
by withholding funding until their conditions are met. 
For example, U.S. insistence on a Resource Allocation 
Framework in the context of negotiations over the 
fourth GEF Replenishment resulted in its adoption over 
the resistance of many developing country participants. 
As a result, developing countries’ desire for greater power 
over the institutions that channel climate finance has 
become a central point in the international climate 
change debate.47
3 2 goveRnAnce stRuctuRe, voice, And 
vote
The power to set the overall policies and program 
priorities for a financial institution is typically entrusted to 
a governing body made up of a combination of contributor 
and recipient countries. Depending on the size of the 
membership, these functions will either be performed by 
the membership as a whole, or by a governing body of 
representatives elected or appointed by the membership. 
The large number of countries participating in the GEF 
(182) has, for example, led to the establishment of the 
GEF Governing Council, which has 32 members.
Typically, the struggle for power in the design of 
a financial mechanism begins with the design of its 
governing body and the distribution of seats and votes 
across different geographical regions and development 
groupings. As has been discussed, the climate change 
regime has traditionally followed the principle of 
“equitable, balanced representation of all Parties through 
universal membership within a transparent system of 
governance.”48 
Institutions designed under the U.N. system typically 
take decisions by consensus. Should consensus fail, they 
vote following the principle of sovereign equality by 
formally extending an equal vote to each country (see 
Box 3). As has been described in Section 2, the GEF 
has developed a system of double-weighted majority 
that weights countries’ votes on the basis of their 
contributions to the GEF Trust Fund. 
While there is an apparent trend toward allowing 
developing countries more votes and more voice in 
the governance of climate finance, the outcome of this 
aspect of the UNFCCC negotiations will depend in 
part on the scale and sources of the finance. Traditional 
recipient countries are understandably concerned about 
housing climate funds at institutions whose governance 
structures give contributor governments more power. 
Contributing countries will want to continue to exercise 
control over what may amount to tens of billions of 
dollars annually of public investment. These concerns 
have been expressed unequivocally in the context of the 
deliberations of the U.S. Congress over contributions to 
international funds for climate finance. 
To date, four different governance models for climate 
finance have emerged within and outside the UNFCCC: 
(1) the GEF model, described in Section 2; (2) the 
Marrakesh model, which emerged after the negotiation 
of the Kyoto Protocol; (3) the Adaptation Fund Board 
model; and (4) the World Bank–Administered Funds 
model. These are discussed below and summarized in 
Table 2.
the marrakesh model
In 2001, as part of the Marrakesh Accords 
negotiations, the COP established two new Convention 
funding mechanisms to respond to the needs and 
Box  3   voting veRsus consensus
In	most	cases,	the	rules	of	procedure	of	the	governing	boards	of	the	
funds	surveyed	resort	to	formal	voting	only	on	the	rare	occasion	when	
consensus	cannot	be	reached	among	member	states.	Consensus	is	
typically	defined	as	having	been	reached	when,	in	the	opinion	of	the	
presiding	officer,	no	member	present	formally	objects	to	a	proposed	
decision.	This	rule	can	operate	to	empower	any	individual	member	to	
block	the	decision	of	the	majority.	It	also	raises	the	political	stakes	of	
withholding	consent	and	can	operate	to	shift	transparent	decision-
making	into	backroom	negotiations,	where	less	politically	powerful	
countries	lose	leverage.	It	may	also	reduce	the	accountability	of	
representatives	to	their	constituencies. If	governments’	positions	are	
made	transparent	through	recorded	votes,	representatives	may	be	
more	accountable	for	demonstrating	that	their	decisions	reflect	the	
interests	of	their	national	governments	or	other	constituencies.
Sources: 
H.	Schmermers	and	N.	Blokker,	International Institutional Law	(Boston:	
Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers,	1995),	note	1	at	§	771.
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demands of the most vulnerable countries, particularly 
the least developed countries and the Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS). The Least Developed 
Countries Fund (LDCF) supports the development and 
preparation of national adaptation programs of action. 
The Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) places a 
special emphasis on: (1) adaptation; (2) transfer of 
technologies; (3) energy, transport, industry, agriculture, 
forestry, and waste management; and (4) economic 
diversification.49 While both Funds emanated from the 
desire of a majority of developing countries to create new 
institutional arrangements separate from the GEF Trust 
Fund that would be more responsive to their priorities, 
the governance and management of these Funds 
has been effectively outsourced to the GEF Council 
and Secretariat.50 The SCCF and LDCF policies and 
procedures are determined by the GEF Council, which 
acts as the Council for the two Funds under the guidance 
of the COP.51 Decisions are made by consensus, and 
should consensus fail, by a vote based on GEF double-
weighted majority rules that are modified to reflect each 
country’s relative contribution to these Funds (rather 
than their contributions to the GEF).52 According 
to the GEF Secretariat, members of civil society and 
representatives of other relevant international agencies 
(e.g., UNDP, UNFCCC) are welcome to attend Council 
meetings dealing with the LDCF and SCCF agendas as 
observers.53 
the Adaptation Fund model
The Adaptation Fund Board (AFB) was designed with 
a composition of 10 developing country members and 
six developed country members. Decision-making is by 
consensus, and if consensus fails, by a two-thirds majority 
vote, based on one member, one vote. In theory, all 
developing country members would need to join with 
one developed country member to adopt a decision. 
All meetings of the AFB are open to observers, who 
may participate only upon invitation of the chair. This 
balance of power in favor of developing countries on the 
AFB may be attributable in part to the financing of the 
Adaptation Fund, which is drawn from a portion of the 
proceeds of the Clean Development Mechanism, rather 
than contributions from developed countries.54 
World Bank–Administered Funds model
Outside the auspices of the Convention, but in a 
parallel effort to inform the next generation of climate 
finance, the World Bank has been conducting a series 
of “live experiments” in institutional design through 
its Climate Investment Funds (CIFs). The governance 
structure of the World Bank–administered CIFs departs 
from the traditional Bretton Woods governance 
structure, in which donors have more votes (see Box 4).
Instead, the CIFs emulate the design of the GEF and 
the Multilateral Fund for the Montreal Protocol55 (but 
without the double majority veto system), and they 
feature an even division of membership and decision-
making power between contributors and recipients. Each 
of the CIFs is governed by a relatively small Trust Fund 
Committee with an equal number of contributor country 
representatives and recipient country representatives. 
The Clean Technology Fund (CTF) committee, for 
example, has eight contributor and eight recipient 
tab le  2   FouR models  FoR climAte  F inAnce goveRnAnce
goveRnAnce model BAsic goveRnAnce stRuctuRe method oF decision-
mAking
stAtus oF non-stAte PARticiPAnts
Global Environment Facility model Core governance outsourced by COP 
to GEF Council of 32 members: 16 
from developing countries, 14 from 
developed countries, and 2 from 
economies in transition 
Consensus (and if it 
fails, double-weighted 
majority voting)
The GEF CEO may invite civil society 
observers to contribute to the meeting; 
also engages with NGOs through the 
GEF-NGO network that includes more 
than 700 members
marrakesh model (Least Developed Country 
Fund and Special Climate Change Fund)
Core governance outsourced by COP to 
the GEF Council 
Consensus (and if it 
fails, modified double-
weighted majority voting)
Civil society and representatives 
from other international agencies can 
observe
Adaptation Fund model Governed by Board created by CmP 
and consisting of 10 developing 
country members and six developed 
country members
Consensus (and if it 
fails, two-thirds majority 
voting)
meetings open to all kyoto Protocol–
accredited observers, who may 
participate if invited by chair
Climate Investment Funds model (Clean 
Technology Fund and Strategic Climate Fund, 
including the Forest Investment Program and 
Pilot Program on Climate Resilience)
Each Fund governed by a Trust Fund 
Committee of 12–20 members with 
an equal number of contributor and 
recipient country representatives 
Consensus only “Active observer” positions open 
to civil society, private sector, 
representatives from multilateral 
agencies, and indigenous groups
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Box  4   ReFoRm oF  the  goveRnAnce oF  the  BRetton Woods institutions
The governance structures of the Bretton Woods Institutions—the 
World Bank Group and the ImF—have for 60 years provided a model 
for the design of multilateral financial institutions, inspired by the 
shareholder model of a commercial bank. Each country party to the 
World Bank charter has 250 votes, plus one vote for every share 
of stock held in the Bank. Quotas of capital stock were originally 
assigned on the basis of the relative economic power of the various 
economies of the world in the 1950s when the World Bank and ImF 
were established. 
As developing countries have sought to join these systems the 
capital stock has increased, but the general power dynamics have 
remained constant. In April 2008, however, the formula for assigning 
ImF quotas was reformed on the basis of a weighted average of 
a number of factors: GDP (50 percent); openness (30 percent); 
economic variability (15 percent); and international reserves (5 
percent). The ImF has also agreed to “adjust quota shares every 
five years to reflect members’ evolving weight in the world economy 
and to increase the shares of underrepresented countries” in order 
to create a more dynamic power mechanism. Civil society groups 
have argued that voting shares should be assigned on the basis 
of human development variables in addition to economic ones. For 
example, it has been proposed that GDP at purchasing power parity 
(PPP), population, greenhouse gas emissions, external debt, and 
the poverty index might all be variables that should be factored into 
the allocation of voting shares. These perspectives inevitably color 
Parties’ views on the design and choice of institutions that should be 
entrusted with financing climate change. 
The Executive Board of the World Bank consists of 24 Executive 
Directors, where the five Executive Directors with the largest quotas/
voting shares are appointed by their respective governments,1 namely 
the United States (16.40 percent), Japan (7.87 percent), Germany 
(4.49 percent), France (4.41 percent), and the United kingdom 
(4.31 percent).2 The remaining 16 Executive Directors are elected 
by member states, which in theory belong to geographically related 
voting blocs, and each voting bloc casts their vote as one unit. 
China has sought speedy implementation of the agreement reached 
by leaders of the Group of 20 at their Pittsburgh summit to increase 
developing countries’ voting power and quota in the ImF and the 
World Bank by at least 5 percent and 3 percent, respectively. The ImF 
was also urged to set up an automatic adjustment mechanism for 
its quota in the mid- and long term to reflect the evolving weight of 
each member in the global economy. This includes encouraging the 
World Bank toward the ultimate goal of parity voting power between 
developed and developing members, a goal endorsed by the Bank’s 
President.
The first round of the voice and vote reform at the World Bank Group 
was approved at the 2010 annual meeting of the World Bank. The 
Bank’s 186 member countries endorsed an USD 86 billion general 
capital increase (a first in 20 years) and approved a shift in 
voting power to developing countries. The shift represents a “3.13 
percentage point increase in the voting power of Developing and 
Transition countries, bringing them to 47.19 percent.”3 In addition, 
a twenty-fifth seat at the World Bank Board was approved for sub-
Saharan Africa. A new post-crisis strategy was also adopted, as well 
as a package of reforms to make the Bank “more efficient, more 
flexible, and more accountable.” 
The decision to shift power and representation at the World Bank 
was welcomed as a significant step forward by developing countries, 
including China and India. The Chinese Finance minister called the 
reform “an important step towards equitable voting power between 
developing and developed members.”4 China has now become the 
third largest member behind the United States and Japan. 
Nonetheless, calls for reform continue. For example, developing 
country governments have suggested that the process for choosing 
the leaders of the World Bank and ImF needs to be more open, 
transparent, and merit-based. There has also been an explicit 
demand for the Bank and the ImF to continually increase developing 
countries’ representation in their staffing structure, particularly 
senior management, in order to achieve “a good geographic 
balance.”
Sources:
IMF,	“IMF	Quotas	Fact	Sheet”	(August	31,	2009),	online	at:	http://www.
imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm;	Group	of	Lecce,	“Reforming	
Global	Economic	Governance:	A	Proposal	to	the	Members	of	the	G-20,”	
Euromediterranean	School	of	Law	&	Politics	Sector	(2009);	A.	Marston,	Are	
We	Nearly	There	Yet?	Bridging	UK	Supported	Funds	and	Post	2010	Climate	
Architecture	(Bretton	Woods	Project,	June	2009);	A.	Caliari	and	F.	Schroeder,	
“Reform	Proposals	for	the	Governance	Structures	of	the	International	
Financial	Institutions,”	New	Rules	for	Global	Finance	(Mimeo,	May	2004);	A.	
Buira,	“The	Governance	of	the	IMF	in	a	Global	Economy,”	in	Challenges	to	the	
World	Bank	and	IMF,	Developing	Countries	Perspectives,	A.	Buira,	ed.	(London:	
Wimbledon	Publishing	Company,	2004);	Statements	by	China,	Switzerland,	
et	al.	during	the	WB/IMF	Meetings	in	Istanbul,	October	6–7,	2009;	World	
Bank,	“World	Bank	Reforms	Voting	Power,	Gets	USD	86	Billion	Boost,”	World	
Bank	Press	Release	(April	25,	2010),	online	at:	http://go.worldbank.org/
VOCHUCZQL0;	Xinhua	News	Agency,	“World	Bank	Increases	Voting	Power	of	
Developing	Countries,”	(April	26,	2010),	online	at:	http://news.xinhuanet.
com/english2010/world/2010-04/26/c_13266889.htm;	Statement	by	Ashok	
Chawla,	Department	of	Economic	Affairs,	India,	April	2010.	
Notes:
1.		Saudi	Arabia,	China,	and	Russia	also	appoint	their	respective	Executive	
Directors	because	they	enjoy	a	single	country	voting	bloc.
2.		As	of	June	30,	2009.
3.		World	Bank,	“World	Bank	Reforms	Voting	Power,	Gets	USD	86	Billion	Boost,”	
World	Bank	Press	Release	(April	26,	2010).
4.		Xinhua	News	Agency,	“China’s	Influence	Grows	at	the	World	Bank,”	
China	Daily	(April	26,	2010),	online	at:	http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
china/2010-04/26/content_9772218.htm.
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countries. In addition, there are a number of dedicated 
“active” observer positions, “self-selected” by their 
constituencies, that represent relevant multilateral 
agencies such as the GEF, UNDP, and UNEP; the 
private sector; civil society; and in the case of the Forest 
Investment Program (FIP), indigenous peoples. Under 
each of the CIFs, decisions are to be made by consensus. 
CIF Trust Fund Committee deliberations over budgets 
and work programs, and CTF discussions on the details 
of projects to be funded, have, to date, been closed to 
observers.56
In the case of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 
(FCPF), there are also an equal number of contributor 
and recipient country representatives of the Participant 
Assembly represented on its Governing Participant 
Committee, whose proceedings are open to observers 
from civil society and representatives of indigenous 
peoples. Civil society groups are also able to participate 
in the Facility as contributors. The Nature Conservancy, 
for example, has contributed USD 5 million to the 
carbon finance mechanism of the FCPF, and is therefore 
a voting member of the Participant Assembly. 
3 3 the PoWeR oF the conFeRence 
oF the PARties in the context oF 
“outsouRcing”
As has been mentioned in the context of the GEF, 
accountability of the financial mechanism to the COP 
is an important part of the power struggle between 
contributor and recipient countries. The struggle 
continues in the design and operation of the Adaptation 
Fund, new experiments such as the Climate Investment 
Funds, and in the post-Copenhagen negotiations. If 
the Parties agree, as they did with the GEF and the 
AF, to “outsource” some or all of the operations of the 
financial mechanisms to institutions other than those 
created by the COP, these institutions will be outside 
the direct authority of the Parties and answerable to 
their own systems of governance. As with the COP-GEF 
relationship, technicalities related to legal personality 
and capacity will prevent the COP and outside 
institutions from being formally bound together. 
The power of the secretariat of the financial 
mechanism is a key piece in the power dynamic 
between COP and the mechanism. Fund secretariats, 
the international civil servants responsible for 
managing the project cycle, can play a crucial role in 
mediating the power relationships among contributors, 
recipients, and the financial mechanisms they create. 
In decentralized structures that rely upon multiple 
governing boards that meet infrequently, and multiple, 
networked Implementing Agencies (such as the GEF 
and the Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol), 
the secretariat can be a gatekeeper between policies 
and implementation, and between resources and 
recipients. The GEF Secretariat’s role in implementing 
the Resource Allocation Framework has been seen 
as a particularly controversial exercise of secretariat 
“power.”57
Adaptation Fund 
The design and establishment of the Adaptation 
Fund by the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of 
the Parties, or CMP) represents the most recent and 
creative attempt to bring climate finance more directly 
under the Parties’ control. This attempt revealed that 
the power of a financial mechanism is closely linked 
to its legal personality and its institutional capacity 
to perform the functions necessary to raise, manage, 
and allocate funds. Efforts by developing countries 
to create a functioning fund independent of the GEF 
and its Implementing Agencies (in particular, the 
World Bank) ran into the challenge that without 
“international legal personality” the AF is unable, on 
its own, to enter into the contracts necessary to hire 
staff, to convert Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) 
into cash, and to enter into grant or loan agreements 
with the recipient country institutions. 
Under an MOU between the CMP and the GEF 
Council, the AF will rely upon the GEF Secretariat 
to perform, on an interim basis, the institutional 
functions necessary to “operationalize” its project cycle. 
Under “legal arrangements” between the CMP and the 
World Bank, the Bank will act on an interim basis as 
the Trustee of AF funds, primarily for the purpose of 
monetizing CERs, and for the financial management 
of the trust fund. These arrangements will be reviewed 
at COP-16 in Cancun. Under these arrangements, 
the Bank undertakes to “comply with” relevant CMP 
decisions but also will have “no liability” as a result 
of relying, in good faith, on these decisions. Aspects 
of these Terms of Reference appear to reflect the 
Bank’s expectation that the CMP does or will have 
legal personality and will be capable, for example, of 
participating in any disputes that may arise between 
the Bank and the CMP under international arbitration 
rules. Which institution is ultimately accountable 
for the intended and unintended impacts of AF 
investments remains ambiguous (see Box 5). 
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climate investment Funds
Climate Investment Funds, as administered by the 
World Bank, establish no formal relationship with the 
COP. In designing the CIFs, however, participating 
countries asked the World Bank and the regional 
development banks to emphasize the primacy of the 
UNFCCC process and the COP when they set up the 
Funds. The governance frameworks for both CIFs (i.e., 
the main document that outlines the objectives of the 
Funds) include a sunset clause stating that the CIFs will 
not “prejudice the on-going UNFCCC deliberations 
regarding the future of the climate change regime, 
including its financial architecture, and [each fund] will 
take necessary steps to conclude its operations once a 
new financial architecture is effective.”58 At the time 
of this writing, all funds have been committed, so any 
future continuation or expansion of the program will 
depend on additional commitments.
Proposals for Post-2012 climate Finance 
As part of the Copenhagen negotiations (see Box 2 in 
Section 2), the Group of 77 and China proposed for the 
financial mechanism to “operate under the authority and 
guidance, and be fully accountable to, the COP,” with all 
climate financing channeled through the UNFCCC.59 
China’s proposal for a Multilateral Technology 
Acquisition Fund echoes a similar set of governance 
arrangements.60 Many of the industrialized countries, 
on the other hand, including the United States, Japan, 
Canada, and Australia,61 prefer a decentralized approach 
to managing climate funds by relying on existing 
institutions with the financial mechanism merely being 
guided by the COP. Developing countries, in particular 
the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), argue that 
relying on existing institutions and on “the governance 
arrangements of the international financial institutions 
places small countries at a distinct disadvantage and 
more often the priorities of these institutions mirror the 
priorities of those in control.”62 
As discussed in Box 2, in October 2009, the United 
States proposed a new Global Fund for Climate 
operating under the Convention, with a balanced 
representation of net contributors and net recipients 
on its governing body. While this governance structure 
could be seen as a concession to developing countries, 
the United States proposal is ambiguous about the 
Fund’s relationship to the COP. It also asks developing 
countries (excluding least developed countries) to 
contribute resources to the Fund. It would rely heavily 
on existing international financial institutions, including 
the World Bank, to program its resources. While some 
developing countries have made contributions to the 
GEF, they have done so voluntarily (see Table 3). 
For these reasons, many developing countries reacted 
negatively to the proposal.63
3 4 PoWeR And conditionAlities
Whatever formal governance structures and 
decision-making procedures are put in place, financial 
mechanisms will likely remain vulnerable to the 
disproportionate power exercised by the countries that 
donate the bulk of the funds. One of the ways in which 
major contributors exercise this power is by withholding 
and adding conditions to their contributions. 
As long as contributions remain voluntary and 
disproportionately from the North (as is the case in all 
the funds studied except for the AFB), the institutions 
in each contributing country with the authority to 
appropriate funding will have a significant influence 
over the terms on which resources are allocated. Under 
previous global deals on climate finance, these terms have 
been set, by and large, by contributor countries keen to 
ensure that their taxpayers’ dollars were spent effectively. 
The United States, which because of the size of its 
Box  5     the  tRicky  issue oF  legAl  PeRsonAlity  And 
the  AdAPtAtion Fund
In	order	to	“resolve”	the	issue	of	legal	personality,	developing	
countries	asked	the	CMP	to	grant	the	AF	international	legal	
“personality”	or	capacity.	Conventional	understanding	of	
international	law	would	hold	that	the	CMP,	which	itself	is	not	an	
international	organization,	cannot	therefore	grant	international	legal	
personality	to	the	AF.	Because	the	AF	is	not	dependent	on	donor	
funds,	developing	countries	were	able	to	drive	through	a	set	of	CMP	
decisions	that	stand	on	unclear	and	untested	legal	grounds.	The	CMP	
decided	that	the	AF	“be	conferred	such	legal	capacity	as	necessary	
for	the	discharge	of	its	functions	with	regard	to	direct	access	by	
eligible	Parties	and	implementing	and	executing	entities	.	.	.	in	
particular	legal	capacity	to	enter	into	contractual	agreements	and	
to	receive	project,	activity	and	programme	proposals	directly.”	The	
decision	is	ambiguous	as	to	how	this	capacity	will	“be	conferred”	if	
the	CMP	does	not	have	the	capacity	to	confer	it	directly,	and	further	
legal	research	has	been	commissioned	by	the	AF	to	resolve	remaining	
ambiguities.	Germany,	as	the	host	government	of	the	UNFCCC	
Secretariat,	may	confer	domestic	legal	personality	recognized	under	
its	domestic	law,	as	may	individual	developing	country	governments	
wishing	to	enter	into	agreements	with	the	AF.
Source: 
Report	of	the	Conference	of	the	Parties	serving	as	the	meeting	of	the	Parties	
to	the	Kyoto	Protocol	on	its	Fourth	Session,	held	in	Poznan	from	1	to	12	
December	2008	Addendum,	Decision	1/CMP.4	Adaptation	Fund.
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economy is typically expected to contribute 20 percent 
or more of the resources of a financial mechanism, will 
often tie its contributions to conditionalities set by its 
administration or the U.S. Congress.64 As both the power 
and responsibility of developing countries in development 
finance grow, questions arise as to how these terms will be 
renegotiated in a post-2012 regime. 
Donor conditionalities are also a means by which 
power can be exercised responsibly, and financial 
mechanisms can be held accountable to both their 
donors and beneficiary communities. This aspect of 
conditionality is discussed in Section 4. From the 
contributor’s point of view, such conditionalities are 
a straightforward expression of due diligence—the 
desire to ensure that resources are used in a manner 
consistent with their development assistance goals. The 
mechanism’s performance against these conditionalities 
will affect the prospects for its replenishment and thus 
can have a significant influence on the decisions of its 
governing body and the activities of its management and 
Implementing Agencies. However, these conditionalities 
can also be profoundly disempowering for developing 
country governments, requiring them to perform 
against an imposed set of standards. Recent exchanges 
between the U.S. Treasury, World Bank management, 
and developing country members of the Bank’s Board 
of Directors over U.S. efforts to block an investment 
in a coal-fired power plant in South Africa revealed 
the complex and dynamic relationship between power, 
responsibility, and accountability in the context of 
climate finance (see Box 6). 
3 5 distRiButing PoWeR thRough 
PRoJect cycle mAnAgement
The project cycle is the decision-making process 
through which grants and loans are proposed and 
approved, resources are disbursed, and results are 
monitored and evaluated. An effective and efficient 
financial mechanism needs to assess on a project-by-
project basis which projects are eligible, what funds will 
be available for each project, how performance will be 
measured, and what environmental and social safeguards 
will apply. Typically, these functions will be performed 
at different stages of the project cycle by the governing 
board, the fund secretariat, and by the program staff of 
Implementing Agencies. 
Traditionally, as with the case of the GEF, contributor 
countries and the institutions they dominate have used 
their influence over project cycle management—from 
application of resource allocation rules, standards, 
and the design of individual grants, to the application 
of social and environmental safeguards—as a way 
of protecting their investments and advancing their 
interests. These concerns and interests do not always 
align with recipients’ priorities. But practice varies 
considerably among the financial mechanisms studied in 
this report.
The Executive Committee of the Montreal Protocol 
Fund (composed of seven developed and seven 
developing countries) has been proactive in its project 
cycle. For example, at its third meeting, the Committee 
rejected all Implementing Agencies’ proposed work 
programs. While this may have led to some frustration 
tab le  3   develoPing countRies  thAt  Both contRiButed money to  And Received disBuRsements  FRom the 
geF  (2005–2009) 
voluntARy contRiButions to the FouRth 
geF RePlenishment (geF-4 2006) By 
select develoPing countRies  
(usd millions)
disBuRsements FRom geF to select develoPing countRies  
(Jan 2005 to oct 2009)
APPRoved  
(usd millions)
disBuRsed  
(usd millions)
China 11.09 237.33 28.43
India 10.50 35.57 3.50
mexico 6.25 57.49 3.41
Nigeria 6.25 4.08 3.16
Pakistan 6.25 5.15 0.51
South Africa 6.25 33.55 3.38
Turkey 6.25 9.59 0.98
Total 52.84 382.75 43.38
Source: Global Environment Facility, “Summary of Negotiations on the Fourth Replenishment of the GEF Trust Fund” (may 2006), online at: http://207.190.239.143/
replenishment/Reple_Documents/documents/R.4.35DraftSummaryofNegotiations.pdf.
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on the part of Implementing Agencies, some analysts 
have concluded that the Committee’s independence 
from these Agencies has been central to its success.65 By 
contrast, under the CIFs, the World Bank serves both 
as the CIF Secretariat and as its largest Implementing 
Agency. 
How will developing and recipient countries share and 
exercise power in project cycle management under a 
new climate regime? Will the same developing countries 
that have, as recipients, consistently called for more 
country-driven and country-owned development finance 
be respectful of a host country’s self-determination? Will 
countries that resisted donor conditionalities in the past 
find a means of ensuring the environmental integrity of 
investments by some other means? In other words, can 
developing countries achieve both competent project 
cycle management and greater legitimacy than current 
climate financial mechanisms? 
Whatever the answer, if the latest round of 
negotiations on climate finance is to succeed in 
leveraging significant transformations in developing 
countries, multilateral and bilateral policies will need 
to support and align with national planning processes. 
This will require a shift in power from contributor to 
recipient countries and a greater sense of responsibility 
and accountability by recipient countries. There are 
some indications that this shift is happening as the 
international community embarks on the design of the 
post-2012 climate regime. 
3 6 shARing PoWeR: the Role oF 
technicAl exPeRtise And non-stAte 
ActoRs 
Non-state participants such as civil society groups, 
technical experts, and private sector companies, will 
play a crucial role in the power dynamics of post-2012 
climate finance. They can moderate power relationships 
of a finance mechanism by providing transparency and 
accountability in their role as observers, by representing 
the views of marginalized communities—such as 
indigenous peoples—that are often underrepresented by 
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Bank of Brazil, Petrobras and Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES): Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (2008). 
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Box  6    PoWeR veRsus ResPonsiBil ity:  the  eskom suPPoRt  PRogRAm
The	World	Bank’s	recent	USD	3.75	billion	loan	to	the	South	African	
national	utility	Eskom—the	largest	stand-alone	energy	investment	
in	the	Bank’s	history—offers	insights	into	the	complexities	of	the	
politics	and	institutional	arrangements	for	climate	finance.	The	
loan	will	finance	the	construction	of	the	4,800	megawatt	(MW)	
Medupi	supercritical	coal-fired	power	plant,	a	railway	line	to	
enhance	the	efficiency	of	the	plant’s	fuel	supply	chain,	as	well	as	
a	100	MW	wind	farm	and	a	100	MW	concentrating	solar	thermal	
facility.	The	renewable	energy	components	of	the	Eskom	support	
program	are	central	components	of	South	Africa’s	Clean	Technology	
Investment	Plan,	which	will	be	co-financed	by	the	CTF.	The	African	
Development	Bank	will	co-finance,	at	a	smaller	scale,	both	the	coal	
and	renewable	energy	components	of	the	project.
The	Eskom	loan	has	provoked	controversy	among	governments	as	
well	as	civil	society,	and	it	was	seen	as	a	test	of	donor,	recipient,	
and	the	Bank’s	commitment	to	low-carbon	development.	South	
Africa	has	taken	a	very	progressive	stance	in	international	
negotiations	on	climate	change	and	was	one	of	the	first	major	
developing	countries	to	publish	“long-term	mitigation	scenarios”	
(LTMS)	demonstrating	how	it	could	significantly	reduce	its	GHG	
emissions	over	time.	The	Medupi	plant	doesn’t	deviate	from	these	
scenarios;	it	is	seen	by	the	government	as	necessary	to	meeting	
South	Africa’s	near-term	energy	needs	and	is	factored	into	the	GHG	
reduction	targets	that	President	Jacob	Zuma	announced	in	the	lead	
up	to	the	Copenhagen	COP.	
As	the	loan	was	being	prepared	by	the	Bank	staff,	the	United	
States,	the	Bank’s	most	powerful	shareholder,	proposed	guidelines	
for	MDB	lending	that	sought	to	significantly	restrict	World	Bank	
support	for	coal	as	an	option	of	last	resort.	The	Bank,	for	its	part,	
had	also	adopted	a	Strategic	Framework	on	Climate	Change	and	
Development,	which	was	designed	to	limit	the	circumstances	under	
which	the	Bank	will	invest	in	new	coal-fired	power.
In	the	weeks	before	the	Board	of	the	World	Bank	met	to	consider	
the	Eskom	loan,	developing	country	members—including	China,	
India,	and	Brazil—publically	rejected	the	proposed	U.S.	guidelines	
in	an	open	letter	to	the	Bank	President	and	labeled	them	as	an	
unacceptable	“green	conditionality,”	highlighting	the	irony	that	the	
proposal	came	from	one	of	the	world’s	largest	consumers	of	coal-
fired	power.	
Civil	society	was	also	split	on	the	issue.	Many	U.S.-based,	
international,	and	some	South	African,	NGOs	opposed	the	loan	and	
supported	the	U.S.	efforts	to	move	the	Bank	away	from	fossil-fuel	
financing,	particularly	at	a	time	when	the	Bank	was	positioning	
itself	as	a	future	steward	of	climate	finance.	Organized	business,	
such	as	Business	Unity	South	Africa,	made	public	statements	
in	support	of	the	loan	as	essential	to	meet	growing	demands	for	
energy.
Bank	management	supported	this	loan	as	a	“transitionary	
measure”	that	would,	because	of	the	components	supporting	
renewable	energy	and	energy	efficiency,	help	Eskom	take	long	
overdue	steps	to	implement	more	sustainable	programs.	
When	the	loan	reached	the	Board,	four	traditional	contributor	
constituencies	(the	United	States,	the	UK,	the	Netherlands,	and	
Italy)	abstained,	and	the	German	Executive	Director	joined	all	
major	developing	country	constituencies	in	approval.	This	level	of	
opposition	to	a	specific	loan	is	unusual,	as	the	Board’s	“culture	of	
approval”	tends	to	defer	to	management’s	judgment	and	to	avoid	
overriding	individual	members’	requests	for	loans.	In	the	context	of	
the	earlier	skirmish	over	the	U.S.	proposed	coal	guidelines,	it	was	a	
high-profile	exercise	of	developing	country	power	on	the	Board.
For	many	civil	society	observers,	the	loan	may	have	created	
the	impression	that	ultimately	the	World	Bank’s	management	
and	the	majority	of	the	Board	do	not	prioritize	environmental	
or	social	sustainability	objectives.	A	coalition	of	South	African	
and	international	NGOs	have	since	triggered	the	Bank’s	most	
high	profile	accountability	mechanism—its	Inspection	Panel—
claiming	that	the	loan	doesn’t	comply	with	the	Bank’s	social	and	
environmental	safeguards.	For	many	developing	countries,	the	
Eskom	decision	may	have	offered	some	reassurance	that	the	World	
Bank	will	be	responsive	to	their	stated	development	priorities,	even	
when	contributor	countries	express	concerns.	
Sources:
S.	Nakhooda,	“The	World	Bank’s	Eskom	Support	Program,”	(Washington,	
DC:	World	Resources	Institute,	April	2010);	Energy	Research	Centre,	Idasa,	
and	World	Resources	Institute,	Climate Change Finance: Unlocking Low 
Carbon Development Opportunities for South Africa,	Workshop	Report	
(August	2010);	L.	Friedman,	“South	Africa	Wins	$3.75	Billion	Coal	Loan,”	
New York Times	(April	9,	2010),	online	at:	http://www.nytimes.com/
cwire/2010/04/09/09climatewire-south-africa-wins-375-billion-coal-
loan-17887.html;	H.	Schmermers	and	N.	Blokker,	International Institutional 
Law (Boston:	Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers,	1995),	note	1	at	§	771;	L.	
Friedman,	“South	African	Coal	Plant	Proposal	Strains	‘Culture’	of	World	
Bank”	(E&E	Publishing,	LLC,	April	5,	2010),	online	at:	http://www.eenews.
net/public/climatewire/2010/04/05/1.
governments, and by bringing an expert evidence base to 
government decision-making. 
the global environment Facility
The GEF engages civil society on policy issues through 
the GEF-NGO network of accredited NGOs, managed 
by local focal points. The meetings of the GEF Council 
themselves are open to civil society observers. The GEF 
strategy and programs are also informed by a Scientific 
and Technical Advisory Panel (STAP); notably, the 
STAP reviews proposals for GEF funding and offers 
recommendations on their suitability to the GEF 
Council.
The need for technical advice is now widely 
recognized, but concerns about loss of political control to 
technocratic judgment continue to run deep. Developing 
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countries continue to express concern that if a board 
is formed primarily to deliver technical expertise, 
developing country power could be marginalized, since 
more technical expertise is often centered in developed 
countries. 
NGOs can also be grantees and “executing agencies” 
for GEF projects, including through the GEF’s Small 
Grants Program.
the montreal Protocol multilateral Fund
Among existing financial mechanisms, the Multilateral 
Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol 
stands out for its inclusion of technical experts, civil 
society, and the private sector. Meetings of the Montreal 
Protocol Fund Executive Committee are open to 
interested observers, unless more than one-third of 
the members object. Civil society groups fought hard 
for this provision, which has significantly enhanced 
the transparency and accountability of the Fund’s 
operations.66 The Committee can request to have any 
portion of its meeting concerning sensitive matters 
closed to observers. Industry has had a significant and 
often more direct role in the Montreal Protocol as 
well; industry representatives are often included on the 
country delegations of the Executive Committee.67 
The Fund also stands out for the Technical and 
Economic Advisory Panel (TEAP), which reviews 
replenishment requests as part of its overall function 
of providing independent scientific advice to the 
Montreal Protocol. Comparisons of the TEAP and 
the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
which serves a similar function for the UNFCCC, have 
noted that the TEAP is far more independent than the 
IPCC, which includes many negotiators, and whose 
report conclusions are carefully edited to reflect country 
perspectives.68 The TEAP also includes private sector 
representatives, allowing it access to information about 
new technological developments.69 
the climate investment Funds
The World Bank CIFs may have gone further than 
the Montreal Protocol Fund by institutionalizing formal 
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observer roles for civil society, the private sector, and 
in some cases indigenous peoples in the governance of 
the trust funds. Observers are allowed to suggest agenda 
items as well as contribute to discussions. The FIP of 
the Strategic Climate Fund, in particular, includes a 
large number of observers: four representatives of civil 
society (one each from Latin America, Africa, Asia, 
and developed countries); four indigenous peoples 
representatives (three regional, and a representative of 
the Chair of the U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Peoples); two representatives of the private sector; and 
representatives of the Secretariats of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, the UN-REDD program, and the 
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility. 
The design documents for the CTF were drafted before 
the establishment of this relatively inclusive governance 
structure. The basic criteria for the CTF were agreed 
upon at the original meeting to establish the CIFs at 
the beginning of 2008. As a result, stakeholders did not 
have much opportunity to debate or influence these 
fundamental design parameters (which, as we discuss in 
Section 5, have been quite controversial). By contrast, 
civil society representatives and indigenous peoples 
were active participants in the drafting of the FIP design 
documents. As a result, FIP priorities have placed 
significant emphasis on issues of governance, community 
empowerment, and the need to support programs that 
reassess the fundamental drivers of deforestation.
the Adaptation Fund 
The Kyoto Protocol’s Adaptation Fund does not 
provide a formal role for civil society, although all 
meetings are open to observers, and it has recently 
begun to webcast its meetings. Civil society advocates 
have successfully advocated for improvements in the 
Fund’s transparency: projects will now be publicly 
disclosed and open to comment prior to their approval.70 
The involvement of national institutions through 
“direct access” may, in certain national contexts, lead 
to greater local civil society participation in the AF 
project cycle. National institutions could learn a lot 
from the experience of the international Implementing 
Agencies’ policies on information disclosure, community 
engagement, and grievance mechanisms that have 
proved to be essential tools for civil society participation. 
Some of this experience is discussed in Section 5.
The quality of civil society and technical input 
within these fora can have a significant impact on the 
substantive outcomes and legitimacy of climate financial 
mechanisms. Formal space for public participation 
will only impact decisions if civil society groups step 
up to occupy that space and advance public interests, 
seeking transparency and accountability. In the case of 
the Montreal Protocol Fund, attention has been short-
lived, and few civil society groups have had a sustained 
presence in these discussions.71 The CIFs may have 
taken a step forward by institutionalizing civil society 
participation in the governing committee process. In 
the case of the CTF, however, discussions about actual 
country investment plans are closed to all observers.
3 7 conclusions
Developing countries are making significant political 
headway in demanding greater voice and vote in the 
overall governance of climate financial mechanisms. But 
the complex nature of the institutional and procedural 
relationships among contributors, recipients, and 
financial institutions requires investigation beyond 
formal governance structures into the informal means by 
which power is exercised in the course of an institution’s 
project cycle. 
The design and implementation of standards, the 
application of conditionalities, and the criteria for the 
allocation of resources are likely to be heavily influenced 
by traditional donors as long as they are the major 
sources of financial resources and have the discretion 
to withhold their contributions. While many of these 
standards and criteria are essential to the responsible 
investment of climate finance, if they are developed 
through the coercive use of donor power, rather than 
the collective decisions of all stakeholders, they are 
less likely to have a sustained impact. Donors and 
recipients also exercise power through their influence 
over the multiple institutions involved in the project 
cycle, including the COP, Implementing Agencies, 
and secretariats. Holding each of these institutions 
accountable for the decisions they influence is critically 
important in an effective decentralized approach to 
climate finance.
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By responsibility we mean the exercise of power 
to ensure that the resources entrusted to a financial 
mechanism are programmed fairly, effectively, and 
efficiently. This includes the responsibility exercised by a 
governing body in setting standards designed to ensure the 
environmental integrity and ambition of investments. It 
also describes the responsibility exercised by secretariats, 
trustees, and international and national Implementing 
and Executing Agencies in implementing these standards.
By seeking more power in the governance structures 
of climate financial mechanisms, developing countries 
implicitly assume greater responsibility in the funding 
decisions of these mechanisms. Developing countries are 
also seeking to gain “direct access” to funds raised globally 
for climate purposes. Essentially, direct access would 
enable national and sub-national developing country 
institutions to enter into grant and loan agreements 
directly with existing or new financial mechanisms, 
without having to rely upon Implementing Agencies or 
other intermediaries. To perform these functions well, 
these national institutions will have to demonstrate the 
capacity to ensure that standards are met responsibly.
Critiques of past development finance suggest that 
successful actions to reduce GHG emissions and respond 
to climate change must be grounded in development 
priorities and national policy-making processes. Under 
previous arrangements for development finance, 
contributor countries have largely set the terms on which 
developing countries can access funds. Contributor-
set standards attached to development assistance 
strategies—often described as “conditionalities”—have 
been heavily criticized for prioritizing the interests, 
agendas, and development strategies of contributor 
countries over the locally defined needs and constraints 
of recipient developing countries.72 Increasing the power, 
and therefore the formal responsibilities of developing 
countries in setting the terms for finance at the level of 
the governing boards, and in programming resources at 
the national level, could lead to more country ownership 
and more successful development outcomes.73
This Section reviews the experiences from various 
institutions at the governing-board level in exercising 
responsibility through establishing priorities via resource 
allocation and standard setting, as well as at the 
operational level in negotiating individual investments 
with host countries. Our analysis emphasizes the need 
for climate financial mechanisms to ramp up their efforts 
to support planning processes and institutions at the 
national level and the involvement of stakeholders in 
these processes to ensure that climate-related objectives 
are owned and supported by national constituencies.
4 1 ResouRce AllocAtion: PRioRitizing 
investments oF scARce ResouRces
Any new financial deal that emerges from post-
Copenhagen negotiations is likely to generate fewer 
resources than will be necessary to meet the demand 
for funds. As a result, governments—acting through 
the COP or through the governing board of a financial 
mechanism—will have to identify programming 
priorities and establish eligibility criteria to ensure that 
scarce funding achieves maximal impact. The GEF’s 
Resource Allocation Framework, discussed in Section 
2, is an example of an effort to develop an objective, 
criteria-based framework for prioritizing which countries 
receive financing. 
As was described, the RAF proved unpopular because 
it was pushed through at the insistence of the United 
States, and because its criteria resulted in the majority 
of funds being channeled to large countries, neglecting 
least developed and most vulnerable countries. But a 
lack of adequate selection criteria can also undermine 
the impact and legitimacy of a financial mechanism. 
One of the critiques of the Montreal Protocol Fund 
is that it did not adopt a framework for prioritizing 
which countries received funding. As a result, it did 
not systematically target the most strategic or low-cost 
options for the abatement of ozone depleting substances 
(ODS). The first round of programs it supported were 
in countries that were not the highest producers or 
consumers of ODS.74 
In the case of the Climate Investment Funds, the 
Strategic Climate Fund will support pilot programs in a 
small subset of countries. A process has therefore been 
put in place for experts to help the Bank select which 
countries will participate in pilot programs, in response 
to expressed country interest. The Clean Technology 
Fund, on the other hand, does not have a system in 
place to prioritize countries. Instead the priority has been 
to get programs off the ground as quickly as possible. 
Proposals have been reviewed on a first-come, first-
served basis. This may be a more viable approach for 
a pilot program than for a longstanding fund. As more 
countries line up to seek CTF resources, the Trust Fund 
Committee will need to create a process for prioritizing 
proposals.
The Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Protocol is 
exceptional because its resources are raised through a 
levy on the transactions of the Clean Development 
Mechanism, rather than from donor contributions. This 
fact alone should, in theory, significantly re-balance 
the power within the AF away from contributors 
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and generate decisions that are more reflective of the 
collective will and shared sense of responsibility of 
both developed and developing countries. The criteria 
for allocation of adaptation funds articulated in the 
AF’s operational policies and guidelines suggest that 
financing for the most vulnerable countries should be 
prioritized. This principle has not yet been put into 
practice, however, as the Adaptation Fund Board is 
still developing templates for project and program 
screening.75 An objective analytical basis for assessing 
the vulnerability of countries may help achieve this aim 
(see Box 7).
Agreed allocation criteria will be critical to the 
responsible programming of any climate financial 
mechanism. If the power of developing and recipient 
countries grows—for example, through the design of 
governance structures, or the de-linking of finance 
from the voluntary contributions of traditional donor 
countries—it is unclear what kind of new allocation 
rules may emerge. In addition to the divide between 
developed and developing countries, there are 
increasingly significant power imbalances among 
developing countries. The emerging economies, such 
as China, India, and Brazil, have begun to play the role 
of international donors through bilateral and regional 
financing mechanisms. It remains to be seen whether 
the allocation criteria developed by these new actors 
in development finance differ from previous allocation 
attempts and are perceived as more legitimate by the 
recipients of their funds.
4 2 setting stAndARds With investment 
cRiteRiA
The COP and/or the governing board will also need 
to set standards—often referred to as “investment” or 
“eligibility” criteria—to ensure there is environmental 
integrity, ambition of investments, and specified 
activities eligible for support. In a context in which 
developing countries are under pressure to reduce 
their long-term emissions trends while struggling to 
power economic growth and meet the basic energy 
needs of poor populations, striking a balance between 
environmental ambition and other development 
objectives will be at the heart of the governing body’s 
exercise of responsibility. 
the clean technology Fund investment criteria 
The investment criteria of the Bank’s flagship clean 
technology fund, the CTF, allow support for fossil 
fuel technologies if the investment is shown to be 
“transformative” and meet a set of emission standards. 
This has raised important questions about the terms 
on which scarce public resources should be spent. For 
example, CTF funding can be used to support ultra-
supercritical coal-fired power plants. While these plants 
are more efficient than conventional pulverized coal 
plants and therefore have cheaper lifetime operating 
costs, they will still emit millions of tons of carbon 
over their lifespan. CTF funding can also support the 
substitution of proposed coal-fired plants with highly 
efficient natural gas plants if the new facility will emit no 
Box  7   ResouRce AllocAtion FoR AdAPtAtion?
As	the	Adaptation	Fund	and	other	adaptation	funding	institutions	
explore	options	for	more	objective	allocation	of	finance,	there	is	
growing	interest	in	the	construction	and	application	of	vulnerability	
indices.	Such	indices	evaluate	a	country’s	vulnerability	to	climate	
change	by	using	quantitative	national-level	indicators	that	capture	
either	biophysical	or	socioeconomic	drivers	of	vulnerability.	One	
such	index,	developed	by	Brooks	et	al.	(2005),	assesses	climate	
vulnerability	using	indicators	in	the	areas	of	economy,	health	and	
nutrition,	education,	infrastructure,	governance,	geography	and	
demography,	agriculture,	ecology,	and	technology.	Likewise,	the	
Vulnerability	and	Adaptation	Module	of	World	Resource	Institute’s	
(WRI’s)	Climate	Analysis	Indicators	Tools	(CAIT;	http://cait.wri.org/
cait-va.php)	provides	data	for	indicators	in	six	categories,	including	
infrastructure,	institutions,	and	the	environment.	
Vulnerability	indices	can	guide	funders	in	targeting	especially	
vulnerable	countries,	but	care	is	needed	in	their	construction	and	
application,	since	generic	indicators	often	do	not	capture	the	unique	
processes	that	drive	vulnerability	in	different	countries.	For	example,	
Brooks	et	al.	(2005)	recognize	that	their	index	underestimates	the	
vulnerability	of	small	island	states.	Moreover,	indices	often	do	not	
capture	the	variation	in	climatic	and	social factors	within	a	country	
and	are	likely	to	overlook	the	vulnerability	of	specific	populations.	
Bottom-up	approaches	to	vulnerability	assessment	that	start	at	the	
community	level	may	provide	an	alternative	to	such	national	indices	
by	working	within	communities	to	determine	key	local	drivers	of	
vulnerability.	One	example	of	a	bottom-up	approach	is	the	Community-
Based	Risk	Screening	Tool—Adaptation	and	Livelihoods	(http://www.
cristaltool.org),	which	provides	communities	with	a	framework	to	
assess	local	vulnerability	through	determining	possible	local	impacts	
of	climate	change	and	assisting	in	the	compilation	of	potential	coping	
strategies.	Such	approaches	to	vulnerability	assessment	are	needed	to	
complement	index-based	approaches,	as	they	provide	a	clearer	picture	
of	how	to	address	adaptation	needs	on	the	ground.
Sources:	
N.	Brooks,	W.N.	Adger, and	P.M.	Kelly,	“The	Determinants	of	Vulnerability	
and	Adaptive	Capacity	at	the	National	Level	and	the	Implications	for	
Adaptation,”	Global Environmental Change	15	(2005):	151–163;	IISD,	SEI,	
IUCN,	“Community-Based	Risk	Screening	Tool—Adaptation	and	Livelihoods	
(CRiSTAL),”	online	at:	http://www.cristaltool.org;	UNEP,	“Vulnerability	Indices:	
Climate	Change	Impacts	and	Adaptation”	(UNEP:	2001).
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more than half the carbon of a coal-powered, business-
as-usual alternative. 
Civil society and independent analysts have sharply 
criticized the CTF’s willingness to consider investing 
in coal. Many have argued that the CTF should focus 
on alternatives to coal, such as wind and concentrating 
solar power, which need public support to reach the 
point where they can provide competitive, reliable 
power without the emissions of conventional fossil 
fuels.76 By contrast, developing countries and some MDB 
representatives have argued that the cheapest emission 
reductions may be gained from large-scale deployment of 
cleaner fossil fuel technologies.77
4 3 APPlying stAndARds thRough the 
PRoJect cycle
Standards agreed to by the governing body are 
typically applied through the project cycle to individual 
projects and programs by the secretariat, management 
staff, and/or Implementing Agencies of a financial 
mechanism. The debates over donor conditionality 
and recipient priorities that happen at the board 
level when the standards are set are often replayed in 
the project cycle level as projects are approved and 
implemented. Experience suggests that high standards 
that are designed to ensure funds are invested responsibly 
can slow the project cycle and the rate of fund 
disbursement. Similarly, the demand for greater civil 
society participation can both improve the quality of 
investments and slow down the approval process.
the global environment Facility
One of the dominant critiques of the GEF has been 
its cumbersome project cycle, which involves several 
stages of review and approval by the Implementing 
Agencies, the GEF Secretariat, associated technical 
panels, and the GEF Council.78 One study calculates 
that in 2005 the average time for projects to qualify for 
funding was between four and five years.79 Even after 
reforms were adopted in 2007 to expedite processing, 
the project cycle for full programs can take up to 22 
months before approval.80 The GEF Secretariat, which 
sits at the center of this complex process, has accrued 
significant responsibility in this decision-making process 
by managing which projects reach the GEF Council for 
final approval and when. The adoption of the Resource 
Allocation Framework detailed in Section 2 has also had 
a significant influence on which programs are eligible for 
support. The GEF Council is not a standing body and 
meets only twice a year, which constrains its consistent 
exercise of responsibility. The need for improved risk 
assessment and management has been recognized, as 
project managers are often “[unable] to adjust to changes 
in markets, policies, macroeconomic conditions, co-
financing, and government commitments.”81 
the Adaptation Fund
By contrast, in the case of the AF, a simplified project 
approval process has been proposed wherein projects 
and programs are submitted to the AF Secretariat (a 
function performed, ironically, by the GEF Secretariat) 
using approved templates, then screened for consistency 
by the Secretariat within 15 days, and reviewed by the 
Committee on Project and Program Review at the next 
board meeting. Program proposals are now disclosed on ©t
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the Web site of the AF, and comments are invited while 
screening is underway. 
the clean technology Fund 
The CTF investment criteria were tested by Ukraine, 
which sought CTF funds in support of an upgrade to its 
gas transit system and to build a new 450 MW combined 
cycle gas turbine with combined heat and power facility 
(CCGT/CHP). While the demonstration value of the 
CCGT/CHP project would have been important, it was 
not clear that USD 50 million in concessional finance 
from the CTF was necessary to make it viable. Similarly, 
the efficiency gains from upgrading the compressors 
in the gas network represented a highly cost-effective 
investment that would deliver emission reductions and 
benefits to the system as a whole, including end users in 
European countries. It was not clear that concessional 
finance from the CTF was essential to realize these 
reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions. 
Importantly, the plan did not meet the specific 
investment criteria for natural gas.82 
Transparency about the plan has allowed civil society 
to draw the attention of Trust Fund Committee members 
to these issues, though the investment plan discussions 
were held in executive session. The committee 
deliberations concluded that the plan did not meet the 
investment criteria, and requested Ukraine to revisit 
the plan and provide additional information on the 
regulatory and policy frameworks for the proposed 
investments. In March 2010, a revised Ukraine 
investment plan was submitted without these two 
components. The question of how to interpret the CTF 
investment criteria in these difficult cases will come up 
repeatedly: for example, the Kazakhstan investment plan 
sought CTF financing to build gas power plants fueled by 
waste gas from the country’s oil pipelines. 
the Forest carbon Partnership Facility
The FCPF administrative unit has developed a 
template for a Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP) 
that identifies a range of issues that countries should 
address in developing a REDD strategy. A Technical 
Advisory Panel (TAP) then reviews the R-PPs and 
assesses whether these criteria have been met. Again, 
challenges have been quick to manifest and difficult 
to overcome: on the one hand, governments see the 
TAP oversight of the R-PP process as overly intrusive 
and have raised questions about the legitimacy of these 
expert panels as jurors of their program development 
process. On the other hand, civil society groups 
have been actively engaged in this space, seeking 
to make new links between local realities and the 
programming decisions made by global fora. They 
have raised questions about the value of a TAP if its 
recommendations are subservient to political decisions 
taken within the FCPF governing committee.
While the FCPF’s “readiness plans” (R-PINs) had 
the potential to provide a common framework for all 
financing received for REDD programs and activities, 
donors and recipient countries have instead been 
developing distinct national REDD strategies with each 
new investment. Guyana and Indonesia, for example, 
have developed additional strategies and guidelines to 
access bilateral financing from the government of Norway 
for their REDD activities. Indeed, funds for the same 
general purposes are being channeled through different 
national institutions (for example, in Indonesia the 
Ministry of Forests has worked with the FCPF whereas 
the Ministry of Finance is engaging with the government 
of Norway, even as the national planning agency 
BAPPENAS develops a national climate change fund). 
Strategies for supporting low-carbon development 
must be robust, and there have been many critics of 
the draft readiness proposals that have emerged from 
the FCPF processes. Plans for low-carbon development 
are only useful to the extent that there is coordinated 
support for them and that they are not undercut by 
donors who seek to work outside of national plans, or by 
national institutions that are also vying for international 
support.83 
4 4 shARing the ResPonsiBility 
thRough AgReed cost stRuctuRes
Whatever shifts may occur in the power relationship 
between contributors and recipients, the level of climate 
finance provided to any project or program of activities 
will result from a case-by-case negotiation in which the 
responsibilities are set and shared between the climate 
financial mechanism and the host country. 
incremental cost Financing Revisited
Past efforts to finance environmental projects through 
the GEF as well as the Montreal Protocol Fund have 
been based on the concept of incremental cost funding, 
as discussed in Section 3. The provision of financing on 
a grant basis to support the agreed full incremental costs 
of developing country actions represents what could be 
referred to as the “Rio bargain.” The financial obligation 
of developed countries was limited to incremental 
cost financing, while the commitment of developing 
countries was linked to the level of financial resources 
provided to cover those costs. 
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While appealing at a conceptual level, incremental 
financing has proven difficult to apply in practice. For 
developing countries, the economic and social co-
benefits of climate change programs are appropriately 
prioritized, but the distinction between a development 
activity and a climate change program is not easy to 
delineate.84 Such distinctions are even more difficult to 
draw in the case of adaptation to climate change.85 
The Strategic Climate Change Fund and the Least 
Developed Countries Fund seek instead to finance 
the “additional costs” imposed by climate change 
on the “development baseline.” Activities that are 
considered to contribute to core development, such 
as the improvement of public health and education 
systems, infrastructure for rural development, and water 
sanitation, are not eligible for financing. Funding can 
only be sought to address the impacts of climate change 
on a vulnerable socioeconomic sector, beyond the 
development baseline. Projects need not generate global 
benefits, however; local benefits are adequate as long 
as their “additionality” can be demonstrated. Yet it can 
be very complex to distinguish the additional costs of 
climate change in this way, particularly given that many 
developing countries cannot meet the development 
needs that constitute the baseline.86 
Recent experiments in climate finance are taking a 
different approach to determining the scope of what can 
be funded and the balance of responsibilities between 
contributor and recipient countries. The CTF of the 
Climate Investment Funds, for example, determines 
a project’s eligibility and the level of financing on the 
basis of whether it will have a “transformative” effect 
by supporting programs that would not have been 
viable without concessional finance. CTF programs are 
intended to “stimulate lasting changes in the structure 
or function of a sub-sector, sector or market” and 
“demonstrate how CTF co-financing could be used, 
possibly in combination with revenues from emissions 
reductions, to make low GHG emissions investments 
financially attractive by improving the internal rates of 
return on such investments.”87  
The concept of “performance-based” financing may 
provide yet another frame for financing developing 
country actions. This concept is central to carbon 
financing, which rewards demonstrated emissions 
reductions. In essence, finance is made available on the 
basis of demonstrated changes in emissions, rather than 
on a distinction between global and domestic benefits. In 
the case of the World Bank–administered Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility, “performance” encompasses more 
than just demonstrated emission reductions: it includes 
the entire process of getting “ready” for carbon finance. 
This may include significant institutional capacity 
building and policy reform. Countries are able to access 
grant financing to prepare a readiness plan and identify 
the programs and measures that they would need to 
implement to reduce emissions, while also putting in 
place the technical infrastructure to better monitor 
forest cover and measure past rates of deforestation and 
associated emissions.88
4 5 FRom PRoJect to PRogRAmmAtic 
APPRoAches
The need to invest limited financial resources 
responsibly has also prompted financial mechanisms to 
move from a project-based approach to financing climate 
change to programmatic approaches that, in theory, 
can leverage broader societal change as well as private 
and domestic sources of investment. Making the shift 
from project to programmatic interventions can offer 
the opportunity to help countries demonstrate a much 
broader set of responsibilities than are associated with 
hosting projects. Programmatic funding can address some 
of the underlying challenges of policy, regulation, and 
institutional capacity that impede investment in low-
carbon, climate-resilient development. Programmatic 
funding can also reach much deeper into a host country’s 
national policy-making process than project funding, 
by, for example, increasing opportunities for civil 
society engagement. As such, programmatic funding 
at times raises concerns about the interplay between 
conditionality and sovereignty. In general, programmatic 
funding—particularly when it comes in the form of 
policy loans or requires other forms of co-funding by the 
recipient government—can in effect leverage sectoral or 
national-level emissions reduction commitments from 
developing countries. 
voluntary goals for ods Phaseout under the 
multilateral Fund for the montreal Protocol 
Under the Montreal Protocol Fund, eligible countries 
work with Implementing Agencies (the World Bank, 
UNDP, UNEP, and the U.N. Industrial Development 
Organization [UNIDO]) to develop country programs 
detailing the means by which they will meet their 
commitments to phase out the use of ODS by setting 
voluntary interim goals. Country programs typically 
contain prospective regulatory frameworks and 
legislation that would support ODS elimination, systems 
for monitoring progress in implementation, and the 
estimated incremental costs of action. Such programs are 
significantly easier to design for ODS phaseout than they 
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are for climate change, as the range of interventions are 
far more discrete. 
Initially, the Montreal Protocol Fund supported 
discrete projects. Over time, it evolved to support 
sector-wide initiatives and National Terminal Phase-
Out Plans.89 Independent evaluations of early Montreal 
Protocol Fund country programs found that their design 
was driven by Implementing Agencies, and countries 
did not feel ownership of their stated policies and 
objectives. This sometimes led to significant delays in 
project processing, approval, and implementation by 
national authorities.90 Over time, it became increasingly 
apparent to members of the Executive Committee that 
country coordination, information, training, and other 
forms of capacity building would be necessary to achieve 
Montreal Protocol objectives. Initially, many developed 
countries questioned the cost effectiveness and relevance 
of such an approach. In retrospect, reviews of the impact 
of the Montreal Protocol Fund have concluded that 
many of those interventions had significant and lasting 
impact.91 
the clean technology Fund 
The Clean Technology Fund has sought to take 
a programmatic approach to financing technology 
deployment. Discrete investments for which financing 
is sought are set in the context of a macro-analysis of 
the major sources of GHG emissions in the country, and 
the major opportunities for mitigation. The investment 
plan provides a justification for the proposed priorities 
for which CTF support is sought. In developing 
investment plans, the MDBs and countries involved 
are prompted to critically evaluate the extent to which 
there is an “enabling environment” in place for the 
proposed investments to be effective. In practice, 
however, few investment plans have addressed the 
underlying governance challenges that are associated 
with investments in significant depth.92 These issues are 
beginning to be dealt with in some of the projects that 
have emerged from these plans, though the Fund is not 
yet very far into its implementation stages. 
the Adaptation Fund 
The AF supports both projects and programs. Projects 
can be implemented at the community, national, and 
transboundary levels, and seek to achieve concrete 
outcomes within a narrowly defined timeframe. Programs 
are processes, plans, or approaches that exceed project 
boundaries. It will fund both small programs (less than 
USD 1 million) and full programs (more than USD 
1 million). The following general principles are to 
be used to allocate resources: “(i) a country’s level of 
vulnerability (ii) level of urgency and risks arising from 
delay (iii) ensuring access to the Fund in a balanced and 
equitable manner (iv) lessons learned in project and 
programme design and implementation to be captured 
(vi) securing co-benefits to the extent possible (v) where 
applicable, maximizing multi-sectoral or cross-sectoral 
benefits (vi) adaptive capacity to adverse effects of 
climate change.”93
The AF’s track record to date is limited, as are its 
resources. In early 2010, the governments of Spain and 
Germany committed USD 68 million to the Fund. The 
first call for projects and proposals was issued in March. 
Proposals received are disclosed on the Web site for 
any interested stakeholders to provide comments. As 
of June 2010, eight project proposals had been received 
that seek between USD 3 million and USD 15 million; 
five of these were approved by the Secretariat.94 An 
independent civil society review of the proposals 
concluded that attention to co-benefits in the project 
proposals was limited. It emphasized that there had been 
uneven engagement of stakeholders within countries in 
developing projects, noting that there has not been clear 
guidance from the Board emphasizing the importance of 
such engagement in the design and implementation of 
projects.95
the Forest carbon Partnership Facility
In the case of the FCPF, countries are developing 
national REDD strategies that then serve as the basis 
for climate finance. Thirty-seven “REDD+” developing 
countries are currently vying for the USD 115 million 
in the FCPF “readiness” fund. Countries can access 
up to USD 5 million to implement approved plans 
for improving their readiness to implement REDD+ 
emissions reduction programs. Readiness support 
should help countries: (1) prepare a REDD strategy 
that includes issues of carbon ownership and benefit-
sharing; (2) set reference scenarios for forest emissions 
based on recent historical emissions and estimates of 
future emissions; and (3) establish national monitoring, 
reporting, and verification systems for emissions and 
reductions. The sums of money on offer through 
the FCPF are small relative to the estimated costs of 
REDD.96 The active level of country participation 
may be explained by an expectation that the rules and 
strategies developed in this forum will directly influence 
international negotiations on a REDD mechanism 
that may emerge from the UNFCCC. Stakeholder 
participation and inclusion in the development of 
readiness proposals has been uneven, and the scope and 
comprehensiveness of these plans has been an issue of 
significant debate. 
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4 6 diRect Access to climAte FinAnce 
thRough nAtionAl imPlementing 
entities 
One of the major recent innovations in climate 
finance has been the concept of “direct access,” an 
approach that would enable national implementing 
entities (NIEs) under certain conditions to access global 
resources directly without the intervention of one or 
more multilateral implementing entities (MIEs), such as 
the MDBs or the U.N. agencies.97 As has been discussed, 
recipient countries have led this move to entrust NIEs 
with the management of climate finance in an effort 
to gain direct control over new financial flows. This 
approach should also entail the increased responsibility 
and capacity of recipient countries to meet standards of 
environmental and social integrity for programming.
While multilateral and bilateral development agencies 
have been experimenting with various forms of direct 
access—primarily through direct budgetary support and 
the development of national climate funds—the Kyoto 
Protocol AF is pioneering the highest profile experiment 
in direct access. Under the AF’s evolving practice, 
NIEs will need to meet a set of fiduciary standards 
that emphasize responsibility, financial management 
capacity, and accountability. These standards, however, 
have placed limited emphasis on underlying issues of 
institutional capacity. An AF accreditation panel has 
been proposed, which will screen applicants to see if 
they meet agreed-upon standards that focus almost 
exclusively on capacity to manage finances.98 The 
expertise, mandate to address climate change, or ability 
to influence key processes within countries that will be 
affected by climate change have not yet received much 
attention. 
Arguably, entities will build up such expertise 
over time, including through project and program 
implementation. It may not be reasonable in all cases to 
expect the institutions entrusted with climate change 
finance to demonstrate such capacity from the outset.99 
Nevertheless, these factors will impact their effectiveness 
over the long term. 
Of the fourteen project concepts submitted to 
the AFB, one will be implemented by the first 
accredited NIE from Senegal while the thirteen will 
be implemented by MIEs.100 Of the thirteen, ten are 
proposed by UNDP, one by the World Bank, one by 
UNEP and one by the World Food Programme (WFP). 
Several of the project concepts for financing are however 
still pending and deferred to the next deliberations of the 
AFB.101 To date, the AFB has accredited three NIEs from 
developing countries signaling the operationalization of 
the direct access modality.102 Senegal’s Centre de Suivi 
Ecologique, is the first NIE to implement a program and 
its focus is to support adaptation to coastal erosion. The 
other two NIEs are the Planning Institute of Jamaica and 
the Agencia Nacional de Investigacion e Innovacion 
(National Agency of Research and Innovation) of 
Uruguay.103 Interestingly, the AF did not approve the 
proposed World Bank program in Mauritania. Some 
observers have concluded that this is a sign that 
developing country institutions need support to be 
able to propose NIEs that can access the Adaptation 
Fund.104 It is also possible that the resources available 
via the Adaptation Fund are not yet significant enough 
to prompt local institutions to undertake the process of 
seeking accreditation as NIEs. 
While developing countries may have been slow to 
access the Adaptation Fund directly, many are setting up 
national institutions primarily financed through bilateral 
programs for the purposes of directly programming 
resources to address the challenges of climate change. 
The Amazon Fund, the Indonesia Climate Change Trust 
Fund, and the Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience 
Fund are all examples. These are discussed in greater 
detail in Section 5.
4 7 engAging stAkeholdeRs in PRogRAm 
design
While recipient countries may resist standards or 
safeguards that require that planning processes include 
public participation, a growing body of literature 
suggests that more open and transparent consultative 
processes for development plans may improve public 
ownership and the quality of development outcomes.105 
A government’s responsibility to manage the investment 
is both enhanced and shared with its intended 
beneficiaries. Certainly, such processes are at risk of 
being dominated and captured by constituents that 
stand to lose from ambitious climate change action, but 
there is also an increasingly engaged set of stakeholders 
interested in seeing the social, economic, and 
environmental co-benefits of climate change mitigation 
efforts realized. A growing number of stakeholders are 
keen to ensure that programs yield real and meaningful 
results for people and that climate change programs do 
not undermine hard won gains in social welfare and 
rights. 
In the case of the Clean Technology Investment Plans, 
it is not clear how much broad stakeholder engagement 
has taken place. R-PINs presented to the FCPF have 
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sometimes been outsourced to international consultants 
and NGOs to draft. While the process for developing 
R-PINs has been led by national institutions, in several 
cases local civil society groups have expressed concerns 
about the lack of public consultation and transparency in 
developing these proposals and the lack of attention to 
critical issues of governance and institutional capacity.106 
Such engagement will be important to ensure that 
programs are tailored to national needs, including 
those of the private sector, consumers, and citizens, 
and to enhance the prospects of successful program 
implementation. Over time, efforts by contributor 
and recipient country governments, and development 
agencies, to involve civil society in planning project or 
strategy implementation have increased. Such processes 
remain ad hoc, however, and the depth of engagement 
is often limited, particularly given the pressures to 
develop plans quickly and move to begin project 
implementation.107
4 8 conclusion 
Emerging experiments in climate finance are 
deepening and complicating the conventional top-
down relationship of responsibility among contributors, 
recipients, and the financial institutions they create. 
In the future, a greater emphasis on leveraging change 
through the demonstration effect of transformative 
investment may liberate climate finance from the case-
by-case bargaining of incremental cost financing. 
The combination of low-carbon growth plans and 
direct access to funding by national Implementing 
Agencies may lead to a greater emphasis on country-
owned climate plans that emerge from domestic 
planning processes rather than the existing priorities and 
portfolios of Implementing Agencies. National systems 
for measuring, reporting, and verifying funded actions, 
combined with an international system for measuring, 
reporting, and verifying that promised support is 
delivered, may lead to a more reciprocal relationship and 
deeper partnerships between contributors and recipients. 
If governments invest in developing robust plans for 
low-carbon and climate-resilient development through 
inclusive, transparent, and accountable processes, then 
contributors must support those national programs as 
they emerge from national priorities and processes. By 
the same token, developing country governments share 
the responsibility for ensuring a coordinated response 
Walk against warming: Melbourne, Australia (2009). 
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to donor expressions of interest, so that national 
institutions and strategies do not undercut each other. 
As developing countries take on new power and 
responsibility in the governing structures of climate 
financial mechanisms, they may prove more sensitive 
to the concerns of recipient countries about donor-
imposed conditionalities and focus instead on reaching 
agreement on the conditions necessary to empower 
developing countries to shape and manage their own 
climate policies. This may include providing the 
financial, technical, and capacity building support 
to create the strong, legitimate national institutions 
necessary to perform the functions of responsibility and 
accountability previously performed by Implementing 
Agencies.
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Protest outside of Asian Development Bank: Manila, Philippines (2010). 
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To be perceived as legitimate, institutions entrusted 
with climate finance must be accountable to contributors 
and recipient governments, as well as to the intended 
beneficiaries of their investments. In the context 
of climate finance, ultimately this means achieving 
results in terms of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, 
enhancing resilience to climate impacts, and doing so in 
a way that is consistent with prevailing environmental 
and social standards. In the context of grants and 
concessional lending, institutions entrusted with climate 
finance will also need to demonstrate conformity with 
international standards for the delivery of development 
assistance, reflected in the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness and elsewhere.108 
This Section considers the standards and systems that 
have been put in place to ensure the accountability 
of various climate financial mechanisms currently in 
operation. We start by considering the systems in place 
to assess whether the funding is having its intended 
result. We then consider the general fiduciary and 
financial management standards to which financial 
institutions are held. Finally, we turn to the standards 
put in place to avoid or manage unintended negative 
environmental and social impacts of investments. In 
so doing, we also consider systems designed to hold 
financial mechanisms accountable to communities 
affected by projects. 
Although such standards and systems of accountability 
are well established among many conventional donors 
and Implementing Agencies, such as the MDBs and 
U.N. agencies, they are often criticized for being 
insufficient or inconsistently applied.109 The current 
competition among international financial institutions 
for the mandate to manage new climate finance provides 
an opportunity to test and compare their track records. 
For example, some of the resistance from civil society 
organizations to giving the World Bank and other MDBs 
a prominent role in climate finance stems from analyses 
that show a track record of investments that perpetuate 
dependence on fossil fuels. 110 
While many would consider standards and systems for 
accountability essential to the legitimacy of any financial 
mechanism, their existence has proved controversial. 
Recipient governments whose projects are caught up 
in a contributor’s accountability system can find them 
an unwelcome intrusion on sovereignty,111 as these 
standards can be higher than those required by the host 
governments. The systems can provide opportunities for 
civil society organizations to challenge the decisions and 
actions, can expose the shortcomings of host country 
governments, and can lead to the cancellation of grants 
and loans.
Developing countries are demanding direct access 
to funds through NIEs without the intervention of 
international agencies, such as MDBs and the U.N. 
agencies. This will essentially increase the responsibility 
and associated accountability of national and—in some 
cases—regional agencies. The capacity of agencies to 
take on these new responsibilities will differ greatly 
from country to country, as well as within countries. 
We therefore consider the accountability standards and 
systems in place at a number of new national institutions 
established in developing countries to channel financing 
for climate change. Specifically we analyze Brazil’s 
Amazon Fund to address emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation, Bangladesh’s Climate Change 
Resilience Fund to support implementation of its 
Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan, and the 
Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund, as a means to 
understand accountability systems in place and suggest 
constructive ways forward (see Box 8). Our sample 
therefore includes a least developed country as well as 
two major emerging economies to illustrate the different 
challenges that countries in different circumstances may 
confront.
5 1 Accounting FoR Results 
Accountability begins with a precise as possible 
determination of an institution’s goals and objectives, as 
well as agreement on measurable indicators of successful 
performance. However, determining these is not an 
easy task. Complex interventions like climate finance 
can entail multiple, and potentially competing, goals 
and objectives. Early efforts at financing emissions 
reductions from industrial activities have, for example, 
been criticized for pursuing high-volume, low-cost 
emissions reductions with little local environmental or 
societal benefits. Likewise, forestry offset projects must 
be managed carefully to ensure that efforts to enhance or 
preserve forest “sinks” also provide livelihoods for forest-
dependent communities. Similarly, adaptation funding is 
still in its early stages of experimentation, and measuring 
success in terms of “enhanced resilience” is bound to 
prove challenging.112 Nevertheless, the axiom that “what 
is measured is managed” should drive those institutions 
entrusted with climate finance to continue to refine 
efforts to develop and to hold themselves accountable 
against results-based management frameworks.
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the global environment Facility
As has been described, the GEF’s mission is to deliver 
global environmental benefits. Projects and programs 
are assessed by the GEF’s Evaluation Office. Reporting 
and impact assessment requirements vary according to 
the size of the project, and impact assessment processes 
for full projects are comprehensive. In 2007, the GEF 
Secretariat submitted a Results-Based Management 
(RBM) Framework to improve management 
effectiveness and accountability in monitoring and 
evaluation. The RBM considers impacts at the 
institutional, programmatic, and project levels. For 
climate change these may include energy consumption 
and GHG emissions; avoided tons of carbon dioxide (or 
its equivalent); the policy and regulatory frameworks 
adopted; market penetration of on-grid renewable 
energy; the number and percentage of rural households 
served by renewable energy; the number and percentage 
of trips made on sustainable modes of transportation; 
and decreased vulnerability or enhanced resilience to 
climate change.113 The RBM framework is intended to 
make the GEF more results-oriented and increase project 
effectiveness.
the multilateral Fund of the montreal Protocol
Under Article 5 of the Montreal Protocol, developing 
countries are required to report on the status of 
implementation of their country programs. They provide 
data on ODS use by sector, as well as import, export, 
and production information. The Secretariat prepares an 
update for each meeting of the Executive Committee. 
Project impact is now assessed with reference to a set 
of qualitative indicators for both investment projects 
(which consider the quality of preparation, technology 
choice, and management risk) and non-investment 
projects (which consider achievement of project 
objectives, implementation delays, and costs). 
The Executive Committee has sought more regular 
reporting on delays to create an early warning system 
for potentially problematic projects. Since 2002, a Web-
based system has been introduced to facilitate real-time 
reporting and support implementation. Funding may 
Box  8   oveRvieW oF  nAtionAl  climAte  Funds
Brazil’s Amazon Fund
The	Brazilian	Amazon	has	over	1	billion	acres	of	rainforest.	
Approximately	50	million	acres	have	been	lost	over	the	past	20	years	
due	to	deforestation.	Preservation	of	these	forests,	which	serve	as	
important	carbon	sinks,	is	one	of	the	central	components	of	Brazil’s	
Climate	Change	National	Plan.	The	purpose	of	the	Amazon	Fund	is	
to	provide	an	incentive	for	Brazil	and	other	developing	countries	
with	tropical	forests	to	continue	to	increase	voluntary	reductions	
of	greenhouse	gas	emissions	from	forest	deforestation	and	forest	
degradation,	as	proposed	by	the	Brazilian	delegation	to	the	COP-12	
in	Nairobi.	Created	in	August	2008,	the	Fund	received	a	USD	1	billion	
donation	from	the	Norwegian	Government,	with	USD	110	million	to	be	
disbursed	in	2009	and	2010	and	the	remainder	to	be	fully	transferred	
by	2015.1
indonesia climate change trust Fund (icctF)
The	ICCTF	is	a	financial	mechanism	that	is	designed	to	tap	into	the	
policy	framework	for	climate	change	mitigation	and	adaptation	as	
well	as	to	support	it	financially	with	minimal	transaction	costs.2	
It	was	intended	to	address	the	immediate	and	emerging	needs	of	
Indonesia’s	Climate	Change	Sectoral	Roadmap	(CCSR)	program	
investments.3	The	ICCTF	is	an	independent	entity	operated	by	the	
Ministries	of	Planning	(BAPPENAS)	and	Finance,	with	primary	
sectoral	foci	on	energy,	forestry,	and	climate	resilience	for	mitigation,	
and	on	agriculture	and	coastal	areas	for	adaptation.	The	two	primary	
goals	of	the	ICCTF	are	to:	(1)	achieve	a	low-GHG	emissions	economy	
with	greater	climate	resilience;	and	(2)	enable	the	government	
of	Indonesia	to	increase	the	effectiveness	of	its	leadership	and	
management	in	addressing	climate	change.	Additionally,	the	ICCTF	
aims	to	align	international	financing	mechanisms	and	contributor	
support	of	climate	change	with	the	Indonesian	Government’s	national	
investment	policies	and	to	facilitate	private	sector	investment	in	
climate	change.	
Bangladesh’s climate change Resilience Fund
Because	Bangladesh	is	one	of	the	most	vulnerable	countries	in	the	
world	to	the	effects	of	climate	change,	its	climate	financing	needs	
add	significantly	to	the	basic	development	assistance	required	to	
help	the	country	achieve	sustained	economic	growth.	The	BCCRF	was	
established	to	scale-up	investment	and	meet	the	needs	outlined	in	
Bangladesh’s	Climate	Change	Strategy	and	Action	Plan	(CCSAP).	
In	essence,	it	was	designed	to	serve	as	a	one-stop	shop	for	climate	
change	financing	in	Bangladesh.	The	UK	Government,	through	its	
Department	for	International	Development,	committed	USD	96	million	
(£60	million)	to	the	Fund.	
Notes:
1.		Banco	Nacional	de	Desenvolvimento	Econômico	e	Social	(BNDES	-	Brazilian	
Development	Bank),	“Amazon	Fund,”	online	at:	http://www.bndes.gov.br/
SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_en/Institucional/Social_and_Environmental_
Responsibility/amazon_fund.html.
2.		Indonesia	Climate	Change	Trust	Fund,	“The	Indonesian	Climate	Change	
Trust	Fund	(ICCTF)	and	National	Road	Map”	(July	2009),	online	at:	http://
www.ccap.org/docs/fck/file/Liana%20-%20Indonesia%20slides%20
for%20Amsterdam%20FAD.pdf.
3.		Indonesia	Climate	Change	Trust	Fund,	“Blueprint	for	Indonesia	Climate	
Change	Trust	Fund	(ICCTF),	BAPPENAS”	(May	2009),	online	at:	http://www.
ccap.org/docs/resources/686/ICCTF.pdf.
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The GHG benefit per dollar of CTF money invested 
has also been proposed as a measure of success. 
The World Bank also has proposed to monitor 
overarching impacts at the country level, such as the 
average carbon intensity of the sector or country, the 
share of low-GHG emissions technologies in production, 
or the average efficiency of coal- and gas-fired plants. 
These indicators have been quite controversial with 
developing countries, in part because indicators are 
designed to measure outcomes well beyond the proposed 
life of the CTF (programs are supposed to be completed 
by 2012), and because it is difficult to make causal links 
between CTF programs and such macro-level trends. 
Portfolio performance will also be assessed through 
measurement of, for example, the development outcomes 
of projects, the aggregate emission reductions, the quality 
of project supervision, or delays in implementation. 
Developing countries have also asked the administrative 
unit to monitor the extent to which contributions to the 
Fund are new and additional to overseas development 
assistance. Limited emphasis has been placed on 
institutional or capacity issues to date.115 
By contrast, the results framework for the Pilot 
Program on Climate Resilience has been developed in 
consultation with a number of independent experts. 
It seeks to assess whether projects: (1) pilot and 
demonstrate approaches for integration of climate risk 
and resilience into development policies and planning; 
be discontinued for projects with sustained delays. In 
general, evaluations have found that “ODS phase-out 
had occurred as planned. . . . The level of funding was 
often seen as tight at approval stage but generally proved 
to be sufficient to achieve the conversion, and in many 
cases some remaining funds were returned after project 
completion.”114 
climate investment Funds
Each of the sub-funds of the Climate Investment Funds 
has a specific results management framework, and efforts 
have been made to agree upon the general elements of 
this framework before program implementation begins. 
Committee members have expressed interest in having 
reporting in real time. The Clean Technology Fund 
Committee has not yet agreed upon the final scope of 
the framework. The draft framework proposes to assess 
the impact of financed projects in terms of:
n	 Deployment of low-GHG emissions technologies on a 
significant scale; 
n	 Impact on carbon intensity; 
n	 Measurement of GHG reductions against an 
estimated baseline that ensue from the programs 
funded; and 
n	 Percentage of investment leveraged from other public 
and private sources. 
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(2) strengthen capacities at the national levels to 
integrate climate resilience into development planning; 
(3) scale-up and leverage climate-resilient investment, 
building upon other ongoing initiatives; and (4) enable 
learning-by-doing and sharing of lessons at the country, 
regional, and global levels.116 The indicators in the 
framework are less specific than the mitigation indicators 
used in the CTF, or for that matter in the GEF. This may 
reflect the much wider range of activities that countries 
may undertake in order to increase resilience to climate 
change.
Adaptation Fund
The Adaptation Fund is still in the process of 
developing standardized project performance indicators. 
In order to gain accreditation, NIEs must demonstrate 
that they have the capacity to manage projects. Each 
project is required to include a results framework with 
a monitoring and evaluation component containing 
clear indicators for measuring project impact and 
sustainability, according to the March 13, 2009, Draft 
Provisional Operational Policies and Guidelines for 
Parties to Access Resources from the Adaptation Fund. 
At the recent 11th meeting of the Board, a project-level 
results framework and baseline guidance document was 
adopted.117 Any project or program funded through the 
AF now has to be aligned with this results framework 
and has to “directly contribute to the overall objective 
and outcomes outlined” and use the format of a project 
logical framework and impact chain. The AF’s Strategic 
Resources Framework is relatively detailed and outlines 
clear objectives, goals, and indicators for each output. 
national Funds
The Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund 
This facility follows the performance monitoring 
standards set by the Fund’s administrator, the World 
Bank. The procedures for review and quality control 
will follow Bank guidelines on advisory and analytical 
activities. As the Bangladesh Government Multi-
Donor Trust Fund for Climate Change Draft Concept 
Note states: “With a view to capacity building and 
institutional strengthening, the Bank will execute part 
of the MDTF, specifically related to the preparation 
of analytical work and capacity building activities, as 
broadly identified under the [Bangladesh’s Climate 
Change Strategy and Action Plan] pillars.”118 
Additionally, a monitoring matrix will be developed to 
track inputs, outputs, and outcomes with intermediate 
and key performance indicators.
Brazil’s Amazon Fund 
Amazon Fund projects must comply with Brazil’s 
National Plan on Climate Change. Funding applications 
need to conform to the guidelines of the Sustainable 
Amazon Plan (PAS) and the Prevention and Control 
of Deforestation of the Legal Amazon (PPCDAM). 
Performance monitoring is comprised of regular auditing, 
primarily focused on checking that Fund resources 
correspond to the objectives and criteria established 
by its Steering Committee. Additionally, the Fund’s 
Technical Committee and external auditors will review 
the emissions reductions from deforestation and assure 
contributors that their funds are going toward these 
reductions. 
Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund (ICCTF)
This Fund will include a Steering Committee 
responsible for organizing the monitoring and 
evaluation of projects to assess their effectiveness and 
impacts. Additionally, the Secretariat will develop and 
implement monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for 
the ICCTF.119 The tchnical committee will conduct 
monitoring and evaluation, including field surveys 
and spot checks, quarterly reporting, regular meetings 
with ICCTF management, and midterm and terminal 
evaluations. UNDP has recently been appointed to 
administer the ICCTF. 
5 2 FiduciARy stAndARds And FinAnciAl 
mAnAgement 
Fiduciary standards describe the specific duties 
attributable to the trustee of a trust fund holding money 
for the beneficiaries of that fund. In the context of 
climate finance, the term “fiduciary standards” has 
also come to describe the broader set of capacities 
and responsibilities required of an agency entrusted 
with implementing grants and loans. We focus on this 
second aspect. The fiduciary standards for Implementing 
Agencies for the GEF and the Adaptation Fund present 
a useful starting point for the issues raised by fiduciary 
standards.
global environment Facility 
In 2005, the GEF Council, which relies on 
Implementing and Executing Agencies to carry out its 
grants, adopted a set of minimum fiduciary standards to 
strengthen the accountability of these Agencies. These 
standards include: independent oversight, audit and 
evaluation, and investigation functions; external financial 
audit; financial management and control frameworks; 
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project appraisal standards, including environmental 
assessments and other safeguard measures; monitoring 
and project-at-risk systems; procurement; financial 
disclosure; hotline and whistleblower protection; and 
codes of ethics. These standards were developed in 
consultation with the Implementing and Executing 
Agencies and the input of an international accounting 
firm. They present a comprehensive definition of 
fiduciary standards that include questions of overarching 
institutional integrity and governance. The proposed 
standards for project appraisal functions ask that agencies 
“examine whether proposed projects and/or activities 
meet appropriate technical, economic, financial, fiduciary, 
environmental, social, institutional and/or other relevant 
criteria.” In an independent evaluation completed in 
2007, some Implementing Agencies were found to be in 
noncompliance with these standards. UNIDO and the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) have since 
created action plans to achieve compliance.120
the Adaptation Fund 
The major innovation of the Adaptation Fund has 
been to propose arrangements by which national 
institutions based in developing countries or regional 
institutions can directly access financing, bypassing 
traditional Implementing Agencies. Subsequently, 
the AF Board has commissioned its own reports 
recommending minimum fiduciary criteria and a 
process for assessing whether NIEs and MIEs meet these 
criteria.121 
A template for screening prospective NIE and MIE 
applicants has been developed based on detailed criteria 
regarding their “financial management and integrity” 
capacity. The entities are additionally required to include 
documentation that proves this capacity, such as audited 
financial statements, a policy or published document that 
outlines the internal auditing function, a business plan/
budget for the upcoming year, and an end-of-year budget 
report. They are further required to prove that they have 
the capacity to ensure transparent competition in the 
following areas: procurement procedures; monitoring and 
evaluation; identification, development, and appraisal of 
projects; and project management.122 
A Project and Programs Committee has been 
established to oversee portfolio performance and 
supervise executing entities. 
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including the use of international fiduciary standards. 
These design principles would include regular financial 
audits,125 as well as an annual policy compliance audit 
to ensure that grant funds are allocated according to 
the stipulations of the grant agreements. This same 
independent auditor will audit the performance of 
the Trustee.126 It will be particularly important to 
ensure compliance with robust fiduciary standards in 
Indonesia, where the credit risk management capacity 
of the national bank remains weak, and corruption is 
widespread.
The Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund
Fund participants have appointed the World Bank 
to administer the “national” fund. This has been 
controversial amongst local stakeholders. It reflects, in 
part, a lack of contributor confidence in the capacity 
and credibility of institutions in Bangladesh to steward 
funds responsibly.128 It may also reflect the fact that a 
major contributor to the Fund is the UK Department 
for International Development, which has a close 
working relationship with the World Bank. Programs 
financed by the Fund will seek to build the capacity 
of local institutions in Bangladesh.129 For each project 
that receives funding, a grant agreement between the 
World Bank and Executing Agency will be signed 
that contains detailed fiduciary standards (focused on 
financial management, procurement, and monitoring 
mechanics) to guide the disbursement of the funds. 
national Funds
All three of the national funds discussed here have 
established significant fiduciary standards. The proposed 
institutional approaches to meet these objectives vary, 
however, as a result of unique national factors including 
the level of institutional capacity in the country’s 
financial sector, contributor perceptions of this capacity, 
and perceived risks of corruption. 
Brazil’s Amazon Fund 
The Fund is administered through a trust fund 
managed by the Brazilian National Bank for 
Development (BNDES). BNDES’s own reputation 
in the international banking community is strong. 
In 2001, the international credit risk rating agency 
Moody’s upgraded BNDES to an A2 classification, the 
highest assigned to any Brazilian bank.123 The Bank 
also has a long history of working with international 
financial institutions. The World Bank, for example, 
recently approved a USD 2 billion environmental 
policy loan for Brazil to be administered through 
BNDES, which will act as the intermediary in 
administering sub-projects in Brazil. BNDES seems 
well positioned to manage the large sums donated to 
the Amazon Fund, and the Bank is currently providing 
secretariat services for the Fund. In addition to 
managing its finances, the BNDES supports fundraising 
efforts, project selection, and project monitoring 
and evaluation for the Fund. This is requiring the 
institution to build new capacity and expertise 
in making positive investments that will reduce 
deforestation and forest degradation and to manage 
potential risks. 
Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund (ICCTF)
Fiduciary criteria were detailed in the original 
proposal for the ICCTF (see Box 9). In September 
2009, the UNDP was appointed interim Trustee of 
the ICCTF (see Box 10).124 The Trustee will manage 
funds granted by development partners and at the 
request of the ICCTF channel funds for payment 
of service providers and contractors selected by the 
central government ministries to implement ICCTF-
financed activities. Fiduciary arrangements for these 
activities must satisfy both Indonesian Government 
and development partner (contributor) requirements. 
Additionally, the ICCTF is intended to follow the 
principles of the Jakarta Commitments and the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. As such, it has been 
proposed that the ICCTF follow design principles such 
as accountability in the management, operation, and 
the use of funds, with sound financial management, 
Box  9     F iduciARy stAndARds FoR the  indonesiA 
climAte  chAnge tRust  Fund ( icctF)
The	bank	that	serves	as	the	Trustee	of	the	ICCTF	is	expected	to	meet	
the	following	criteria:
•	 Be	registered	in	Indonesia
•	 Be	credible,	competent,	and	well-recognized	national	institution
•	 Have	proven	financial	management	capability,	i.e.,	sufficient	
assets,	rate	of	return,	cash	flow,	and	return	on	investment
•	 Have	adequate	human	resources	capacity,	i.e.,	staff	numbers	
and	qualifications,	as	well	as	a	high	level	of	knowledge	of	the	
Indonesian	Government	financing	and	treasury	system
Source: 
Indonesia	Climate	Change	Trust	Fund,	“Blueprint	for	Indonesia	Climate	
Change	Trust	Fund	(ICCTF),	BAPPENAS”	(May	2009),	online	at:	http://www.
ccap.org/docs/resources/686/ICCTF.pdf.
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5 3 mAnAging enviRonmentAl And 
sociAl Risk thRough sAFeguARds And 
gRievAnce mechAnisms
Climate change will require significant investments 
in infrastructure and changes in policies. Even as they 
lower emissions and build resilience, climate change 
investments may also entail environmental and social 
risks. For example, low-GHG energy technologies, 
including wind and concentrating solar power, 
may require land use changes that impact on local 
communities. Investments in adaptation infrastructure 
will need to be watched closely for unintended negative 
impacts. Project-related stresses on water resources and 
ecosystem services may also need to be managed. It is 
therefore critically important to have systems in place 
to identify and assess risks, safeguards that manage risks, 
and grievance mechanisms that allow local people 
and communities to raise concerns. These systems are 
discussed below and summarized in Table 4.
international Funds
The GEF, Montreal Protocol Fund, and Climate 
Investment Funds rely on the safeguard policies 
and grievance mechanisms of their Implementing 
Agencies.130 The most high profile of these are the World 
Bank’s Safeguard Policies and Inspection Panel, which 
allow project-affected people to request an inspection 
where the Bank’s failure to comply with its policies have 
led to social or environmental harm.131 These systems 
have, however, been criticized by both civil society and 
host countries—though typically for different reasons. 
Civil society and project-affected people have raised 
concerns that the systems in place, particularly at the 
Inter-American Development Bank, are not sufficiently 
robust to ensure accountability for compliance with 
policies.132 On the other hand, host governments and 
project partners have expressed concerns that social 
and environmental risk policies can be overly rigid 
and have complained that demonstrating compliance 
can pose a significant burden and can delay project 
implementation.133
Box  10   the  u  n   multi-donoR tRust  Funds
The	U.N.	manages	numerous	multi-donor	trust	funds	(MDTFs)	that	
are	administered	by	UNDP	to	support	U.N.	agencies’	work,	resource	
mobilization,	donor	coordination,	and	policy	dialogue.	Each	MDTF	is	
designed	to	meet	specific	country	or	global	objectives	and	intended	
to	provide	predictable	and	coordinated	support	for	nationally	owned	
processes,	while	ensuring	that	resources	are	spent	efficiently	and	
effectively,	through	transparent	and	accountable	fund	management	
services.
Each	MDTF	has	a	unique	governance	structure	designed	by	
contributors	and	recipients	to	fit	its	mandate.	In	the	case	of	the	
Indonesia	Climate	Change	Trust	Fund,	for	example,	the	Indonesian	
Ministry	of	Planning,	BAPPENAS,	proposed	the	governance	structure	
for	the	Fund	in	consultation	with	donors.	It	is	intended	to	support	
the	achievement	of	Indonesia’s	national	climate	change	goals,	
and	will	fund	a	range	of	mitigation	and	adaptation	activities	(see	
Appendix	A:	Climate	Funds	Reviewed).	UN-REDD	is	a	USD	52	million	
MDTF	established	primarily	with	support	from	Norway	to	reduce	
emissions	from	deforestation	and	forest	degradation	by	supporting	
forest	carbon	readiness	activities	in	nine	pilot	countries.	The	REDD	
governance	structure	has	evolved	to	include	donors,	recipients,	
representatives	of	indigenous	peoples,	and	representatives	of	civil	
society	as	voting	partners.	
In	essence,	the	MDTFs	are	a	mechanism	to	ensure	that	fiduciary	
standards	are	met.	Fiduciary	responsibility	for	the	MDTFs	is	shared	
between	UNDP	as	the	administrating	agency	and	the	participating	
U.N.	organizations	that	implement	the	projects	using	MDTF	resources.	
The	UNDP	enters	into	a	Standard	Administrative	Arrangement	with	
each	donor,	which	is	posted	online.	Funds	are	administered	and	
disbursed	in	accordance	with	the	respective	governing	committee’s	
instructions,	and	the	UNDP	provides	annual	narrative	and	financial	
reports	and	final	reports	that	include	a	summary	of	results	with	
reference	to	the	original	goals	and	objectives	of	the	fund.	
By	some	accounts,	the	MDTFs	have	been	relatively	effective	in	
supporting	country-driven	priorities,	which	is	in	line	with	the	
principles	of	the	Paris	Declaration	on	Aid	Effectiveness.	A	Web-
based	reporting	portal	has	been	developed	to	support	reporting	by	
each	of	the	participating	U.N.	organizations	and	disclose	the	status	
of	donor	contributions	(differentiating	between	commitments	and	
funds	received),	as	well	as	disbursement.	If	used	proactively	by	
the	Implementing	Agencies,	these	systems	can	allow	significant	
transparency	about	the	status	of	the	fund.
Sources:
OECD,	“Development	Perspectives	for	a	Post-Copenhagen	Climate	Financing	
Architecture”	(November	2009);	UNDP,	“UNDP-Administered	Multi-Donor	Trust	
Funds,”	online	at:	http://www.undp.org/mdtf/overview.shtml;	UNDP,	“UNDP-
Administered	Multi-Donor	Trust	Funds	&	Joint	Programmes,	Participating	
UN	Organizations,”	online	at:	http://www.undp.org/mdtf/un-organizations.
shtml;	UNDP,	“Standard	Memorandum	of	Understanding	for	Multi-Donor	
Trust	Funds	Using	Pass-Through	Fund	Management”	(October	2008);	UNDP,	
“UNDP	Accountability	When	Acting	as	Administrative	Agent	in	Multi-Donor	
Trust	Funds	and/or	UN	Joint	Programmes”	(June	2007);	UNDP,	“Protocol	on	
the	Administrative	Agent	for	Multi-Donor	Trust	Funds	and	Joint	Programmes,	
and	One	UN	Funds”	(October	2008);	UNDP,	MDTF	Office,	“Finance	Reporting	
Specifications	for	Participating	Organizations”	(December	2008);	C.	Davis,	
et	al.,	Ready or Not? A Review of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 
Readiness Plans and the UN-REDD Joint Program Documents (Washington,	
DC:	World	Resources	Institute,	June	2009).
A C C O U N T A B I L I T y 47
developing partners, the government of Bangladesh, 
and the World Bank. 
Brazil’s Amazon Fund 
The Amazon Fund is managed by BNDES, and 
programs financed will be subject to its environmental 
policy (adopted in 2005), as well as its social policies. 
Its guidelines on forestry are the most stringent of 
these policies, and they require certification for all 
forest management operations. Limited transparency of 
BNDES operations makes it difficult to ensure that these 
safeguards are being followed. However, BNDES does 
have an independent and impartial Ombudsman’s Office 
that addresses citizen opinions and complaints about 
the Bank’s activities and mediates conflicts between 
individuals and BNDES.135 The World Bank’s 2009 
environmental policy loan to BNDES seeks to build its 
capacity for environmental and social due diligence, in 
the context of financing for renewable energy (including 
large hydropower) and sustainable forest management 
programs.136 
Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund (ICCTF)
The ICCTF has no explicit environmental or social 
safeguard policies in place. Funded activities are only 
required to support sustainable development and are 
The U.N. Implementing Agencies, for example UNDP, 
UNEP and UNIDO, tend to lead on “soft projects” 
involving capacity building and technical assistance 
and therefore have not developed impact assessments, 
safeguard policies, and grievance mechanisms similar to 
the Banks’. UNDP, for example, directs members of the 
public with concerns about a project to an online form 
designed for reporting fraud or malfeasance.134
The Adaptation Fund will engage both the traditional 
MIEs as well as NIEs. Its template for screening NIEs and 
MIEs will assess a prospective agency’s ability to manage 
environmental and social issues. However, its unclear 
what minimum standards will apply, if any, that could be 
used to exclude an MIE or NIE from participating. 
national Funds
The Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund  
(BCCRF)
The BCCRF has not yet produced specific safeguards 
or grievance mechanisms. However, the World Bank 
serves as administrator, and the World Bank will sign 
an administration agreement with each developing 
partner that participates in the Fund. This is designed 
to ensure that funds are utilized according to the 
purposes and objectives mutually agreed upon by the 
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5 4 conclusions
More than 60 years of experience in development 
assistance has generated a range of policies and 
procedures for holding financial mechanisms accountable 
for delivering results, anticipating risks, and safeguarding 
against unintended harm. Many of the systems have 
been put in place at the insistence of contributor 
governments and remain controversial with recipient 
governments that have viewed them as intrusions on 
sovereignty. The growing role of national funds and 
national Implementing Agencies in climate finance 
may provide an opportunity to build safeguard policies 
and accountability mechanisms into recipient country 
systems.
assessed based on their contribution to environmental 
and social sustainability. A Technical Committee 
will consider potential impacts on the environment, 
society, and the economy as part of proposal review. 
While the ICCTF proposes to “mainstream civil society 
participation and local community empowerment,” and 
civil society participation in program implementation 
is encouraged, few details on the specific channels for 
engagement have been proposed as yet.
tABle  4   enviRonmentAl  And sociAl  sAFeguARds oF  select  climAte  F inAnciAl  mechAnisms
climAte FinAnciAl mechAnism enviRonmentAl And sociAl sAFeguARds
GEF, montreal Protocol Fund, 
Climate Investment Funds 
• Subject to the environmental and social safeguard policies of the Implementing Agencies they work through (World Bank 
and U.N. agencies)
• Generally, mDBs have well-elaborated safeguard policies and grievance procedures; U.N. agencies generally do not and 
defer to host government’s national policies
Adaptation Fund • NIEs and mIEs will be required to disclose safeguard policies, but no minimum standards have been agreed upon
Bangladesh Climate Change 
Resilience Fund
• No specific safeguard polices yet in place
• Participating partners will enter into agreement with World Bank (the Fund administrator) potentially applying Bank 
safeguards
Brazil Amazon Fund • Subject to environmental and social safeguard polices of BNDES (Fund manager)
• Forestry guidelines require certification for all forest management operations
• Independent Ombudsman’s Office
Indonesia Climate Change Trust 
Fund
• No specific safeguard policies yet in place
• Technical Committee will consider potential environmental, social, and economic impacts when reviewing project proposals
49
S
E
C
t
i
o
n
 
6
Conclusions and 
Recommendations
©
lo
re
n
a
 p
a
Ja
re
s
Carrying charcoal: Entebbe, Uganda (2010). 
P O W E R ,  R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y ,  A N D  A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y50
6 1 geneRAl conclusions
This is a dynamic time for climate finance, as 
the international community is struggling to craft 
mechanisms that are perceived to be legitimate by 
all UNFCCC Parties and that are capable of funding 
climate-related activities efficiently and at scale. Our 
analysis of established and new climate financial 
mechanisms and the current UNFCCC negotiations 
leads us to conclude the following:
n	 Change is coming. A new global deal on climate 
finance will likely reinterpret the principles that in 
the past have guided the design of climate finance 
mechanisms in a way that significantly redistributes 
power, responsibility, and accountability between 
traditional contributor and recipient countries. 
n	 A new balance of power, responsibility, and 
accountability could enhance recipient country 
ownership. Greater representation of developing 
countries on the governing bodies of international 
financial institutions more generally, and climate 
finance mechanisms more specifically, should help 
ensure greater emphasis on the national and local 
“ownership”—and thus the effectiveness—of climate 
finance investments. 
n	 A new understanding of how to balance national interests 
with global responsibility and accountability is required. 
This will require assuring that nationally driven 
investments contribute to global benefits in the 
form of net emission reductions and investments 
that protect the most vulnerable countries and 
communities.
n	 New financial mechanisms—at both the global and the 
national level—are necessary. If the international 
community raises the scale of public finance 
necessary to move developing countries onto a 
low-carbon, climate-resilient pathway, the capacity 
and the creativity to spend these resources well will 
necessitate the creation of one or more new financial 
mechanisms at the global level and multiple national-
level institutions. 
©
d
en
v
ie
 B
a
li
d
ay
Ride to support global climate change deal: Copenhagen, Denmark (2009). 
C O N C L U S I O N S  A N D  R E C O m m E N D A T I O N S 51
n	 Delivering climate finance at scale, at least in the short 
term, will likely involve multiple mechanisms, both new 
and reformed. This is true because of the complex 
politics of the international negotiations and the 
differing views of legitimacy held by contributors and 
donors. The urgency and complexity of delivering 
funds at scale argues for moving forward, at least in 
the near term, with the institutions that we have, 
and investing in the strength and quality of COP 
guidance and national planning processes to ensure 
coordination and coherence. This experience should 
then guide the design and operation of the new 
institutions that will become necessary as the scale of 
resources grows.
n	 Low-carbon, climate-resilient development is an 
unexplored frontier for all countries and has potential risks 
as well as benefits. While high standards will have to 
be developed and maintained to ensure emissions fall 
and the vulnerable are protected, climate finance will 
necessarily entail experiments with new policies and 
technologies that will need to be watched closely for 
unintended environmental and social impacts.
6 2 BAlAncing PoWeR
conclusions
The formal balance of power between contributor and 
recipient countries in climate finance institutions is leveling 
out, but the informal power relationship remains tipped in 
favor of contributing countries. Existing and emerging 
climate financial mechanisms are evolving to have a 
more balanced governance structure with equal votes and 
representation of contributor and recipient countries. 
However, these formal shifts in power have generally 
been neutralized by other ways that contributors exercise 
influence. Contributor countries continue to dominate 
the processes of replenishment, resource allocation, 
and project cycle management through the imposition 
of conditionalities and standards. As long as climate 
financial mechanisms are dependent on voluntary 
contributions raised by the parliaments and finance 
ministries of one set of countries, and channeled to 
finance activities in another set of countries, contributor 
influence is likely to check the formal power of recipients.
Conditionalities imposed to advance contributing country 
priorities are problematic, but agreeing on environmental and 
social standards and safeguards will remain essential to the 
long-term success of any finance mechanism. The economic 
and policy conditionalities that donors have attached 
to their financing in the past have been neither popular 
n	 Existing institutions must also be reformed. The scale 
of the climate change challenge and of the scale of 
the funding necessary to respond to that challenge 
will also necessitate the reform of existing financial 
institutions, many of which have been supporting 
fossil fuel–led growth and have yet to mainstream 
concerns about the impacts of climate change into 
their strategies.
n	 Current negotiating positions reflect deep historical and 
ideological divisions—particularly between developed 
and developing countries—that will need to be overcome 
by building trust and experimenting with new kinds of 
relationships.137 Developed countries have been keen 
to build on existing financial institutions they have 
shaped and traditionally controlled. Developing 
countries are wary of these same institutions, which 
they see as historically having advanced contributor 
interests and theories of development, through both 
the formal and informal exercise of donor power. 
n	 At the international level, the choice between reforming 
traditional development agencies, such as the GEF, 
UNDP, UNEP, and MDBs, and creating new financial 
mechanisms will raise issues of institutional economy and 
effectiveness. In order to generate a greater sense of 
trust and ownership, backers of existing agencies may 
have to accept a degree of duplication of existing 
capacity through the creation of new mechanisms—
particularly where significant gaps in capacity are 
identified—and to accept strengthened lines of 
accountability of climate finance mechanisms to 
the COP. On the other hand, those calling for the 
creation of new institutions may need to concede that 
it may waste precious resources to replicate the staff 
and services being provided by existing agencies. 
n	 Balancing the roles of international and national institutions 
will also involve trade-offs. Traditional development 
agencies have gained the trust of contributors by 
putting in place systems to both measure and manage 
impacts of their investments. Developing country 
recipients, however, have been frustrated by the 
bureaucracy and the focus on generic rather than 
country-specific concerns that these systems can 
generate. Many developing countries will likely 
struggle to convince contributors that their national 
institutions have the capacity to manage large-
scale development finance without the support of 
development agencies. While a number of developing 
countries are taking steps to build and strengthen this 
capacity, they will need support to do so. 
P O W E R ,  R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y ,  A N D  A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y52
with recipients nor entirely effective in leveraging long-
term improvements in policy and practice. But standards 
attached by contributors to resource mobilization have 
also provided a means to prioritize scarce development 
financing and promote environmental and social 
standards and safeguards. It is unclear how developing 
countries, once they secure greater power, will exercise 
this power responsibly without deploying similar 
approaches. 
Recommendations
Policymakers must agree on ways to diversify the sources 
of climate finance and to de-link them from the levers of 
informal power. If existing institutions are to meet 
evolving standards of legitimacy, then their fundamental 
governance structures, as well as their operational 
procedures, will need to be reformed to give greater voice 
to developing country recipients. If formal grants of 
power are to lead to the effective exercise of that power, 
the international community must also make greater 
efforts to identify sources of revenue, such as new levies 
or long-term commitments, that are independent from 
the discretion of contributor governments.
Climate finance mechanisms should be used to build the 
capacity of non-state actors and civil society to monitor 
climate finance governance. Civil society groups at 
all levels can and are playing an important role in 
monitoring and influencing decision-making within 
climate finance funds. But they need to occupy such 
spaces more effectively than they have to date by 
monitoring and engaging in more inclusive decision-
making processes with technical rigor and authority. 
However, “representation” of non-state actors can be a 
very difficult issue—civil society is diverse with widely 
differing views.
6 3 tAking ResPonsiBility
conclusions
Climate finance must lead to investments that are country 
owned and have global benefits. Successful responses to 
climate change must identify a synergy of national 
priorities and global benefits. This both reaffirms and 
introduces a new twist to the conventional wisdom 
that successful investments in development must be 
nationally driven and country owned. While developing 
country–led institutions will be natural champions of 
nationally driven programming, they must also learn to 
be stewards of global benefits.
Arrangements for direct access to finance need to be 
supported by stronger national systems for responsibility and 
accountability. Developing countries are increasingly 
keen to have direct access to climate finance through 
their own national institutions, bypassing traditional 
development agencies. Arrangements for direct 
access should be supported by nationally derived low-
GHG emissions development strategies and national 
adaptation programs developed through robust processes 
of stakeholder engagement at the national and sub-
national levels. If these strategies and programs contain 
measurable, reportable, and verifiable actions, they 
should provide a legitimate basis for allocating resources 
among countries as well as for designing programs within 
countries.
Climate finance should be invested in accordance with 
nationally set priorities. Experience with the Montreal 
Protocol Fund, and more recent practice in the Clean 
Technology Fund and Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, 
suggests that successful climate finance will depend on 
upfront investments in national planning, policies, and 
institutions.
Box 11  lessons FRom the gloBAl enviRonment FAcility
As	climate	negotiators	deliberate	on	the	design	elements	of	a	new	
financial	mechanism,	they	should	take	stock	of	the	lessons	and	
experiences	from	the	GEF.	Many	of	the	financial,	political,	and	
institutional	dynamics	and	constraints	that	shaped	the	GEF	remain	
as	challenges.	These	include:
•	 Asymmetries in power persist. Increasing	the	recipient	countries’	
membership	and	votes	in	a	governance	structure	does	not	fully	
address	power	asymmetries	based	on	continued	dependence	on	
contributing	countries’	resources.
•	 Outsourcing can create complexity. Outsourcing	of	finance-related	
functions	from	the	COP	to	external	institutions,	such	as	the	GEF	
and	its	Implementing	Agencies	(including	UNDP,	UNEP,	the	World	
Bank,	and	regional	development	banks)	may	respect	the	principle	
of	institutional	economy,	but	raises	accountability	challenges	and	
can	lead	to	a	complex	and	cumbersome	project	cycle.
•	 Allocating and prioritizing resources is unpopular but necessary. 
The	incremental	cost	concept	and	the	RAF	have	proved	unpopular	
with	recipient	countries.	However,	as	long	as	resources	are	scarce,	
some	agreed	formula	for	determining	what	portion	of	a	country’s	
actions	will	be	funded	is	necessary.	Any	post-2012	climate	
financial	mechanism	will	also	have	to	grapple	with	the	challenge	
of	allocating	scarce	resources	among	countries,	and	of	balancing	
the	need	to	support	smaller	countries	with	the	need	to	target	
resources	where	emissions	reductions	and	climate	resilience	can	
be	achieved	cost	effectively	and	at	a	large	scale.
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government of Brazil will need to demonstrate to its 
citizens that the programs it supports are generating 
valuable economic, social, and environmental benefits, 
and to the international community that it is delivering 
real reductions in deforestation, forest degradation, and 
the resulting emissions.
It is not yet clear how the governing body of a financial 
mechanism dominated by developing country governments 
will respond to demands for greater accountability. In 
light of their own experiences as recipients, will these 
governments support the introduction of innovative 
accountability mechanisms, such as greenhouse gas 
accounting, the use of environmental and social 
safeguards, and the greater involvement of civil society 
in project cycle oversight, or resist them as intrusions on 
sovereignty?
Recommendation
Draw from the lessons learned from decades of development 
finance to build national institutions that reflect universally 
accepted principles of good governance. Traditional 
finance and development institutions have decades 
of experience—both good and bad—in translating 
internationally agreed agendas into national and local 
investments. National institutions should draw from 
these experiences and be designed and supported to 
operate in accordance with universal principles of good 
governance. Strong provisions for accountability should 
be put in place, including sound fiduciary management, 
anti-corruption measures, and grievance mechanisms 
and inspection procedures that ensure compliance with 
environmental and social standards and safeguards.
Recommendation
Near- and medium-term climate finance should focus on 
strengthening national institutions. A next generation of 
climate investments should promote the responsibility 
of recipient countries by strengthening the national 
institutions that will implement mitigation and 
adaptation activities and by ensuring their transparency 
and accountability to citizens within countries, as 
well as to the international community. While it is 
important that development agencies provide technical 
support to national institutions, they should work in 
closer partnership with national stakeholders. It will 
be particularly important to engage with stakeholders 
outside of government, including the private sector, 
independent research institutions, and civil society. Such 
collaborations can help ensure climate finance proposals 
more appropriately reflect national circumstances and 
priorities.
6 4 ensuRing AccountABility 
conclusions
Accountability will remain a central challenge in future 
climate financial mechanisms. Institutions that give 
developing countries a greater voice and vote in 
decision-making, as well as direct access to funds, will 
still need to be held accountable for their investments. 
This includes being accountable to national stakeholders 
for the outcomes of their decisions, as well as to the 
international community for delivering global benefits. 
In the case of the Amazon Fund, for example, the 
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Farmers returning home: Santiago City, Philippines (2008).
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• Total of 2 percent of Certified Emissions 
Reductions (CERs) for Clean Development 
mechanism (CDm) activity; USD 38.7 million 
from the sale of 5 million CERs as of January 
2010
• USD 71 million in donor contributions received 
in 2010
• Total available funding: USD 99.7 million (USD 
109.7 million less USD 7.28 million already 
attributed for AF administrative budget and 
reimbursement to UNEP, Uk, and Australia)
• Since 1990, contributions total USD 2.7 billion 
(as of July 2010)
• Promissory notes for 2009–11 replenishment 
total USD 28.3 million at a minimum
• Total resources after GEF-5 Replenishment USD 15.9 
billion (Pilot Program Funds: USD 0.8 billion, GEF-1: 
USD 2 billion, GEF-2: USD 2.75 billion, GEF-3: USD 
3 billion, GEF-4: USD 3.13 billion, GEF-5: USD 4.2 
billion)
• In 2010, the GEF has funded USD 8.7 billion in 
projects through the Trust Fund and the Least 
Developed Country Fund (LDCF) and Special Climate 
Change Fund (SCCF)
• Leveraged approximately USD 33 billion in co-
financing 
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• Partly financed by CDm revenues: USD 38.7 
million from CER sales proceeds; USD 28.7 
million available in grants and reimbursable 
loans after deduction of cumulative funding 
decisions 
• voluntary contributions by Spain (USD 58 
million) and Germany (USD 13 million)
• All “non-Article 5” Parties contribute to Fund 
replenishment in accordance with agreed 
schedule
• 25 developed and 7 developing countries contributed 
to the GEF-4 Replenishment; the GEF-5 Replenishment 
additionally targets 32 corporate donors
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• Adaptation Fund Board (AFB): 16 members 
+ 16 alternates—two from each of five U.N. 
Regional Groups, one from a Small Island 
Developing  States (SIDS), one from Least 
Developed Country (LDC), two from Annex I 
Parties, and two from non-Annex I Parties; 
majority constituted by non-Annex I countries; 
the Board determines funding criteria and 
takes funding decisions after screening by 
Secretariat and reviewing by Project and 
Program Review Committee 
• Chair and Co-Chair of Board to be members of 
Annex I and non-Annex I Parties 
• GEF Secretariat serves as the interim 
Secretariat 
• Board decision-making by consensus when 
possible, otherwise two-thirds majority 
• meetings open for attendance by observers
• meeting of the Parties (moP) is governing body 
• Executive Committee oversees operations, 
includes seven Article 5 and seven non-Article 
5 members 
• Decisions reached by two-thirds majority vote
• Secretariat headed by CEO, accountable to 
Executive Committee  
• Four Implementing Agencies: UNEP, UNDP, 
UNIDO, and the World Bank
• UNEP and Secretariat provide treasury 
functions 
• NGOs can participate without right to vote
• Assembly: representatives of member countries 
(182 countries) reviews general policies, operation, 
membership, and considers amendments; meets every 
3–4 years (last meeting in may 2010)
• Council: functions like a board of directors with 32 
members: 16 from developing countries, 14 from 
developed, 2 from Economies in Transition (EITs); 
responsible for developing, adopting, and evaluating 
GEF programs; meets twice every year; the Council 
works with the Scientific and Technical Panel (STAP) 
and the Evaluation Office, which report to the Council 
• Secretariat: headed by CEO, coordinates activity 
implementation, reports to Assembly and Council
• Decision-making: funding decisions taken by the 
Council and by consensus, double majority vote if no 
consensus attainable; approved work programs must 
then be endorsed by CEO
• NGOs: members of the GEF accredited NGOs (GEF NGO 
Network, over 700 institutions) can make interventions 
as observers
Ex
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Os • Board can establish committees/panels/
working groups to provide expert advice
• Independent technical advisory group 
supports research to adapt technology to local 
circumstances
• STAP provides advice
• Six members who are experts in GEF focal areas; GEF 
NGO network also provides input 
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• Based on: vulnerability, urgency, equitable 
access to fund, lesson-learning, regional co-
benefits, maximizing multi- or cross-sectoral 
benefits, and adaptive capacity
• Countries can requests funding for small 
(<USD 1 million) or larger (>USD 1 million) 
projects/programs 
• Projects that result in the elimination of the 
maximum amount of ODS should be given 
priority
• Prioritize projects based on: cost-effective 
and efficient emission reduction; geographic 
balance; ease of replication and technology 
transfer; and highest potential reduction of 
controlled substances 
• Resource Allocation Framework (RAF) ranks recipients 
according to (1) their potential to generate global 
environmental benefits in a focal area (“GEF Benefits 
Index”), and (2) their capacity, policies, and practices 
relevant for successful implementation (“GEF 
Performance Index”)
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)
• Accountable to the UNFCCC COPs • Accountable to all Parties to the Protocol • Loosely accountable to the COPs as established in 
memorandum of Understanding (mOU)
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• Support adaptation activities that reduce 
adverse impacts of and risks posed by 
communities, countries, and sectors that face 
risks of climate change
• Provide for full adaptation costs and to 
finance country-driven adaptation projects and 
programs
• Assist developing countries to meet their 
obligations under the montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
• meet all agreed incremental costs of Article 5 
Parties to phase out the use of Ozone Depleting 
Substances (ODS), with grants for financial 
and technical assistance
• Address global environmental issues and support 
sustainable development in six focal areas: climate 
change, biodiversity, international waters, ozone layer, 
land degradation, and persistent organic pollutants
• Fund the incremental or additional costs associated 
with transforming a project with national benefits into 
one with global environmental benefits
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• Project proponent submits proposal document 
• Secretariat screens all proposals, provides 
technical summary, then forwards to Projects 
and Programs Review Committee, which makes 
recommendation to the Board four times/year
• Board can approve or reject a proposal with a 
clear explanation 
• Secretariat receives proposals from Article 5 
countries and sends them to the designated 
Implementing Agency 
• Implementing Agency works with the country to 
elaborate project documentation and approach
• Executive Committee makes final approval 
decision according to the agreed committee 
priorities
• Full-sized projects (>USD 1 million): respond to both 
national priorities and GEF focal area strategies and 
operational programs
• medium-sized projects (<USD 1 million): expedited 
approval process
• Enabling activities: for inventories, strategies, action 
plans, reports
• Programmatic approaches: increase integration of 
global environmental issues
• Small grants program: community-based
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• Developing country Parties to the kyoto Protocol 
vulnerable to climate change impacts can 
directly access funds through nominated 
National Implementing Agencies (NIEs) or 
through multi-lateral Implementing Agencies 
(mIEs) 
• Article 5 countries are eligible for support 
• Executive Committee approves project 
proposals with incremental costs >USD 
500,000 
• Implementing Agencies approve project 
proposals with incremental costs <USD 
500,000 with an approved work program
• Any government agency, NGO, or private sector entity 
may propose a project 
• Project proposals must be: within an eligible country; 
consistent with the GEF operational strategy and 
national priorities; endorsed by government(s); 
address 1+ GEF focal areas; improve the global 
environment; and involve the public 
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• Projects and programs submit annual status 
reports to Secretariat
• Projects and programs subject to terminal 
evaluation by an independent evaluator upon 
completion
• Terminal evaluation reports submitted to Board
• Executive Committee develops and monitors 
implementation of specific operational policies, 
guidelines, and administrative arrangements; 
reviews performance reports; monitors and 
evaluates expenditures; and reports annually 
to the meeting of the Parties 
• Council approves an annual report on activities of 
GEF which is transmitted to the COPs and includes 
all GEF activities, a list of project ideas submitted 
for consideration, and a review of project activities 
funded by GEF and their outcomes
PE
RF
OR
m
AN
CE
• AFB can carry out independent reviews or 
evaluations and provides strategic oversight 
• Regular reports required from NIEs and mIEs 
• Projects and Programs Review Committee 
monitors and reviews performance 
• The multilateral Fund Evaluations assess 
the continued relevance of Fund support, 
the efficiency of project implementation, 
the effectiveness of projects in achieving 
objectives, and lessons that guide future policy 
and practice
• The GEF Evaluation Office evaluates effectiveness of 
GEF projects/programs; establishes monitoring and 
evaluation standards; and provides quality control 
for monitoring and evaluation by Implementing and 
Executing Agencies
  S
AF
EG
UA
RD
S • Subject to strategic priorities, policies, and 
guidelines of AF
• Safeguard policies of respective Implementing 
Agencies apply
• Safeguard policies of respective Implementing 
Agencies apply
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• USD 115 million pledged 
to the Readiness Fund as 
of June 2009, which has a 
target of USD 185 million
• USD 55 million pledged to 
Carbon Fund as of June 
2009, which has a target of 
USD 200 million
• Grant financing for the 
Readiness mechanism (Rm); 
contributions to the Carbon 
Finance mechanism (CFm) 
will purchase emission 
reductions
• minimum contribution of 
USD 5 million
• USD 4.91 billion pledged to 
the CTF as of 2009
• USD 2.05 billion received as 
of July 2010
• Grants, concessional loans, 
and guarantees: contributors 
can provide concessional 
loans, capital, and grants
FoRest investment 
PRogRAm (FiP)
Pilot PRogRAm on climAte 
Resilience (PPcR)
scAling-uP ReneWABle 
eneRgy PRogRAm FoR 
develoPing countRies (sReP)
• Intended capitalization of 
USD 500 million
• USD 558 million pledged 
as of January 2010
• Grants and concessional 
loans
• Exact terms of financing 
to be decided after 
finalization of design 
document
• USD 967 million pledged 
as of January 2010
• Grants and concessional 
loans
• Technical assistance to 
integrate resilience into 
national development 
plans/sectoral strategies
• USD 292 million pledged as 
of January 2010
• Grants and concessional 
loans
• Financing for use of proven 
“new” renewable energy 
technologies
• Countries that receive SREP 
financing are expected to not 
receive CTF financing
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• Australia, Uk, U.S., Norway, 
France, Netherlands, 
Japan, Spain, Switzerland, 
Norway, Germany, European 
Community, Nature 
Conservancy 
• France, Germany, Spain, Uk, 
U.S., Japan, Sweden, and 
Australia 
• Norway, Australia, Japan, 
Uk, and U.S. 
• Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, Germany, Japan, 
Norway, Uk, and U.S.
• Japan, Netherlands, Norway, 
Switzerland, Uk, and U.S.
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• Participant Committee: 
10 donor country and 
10 recipient country 
participants
• World Bank serves as Trustee 
• Non-voting observers 
include one representative of 
forest-dependent indigenous 
peoples and forest 
dwellers, one private sector 
representative, and one civil 
society representative 
• The UNFCCC Secretariat, 
UN-REDD, and the GEF are 
also observers
• Trust Fund Committee 
(TFC): eight donor and 
eight developing country 
governments 
• World Bank, IFC, and the 
mDBs (Asian Development 
Bank, African Development 
Bank, European Bank 
for Reconstruction and 
Development, and Inter-
American Development Bank) 
represented on committee but 
do not weigh in on funding 
• Decisions by consensus
• Observers include: 
representative of the UNFCCC 
Secretariat, GEF, UNEP, and 
UNDP, plus four civil society 
and two private sector actors
• SCF Trust Fund Committee: eight representatives of contributor countries plus eight recipient 
countries
• Active observers: four civil society reps, two private sector reps, and international 
organizations (UNFCCC, GEF, UNEP, and UNDP)
• All CIF committees and sub-committees have two co-chairs: one donor and one recipient
FiP PPcR sReP
• Up to six donors, equal 
recipients 
• Observers: representatives 
of intergovernmental 
organizations plus 
four civil society; four 
indigenous peoples; four 
private sector 
• Decision-making by 
consensus
• Up to six donor countries 
and equal potential 
recipient countries 
selected on regional basis 
• GEF, UNDP, UNEP, UNFCCC, 
PPCR experts, civil 
society, and private sector 
observers
• Up to six donor countries 
(at least one should be a 
member of the SCF Trust 
Fund Committee), with equal 
number of recipient countries 
(at least one should be a 
member of the SCF Trust Fund 
Committee)
• A representative from the 
Energy for the Poor Initiative 
to be an observer
Ex
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OS • Technical Advisory Panels: 
Readiness Plan Idea Notes 
(R-PINs) and Readiness 
Preparation Proposals 
(R-PPs) before Participant 
Committee consideration
• No formal role for technical 
experts
• NGO and private sector 
observers not included in 
investment plan discussions
• Expert Group will be 
established by FIP sub-
committees to inform 
selection of country or 
regional pilot programs
• An eight member Expert 
Group selected by sub-
committee will help select 
pilot PPCR countries 
• Technical assistance to be 
provided during all stages 
of project development and 
implementation 
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• Countries admitted to the 
Rm apply for a USD 200,000 
R-PP preparation grant, and 
for up to USD 5 million for 
R-PP implementation
• may proceed with R-PP when 
R-PIN accepted 
• Countries develop clean 
technology investment plan 
based on detailed guidelines 
• Financing based on 
Investment Criteria for 
Public Sector Operations and 
Operational Guidelines for the 
Private Sector
• No more than 10 percent of 
funds go to one country
• Criteria include: 
significant mitigation 
potential; target drivers 
of deforestation and 
forest degradation 
while avoiding perverse 
incentives; partner with 
the private sector; seek 
and ensure economic and 
financial viability; build 
local capacity
• Criteria for program 
selection: transparent 
vulnerability criteria; 
country preparedness 
and ability to move 
toward climate-resilient 
development plans, taking 
into account efforts to date 
and willingness to move 
to a strategic approach; 
regional distribution 
• Criteria include: 
transformative impact; 
economic, social, and 
environmental development 
impact; economic and 
financial viability; leveraging 
of additional resources; 
implementation capacity 
of public and private 
sectors; “critical mass” for 
implementation
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• No direct accountability to 
bodies outside of the World 
Bank Group 
• Intergovernmental 
organizations and 
multilateral bodies are 
observers 
• Programs subject to mDB 
board approval
• UNFCCC Secretariat observes 
Fund 
• Sunset clause to conclude 
operations once UNFCCC 
financing negotiated
• Intergovernmental organizations and multilateral bodies are observers to the FIP and SCF, but 
there is no direct accountability
• Sunset clause to conclude operations once UNFCCC financial architecture is negotiated
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• Demonstrate REDD activities 
• Provide incentives per ton of 
CO2 reduced 
• Support deployment of clean 
energy technologies and 
transformative reductions in 
GHG emission trajectories in 
developing countries
FoRest investment 
PRogRAm (FiP)
Pilot PRogRAm on climAte 
Resilience (PPcR)
scAling-uP ReneWABle 
eneRgy PRogRAm FoR 
develoPing countRies (sReP)
• mobilize funds to reduce 
deforestation and forest 
degradation and promote 
sustainable forest 
management
• Demonstrate integrating 
climate risk and resilience 
into development planning
• Promote transformational 
change toward low-carbon 
energy pathways
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• Countries develop R-PINs, 
followed by R-PPs 
• Readiness supports 
countries to: (1) prepare 
REDD strategy, (2) set 
forest emission reference 
scenarios, and (3) establish 
mRv systems 
• World Bank and the regional 
development banks (RDBs) 
organize joint missions to 
engage government, private 
sector, and other stakeholders 
• Clean technology investment 
plan identifies major GHG 
emission sources and 
mitigation opportunities 
• FIP Sub-Committee 
selects pilot countries and 
regional programs 
• Countries must be official 
development assistance 
eligible 
• Governments develop 
projects/programs 
• PPCR Sub-Committee 
selects pilot countries
• mDBs and U.N. agencies 
conduct joint mission to 
enhance climate resilience 
of national development 
plans, strategies financing 
• Proposals prepared by 
country and mDBs 
• mDBs and governments 
conduct joint missions 
to engage U.N. agencies, 
civil society, indigenous 
peoples, private sector, 
and other stakeholders 
on how the program can 
assist the government to 
enhance renewable energy 
investments
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• Only sovereign governments 
can access the FCPF 
• Governments access funds 
via World Bank; funds 
cover World Bank costs of 
operation
• Governments access funds 
via mDBs
• Private companies can 
access funds through 
International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) and private 
sector arms of RDB
• Up to USD 1 million available 
to prepare programs 
• Governments develop investment plans and access funds through pertinent mDBs
FiP PPcR sReP
• Grants for indigenous 
peoples, communities 
• Direct access to financing 
under consideration
• Only countries shortlisted 
by the PPCR Expert Group 
are eligible for financing
• SREP Sub-Committee 
approves a provisional list of 
eligible countries or regions 
based on recommendations of 
the SREP Expert Group
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• Annual performance report 
evaluates FCPF performance 
at country and program 
levels 
• Decision meetings open to 
observers 
• key documents (R-PINs, 
R-PPs) available to 
observers 
• As of may 2009, investment 
plans to be publicly disclosed 
three weeks before Trust 
Fund Committee (TFC) 
deliberations and disclosed in 
country prior to sharing with 
TFC 
• Periodic independent 
evaluations 
• FIP Sub-Committee 
indicators to assess 
investment plans and 
measure program impact 
• mDBs’ Independent 
Evaluation Units will 
assess the FIP and its 
programs after three 
years
• Global Support Program 
proposed to ensure 
lessons are captured and 
disseminated at the global 
and regional level, and 
make expertise and tools 
available to participating 
countries
• SREP Sub-Committee should 
approve a results framework 
to measure the impact of 
SREP
• Annual report on CIF operations will be prepared by the administrative unit 
• As of may 2009, a common framework for results management that will include specific indicators for each fund is under 
development
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 • FCPF committee and 
assembly to ensure that 
operations are consistent 
with charter and objectives 
• A results measurement 
framework is under 
development to monitor the 
impacts and outcomes
FiP PPcR sReP
• Indicators are being 
developed
• Results Framework 
developed with input from 
experts 
• Results measurement 
framework to define how 
transformational impacts will 
be measured
SA
FE
GU
AR
DS • Strategic environmental and 
social assessments with 
reference to World Bank 
Safeguards
• Programs subject to the safeguard policies of the pertinent mDBs
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• USD 110 million pledged: Uk pledged USD 86.7 
million, EU pledged USD 10.4 million, Denmark 
pledged USD 1.6 million, and Sweden pledged USD 
11.5 million
• Financed by grant contributions (minimum USD 1 
million)
• Approximately USD 90 million executed by the 
government of Bangladesh, and USD 8 million will 
be by the World Bank as the administrator 
• Eligible expenditures: goods; works; consultant 
services; training or transfer of knowledge; operating 
costs 
• Uk deposited USD 16.5 million and Australia 
deposited USD 1.8 million 
• Innovation Fund: grants for activities with 
indirect economic and social benefits
• Transformation Fund: domestic loans and 
private financing for low-carbon development
• USD 107 million was donated in 2009 by the 
Norwegian Government 
• Norwegian Government pledged USD 1 billion to 
be fully transferred by 2015
• Potential for USD 24.5 million (€18 million) 
from Germany
DO
NO
RS • Uk, Denmark, EU and Sweden • Uk, Indonesia • Norway 
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• Two-tiered governance structure:
• Governing Council
• management Committee
• Both bodies will be chaired by the Government of 
Bangladesh, and include representatives from line 
ministries, development partners and civil society. 
• management Committee: project review and 
management; developing partners contributing USD 
5.0 million–9.9 million have a seat
• Policy Council: provides strategic direction; 
developing partners contributing at least USD 10 
million receive a seat
• Secretariat: manages day-to-day operations
• Decision-making by consensus (majority voting if no 
consensus)
• Observers: Bangladesh Government ministries; 
World Bank and Asian Development Bank Country 
Directors; U.N. Resident Representative; European 
Commission Ambassador
• Steering Committee: donors and government 
representatives from different ministries; 
each member has voting rights; responsible 
for management, strategic orientation, and 
operational guidelines
• Technical Committee: to advise Steering 
Committee on technical matters; has 
suggested that representatives of the Steering 
Committee with voting rights automatically be 
members of the Technical Committee
• Secretariat: consists of technical, 
administrative, and financial experts 
• Guidance Committee: sets guidelines and 
criteria for the Fund and follows up on results 
achieved; comprised of three “blocks”: federal 
government, state government, and civil society 
blocks
• Each block has one vote, and each member of a 
block has one vote within its respective block 
• Steering Committee: decisions by consensus of 
the three blocks
• Technical Committee: certifies the data and the 
calculation of avoided emissions 
Ex
PE
RT
S 
& 
NG
Os
  
• No formal role for technical experts  
• Expenditures for consultant services are eligible for 
financing
• Technical service providers: assist Secretariat 
and committees; panel of experts assists 
applications and selecting contractors
• Financial service providers: UNDP is the 
interim Trustee 
• Technical Committee: six scientific and 
technical specialists annually issue an 
evaluation report on deforestation data
AL
LO
CA
TI
ON
• Two windows distribute funds: (1) activities 
implemented by government of Bangladesh 
(90 percent of financing), (2) activities by non-
governmental organizations (10 percent)
• Three windows: energy (renewable energy 
and energy efficiency); forestry and peatland 
(REDD, sustainable forest, and peatland 
management); resilience (climate change 
information system, agriculture coastal zones, 
fishery and water management)
• Projects included in at least one of: public 
forests and protected areas, sustainable 
production activities, scientific and technical 
development applied to the sustainable use of 
biodiversity, or institutional enhancement of 
forest management systems
CO
P Not specified  Not specified Not specified
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Re
sP
on
si
Bi
li
ty
PU
RP
OS
E
• Improve the lives of 10 million vulnerable people by 
2015 through climate change adaptation and risk 
reduction measures
• Complement climate risk management projects 
under the Climate Change Fund and other 
development programs and leverage critical 
resources to address the Climate Change Strategy 
and Action Plan (CCSAP’s) six pillars
• Promote coordinated national action to 
respond to climate change 
• Align assistance for climate change with 
Indonesian development priorities 
• Improve access to financing and facilitate 
private investments
• Prepare policy framework for mitigation and 
adaptation
• Combat deforestation and promote 
conservation, and promote deforestation 
monitoring and control systems
BA
SI
S 
FO
R 
FU
ND
IN
G
• Bangladesh Government agencies prepare project 
concept notes (PCNs) and Project Appraisal 
Documents (PADs); World Bank prepares grant 
agreement implementer
• NGOs, community organizations, research 
institutions, others submit proposals with proof 
of registration and recent financial audit, and 
management Committee selects an independent 
organization to process and implement projects
• Sectoral ministries submit proposals to 
Secretariat for pre-appraisal; Secretariat 
submits proposal to the Technical and Steering 
Committees; Steering Committee approves, 
rejects, or provides the opportunity to amend 
and resubmit the proposal for approval  
• Contractors selected through transparent 
tendering process
• Institutions must formalize a preliminary 
application to BNDES describing the basic 
characteristics of the institution and its project 
proposal
Ac
co
un
tA
Bi
li
ty
RE
PO
RT
IN
G
• management Committee meets “as needed” during 
implementation period (at least three times/year); 
produces meeting reports, recommendations, and 
shares notes with members
• minutes of bi-monthly management Committee 
meetings on project concept notes prepared by 
the Secretariat and shared with the management 
Committee and Implementing Agencies 
• Secretariat will prepare technical reviews for 
the Technical Committee, quarterly progress 
reports and monthly financial reports for the 
Technical Committee, and provide semi-annual 
narratives and financial reports to the Steering 
Committee
• Donors may receive a diploma corresponding 
to the amount of the donor’s contribution 
to the reduction of carbon emissions from 
deforestation in the Amazon 
• Annual Report will publish list of donors, 
donated amounts, fund guidelines and 
priorities, results achieved, and financial and 
operational performance
PE
RF
OR
m
AN
CE
 
• management Committee will review semi-annual 
monitoring and evaluation reports prepared by 
Secretariat for submission to Developing Partners 
• monitoring matrix to track inputs, outputs, and 
outcomes will be developed with performance 
indicators
• Administration Agreement ensures funds used 
according to purposes and objectives agreed to by 
developing partners, the government of Bangladesh, 
and the World Bank
• Grant agreements govern use and disbursement of 
funds
• monitoring and Evaluation mechanism will 
be executed by the Technical Committee, 
and reports will be submitted regularly 
to the Steering Committee and interested 
stakeholders
• An independent auditor, appointed by the 
Steering Committee, will annually audit “policy 
compliance” and service providers
• Auditor appointed by the government of 
Indonesia will audit funds used by ministries
• Annual external audit conducted by a reputable 
institution 
• Auditing to verify resources used in line with 
purpose and guidelines, and outputs conform 
with national plans 
• Fund administered by BNDES, overseen by 
Advisory Committee and Auditing Committee
• Annual meetings with donors on continuation of 
funding
SA
FE
GU
AR
DS
• Procurement governed by World Bank policies and 
procedures
• World Bank safeguard measures ensure funds used 
for purposes specified in grant agreements with 
Implementing Agencies
• Projects abide by the Indonesian Government 
National Action Plan and yellow Book
• ICCTF should follow the principles of the 
Jakarta Commitments and Paris Declaration of 
Aid Effectiveness
• Funds are deposited in a dedicated account 
kept by BNDES and all transactions performed 
in full compliance with national and 
international standards and regulations
APPendix  A   cl imAte  Funds RevieWed
BAnglAdesh climAte chAnge Resilience Fund145 indonesiA climAte chAnge tRust Fund146 AmAzon Fund147
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APPendix B  ABBReviAtions
AF Adaptation Fund
AFB Adaptation Fund Board
Aosis Alliance of Small Island State
AWg-lcA Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action 
under the Convention
BAP Bali Action Plan
BccRF Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund
Bndes Brazilian National Bank for Development
cAit Climate Analysis Indicators Tool
ccgt/chP combined cycle gas turbine/combined heat and power
ccsAP Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (Bangladesh)
ccsR Climate Change Sectoral Roadmap (Indonesia)
cdm Clean Development mechanism
ceR Certified Emissions Reduction
cFm Carbon Finance mechanism
ciF Climate Investment Fund
cmP Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties
coP Conference of the Parties
ctF Clean Technology Fund
FAo Food and Agriculture Organization
FcPF Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
FiP Forest Investment Program
gAc Group Allocation Country
gBi Global Environment Facility Benefits Index
gdP gross domestic product
geF Global Environment Facility
ghg greenhouse gas
gnP gross national product
gPi Global Environment Facility Performance Index
icctF Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund
iFc International Finance Corporation
imF International monetary Fund 
iPcc Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ldc least developed country
ldcF Least Developed Countries Fund
ltms long-term mitigation scenarios
mdB multilateral development bank
mdtF multi-Donor Trust Fund
mie multilateral implementing entity
mou memorandum of understanding
mRv measureable, reportable, and verifiable
mW megawatt
nAmA nationally appropriate mitigation action
ngo non-governmental organization
nie national implementing entity
ods ozone depleting substances
PAd project appraisal document
PAs Sustainable Amazon Plan (Brazil)
Pcn project concept note
PPcdAm Prevention and Control of Deforestation of the Legal 
Amazon (Brazil)
PPcR Pilot Program on Climate Resilience
PPP purchasing power parity
RAF Resource Allocation Framework
RBm Results-Based management
RdB Regional Development Bank
Redd Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation in Developing Countries
Rm Readiness mechanism
R-Pin Readiness Plan Idea Note
R-PP Readiness Preparation Proposal
sccF Special Climate Change Fund
sids Small Island Developing States
stAP Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel
stAR System for Transparent Allocation of Resources
tAP Technical Advisory Panel
teAP Technical and Economic Advisory Panel
tFAA trust fund administration agreements
tFc Trust Fund Committee
undP United Nations Development Programme
uneP United Nations Environment Programme
unFccc United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change
unido United Nations Industrial Development Organization
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